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Relationship-specific Investment (relationship-specific + investment)
Selected AbstractsKeiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier To Trade?INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2001Barbara J. Spencer This article develops a model of informal procurement within Japanese keiretsu so as to consider effects on intermediate-good imports, such as auto parts. Parts-suppliers make relationship-specific investments that benefit the automaker and prices are determined by bargaining after investment has been sunk. Although this investment raises efficiency, it limits the range of imports to less important parts, such as tailpipes, and it is possible that no parts are imported, despite lower foreign costs. Lack of information concerning investment rents combined with counterintuitive responses of imports to changes in output and costs could create unwarranted perceptions of a trade barrier. [source] Relationship Investment and Channel Performance: An Analysis of Mediating ForcesJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 7 2009Yadong Luo abstract This study explores how relationship-specific investment (RSI) enhances interfirm cooperation in buyer,supplier partnerships in an emerging market. Building upon the logic of economic sociology, we argue that the contribution of RSI to the success in buyer,supplier partnerships will be mediated by reduced opportunism and reduced conflict and by heightened commitment and knowledge sharing. Our survey of 216 paired distributors (buyers) and manufacturers (suppliers) in China generally supports this argument, leading to a conclusion that RSI is not a direct performance propeller but an important builder of relational infrastructure in which mid-range processes are nourished. Theoretical implications in strategic management and supply chain management research are highlighted. [source] Spillovers, Investment Incentives and the Property Rights Theory of the FirmTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2004David de Meza This paper examines the property rights theory of the firm when a manager's relationship-specific investment can be partially appropriated by the owner of an asset even if cooperation breaks down. The investments of non owners may then be devalued, but are seldom wholly lost to the owner. With such spillovers, the outside-option principle can be incorporated into the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework without implying that ownership demotivates. Enriched predictions on the determinants of integration emerge. [source] Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier To Trade?INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2001Barbara J. Spencer This article develops a model of informal procurement within Japanese keiretsu so as to consider effects on intermediate-good imports, such as auto parts. Parts-suppliers make relationship-specific investments that benefit the automaker and prices are determined by bargaining after investment has been sunk. Although this investment raises efficiency, it limits the range of imports to less important parts, such as tailpipes, and it is possible that no parts are imported, despite lower foreign costs. Lack of information concerning investment rents combined with counterintuitive responses of imports to changes in output and costs could create unwarranted perceptions of a trade barrier. [source] Contract Formalization and Governance of Exporter,Importer RelationshipsJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 3 2008Preet S. Aulakh abstract Exporting relationships between manufacturers and foreign importers pose unique coordination problems because, on the one hand, transactions are recurrent and both firms make non-trivial relationship-specific investments, but at the same time, the exchange partners maintain separate legal entities with individual profit claims. This study examines the role of contracts as a governance mechanism in these relationships that are neither market-based discrete transactions, nor can be governed through ownership-based hierarchies. Drawing upon recent research on contract law and interorganizational relationships, we develop and empirically test a model that incorporates both the antecedents and performance implications of the nature of contract governing exporter,importer relationships. [source] | ||||||||||