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Rent Seeking (rent + seeking)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences50%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting50%

Selected Abstracts

Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920,381

ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 1 2009
JARI ELORANTA
Analysis of military acquisition policies in Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain in the period from 1920 to 1938 produces evidence of rent seeking, both quantitative and qualitative, in all three cases. The Finnish institutional environment offered the most extensive rents and collusion opportunities, which translated into tangible price advantages for domestic producers. The Swedish and British domestic producers operated under more efficient institutions and thus had to settle for more moderate rents. Evolving institutional environments determined the extent of the rent seeking. [source]

From rent seeking to human capital: a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008
Nils-Petter Lagerlöf
The latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing. Rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital. Adding shocks, in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource, the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking, interrupted by small, failed growth spurts, eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit. The model also generates a rise and fall of the so-called natural resource curse: before the takeoff, an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes; shortly after the takeoff, the effect is negative; and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks. Les auteurs présentent un modèle de croissance où les agents divisent leur temps entre la chasse aux rentes (sous la forme de concurrence pour la ressource existante) et le travail productif dans le secteur du capital humain. Cette dernière activité peut se faire dans le commerce ou le secteur manufacturier. La chasse aux rentes a des effets externes négatifs sur la productivité du capital humain. Si l'on injecte des chocs prenant la forme de fluctuations dans la taille de la ressource contestée, le modèle peut générer une longue période durant laquelle les revenus stagnent et le niveau de chasse aux rentes est élevé, période interrompue par des petits sursauts de croissance qui tournent court, et suivie éventuellement par une transition permanente à un sentier de croissance soutenue où, à la limite, les activités de chasse aux rentes disparaissent. Le modèle génère aussi l'apparition et la disparition de la malédiction des ressources naturelles: avant que la croissance prenne son envol, un accroissement de la taille de la ressource contestée a un effet positif sur les revenus; peu après le décollage, l'effet est négatif; et sur le sentier de croissance équilibrée, le taux de croissance des revenus per capita est indépendant des chocs sur la ressource. [source]

Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920,381

ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 1 2009
JARI ELORANTA
Analysis of military acquisition policies in Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain in the period from 1920 to 1938 produces evidence of rent seeking, both quantitative and qualitative, in all three cases. The Finnish institutional environment offered the most extensive rents and collusion opportunities, which translated into tangible price advantages for domestic producers. The Swedish and British domestic producers operated under more efficient institutions and thus had to settle for more moderate rents. Evolving institutional environments determined the extent of the rent seeking. [source]

Was Mancur a Maoist?

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2003
An Essay on Kleptocracy, Political Stability
Much of Mancur Olson's work explored the link between government structure and economic development. This paper provides a framework for thinking about this link that exposes both the powerful insights and the deep tensions in Olson's work. In The Rise and Decline of Nations Olson argued that instability was good for democratic accountability because it upset entrenched interests. In contrast, after the fall of the socialist regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, Olson argued that the stability of a single autocrat or "stationary bandit" was superior to the competitive rent seeking of competing "roving bandits." I argue that there is a real inconsistency in Olson's thinking on the role of stability and change in political life; I do this by developing the connections between Olson's classic Logic of Collective Action and his subsequent writing. The paper concludes by building on Olson's insights to point the way to a more complete analysis of democracy and transition. [source]

Environmental Values and Water Policy

GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003
Jeff Bennett
Abstract The emergence of water markets has heralded the prospect of increased efficiency in the use of the resource for extractive purposes. However, water markets have not encompassed all elements of demand for the resource. Notably, demands for the environmental public goods provided by river flows have not been revealed in markets. State Governments have instituted regulations requiring ,environmental flows' to be quarantined from the market allocation process. This policy has triggered negative responses from irrigators and conservationists. Lobby groups have found that the process of determining environmental flows is a prospective site for rent seeking. To avoid policy being driven by rent seeking, information on the costs and benefits of environmental flows is useful. Whereas the costs of environmental flows are readily assessed through reference to market data on irrigators' surpluses foregone, the benefits must be estimated through the use of non-market, stated preference valuation techniques. These techniques , including contingent valuation and choice modelling , remain controversial. Some argue that they should not be used on ethical grounds. Others argue that they cannot be used on technical grounds. These arguments are discussed in this paper, using the context of the water policy debate. The evidence is that stated preference techniques are being used, and applications have been performed in Australia in the context of riverine health. However their use remains restricted relative to the scale of the Australian natural resource management task. Some possible explanations for this limited up-take are provided along with some suggested ways forward. [source]

MULTIPLE-PRIZE CONTESTS , THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 1 2009
Dana Sisak
Abstract Multiple-prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics, patent and R&D races to tendering for (governmental) projects. Hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment. This survey attempts to outline, compare and evaluate the results from the literature. While a first prize always results in a positive incentive to invest effort, second and later prizes lead to ambiguous effects. Depending on the objective function, the characteristics of the individuals and the type of contest a different prize allocation is optimal. [source]

The Completely Decentralized City: The Case for Benefits Based Public Finance

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2001
Fed E. Foldvary
An alternative to centralized top-down city governance is a multi-level bottom-up structure based on small neighborhood contractual communities. This paper analyzes the voting rules and public finances of decentralized, contractual urban governance and the likely outcome of such a constitutional structure, substantially reduced transfer seeking or rent seeking. Tax and service substitution, with lower-level funding and services substituting for higher-level public finance, is the general process by which the governance would devolve. Land rent is the most feasible source of such decentralized public finance, and local communities could also engage in local currency and credit services. Some empirical examples demonstrate the implementation of some of these governance structures. [source]

From rent seeking to human capital: a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008
Nils-Petter Lagerlöf
The latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing. Rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital. Adding shocks, in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource, the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking, interrupted by small, failed growth spurts, eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit. The model also generates a rise and fall of the so-called natural resource curse: before the takeoff, an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes; shortly after the takeoff, the effect is negative; and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks. Les auteurs présentent un modèle de croissance où les agents divisent leur temps entre la chasse aux rentes (sous la forme de concurrence pour la ressource existante) et le travail productif dans le secteur du capital humain. Cette dernière activité peut se faire dans le commerce ou le secteur manufacturier. La chasse aux rentes a des effets externes négatifs sur la productivité du capital humain. Si l'on injecte des chocs prenant la forme de fluctuations dans la taille de la ressource contestée, le modèle peut générer une longue période durant laquelle les revenus stagnent et le niveau de chasse aux rentes est élevé, période interrompue par des petits sursauts de croissance qui tournent court, et suivie éventuellement par une transition permanente à un sentier de croissance soutenue où, à la limite, les activités de chasse aux rentes disparaissent. Le modèle génère aussi l'apparition et la disparition de la malédiction des ressources naturelles: avant que la croissance prenne son envol, un accroissement de la taille de la ressource contestée a un effet positif sur les revenus; peu après le décollage, l'effet est négatif; et sur le sentier de croissance équilibrée, le taux de croissance des revenus per capita est indépendant des chocs sur la ressource. [source]