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Rent Control (rent + control)
Selected AbstractsTHE IMPACT OF RENT CONTROLS IN NON-WALRASIAN MARKETS: AN AGENT-BASED MODELING APPROACHJOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2006Ralph Bradburd ABSTRACT We use agent-based models to consider rent ceilings in non-Walrasian housing markets, where bargaining between landlord and tenant leads to exchange at a range of prices. In the non-Walrasian setting agents who would be extramarginal in the Walrasian setting frequently are successful in renting, and actually account for a significant share of the units rented. This has several implications. First, rent ceilings above the Walrasian equilibrium price (WEP) can affect the market outcome. Second, rent ceilings that reduce the number of units rented do not necessarily reduce total market surplus. Finally, the distributional impact of rent controls differs from the Walrasian setting. [source] Efficiency Pricing, Tenancy Rent Control and Monopolistic LandlordsECONOMICA, Issue 278 2003Kaushik Basu This paper presents a model of ,tenancy rent control' where rent increases on, and evictions of, sitting tenants are prohibited but nominal rents for new tenants are unrestricted. If there is any inflation, landlords prefer to take short-staying tenants. If there is no way for landlords to tell a tenant's type, an adverse selection problem arises. If landlords have monoply power, then they may prefer not to raise the rent even when there is excess demand for housing. These ,efficiency rents' show that tenancy rent control can give rise to equilibria that look as if there were a flat ceiling on rents. [source] The Institutional Trap in the Czech Rental Sector: Nested Circuits of Power, Space, and InequalityECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 4 2005Stefan Buzar Abstract: An "institutional trap" is a sequence of misplaced regulatory steps that have increased the costs of institutional transformation to the level at which inefficient structures can remain stable, despite changes in the external economic environment. This is a common occurrence in Central and Eastern Europe because of the path-dependent nature of the postsocialist transformation process. This article examines the organizational and territorial transformations of housing, utility, and social welfare policies in the Czech Republic through a comparative analysis of institutional power geometries and household expenditures at the national scale. The results indicate that the Czech Republic is facing an institutional trap in the restructuring of its rent control and social welfare policies. The trap operates within three nested circuits: the power geometries of postsocialist reforms, the geographies of housing prices and social welfare, and the consumption patterns of disadvantaged households. The lock-in created by the trap can be resolved only through carefully targeted and synchronized social support and housing investment programs, parallel to rent liberalization. This article argues for comprehensive, rather than partial, solutions to the institutional trap and emphasizes the need for a deeper understanding of the relationships among institutions, space, and inequality. [source] Efficiency Pricing, Tenancy Rent Control and Monopolistic LandlordsECONOMICA, Issue 278 2003Kaushik Basu This paper presents a model of ,tenancy rent control' where rent increases on, and evictions of, sitting tenants are prohibited but nominal rents for new tenants are unrestricted. If there is any inflation, landlords prefer to take short-staying tenants. If there is no way for landlords to tell a tenant's type, an adverse selection problem arises. If landlords have monoply power, then they may prefer not to raise the rent even when there is excess demand for housing. These ,efficiency rents' show that tenancy rent control can give rise to equilibria that look as if there were a flat ceiling on rents. [source] THE IMPACT OF RENT CONTROLS IN NON-WALRASIAN MARKETS: AN AGENT-BASED MODELING APPROACHJOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2006Ralph Bradburd ABSTRACT We use agent-based models to consider rent ceilings in non-Walrasian housing markets, where bargaining between landlord and tenant leads to exchange at a range of prices. In the non-Walrasian setting agents who would be extramarginal in the Walrasian setting frequently are successful in renting, and actually account for a significant share of the units rented. This has several implications. First, rent ceilings above the Walrasian equilibrium price (WEP) can affect the market outcome. Second, rent ceilings that reduce the number of units rented do not necessarily reduce total market surplus. Finally, the distributional impact of rent controls differs from the Walrasian setting. [source] | ||||||||||