Regulatory Regimes (regulatory + regime)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Distribution within Humanities and Social Sciences


Selected Abstracts


Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory Regimes: The Saga of Leaky Buildings

LAW & POLICY, Issue 4 2003
Peter J. May
Regulatory reformers have widely endorsed greater use of a performance-based approach to regulation that defines objectives in terms of desired outcomes. The appeal of the performance-based approach is as much about introducing a regime that overcomes problems of overly rigid rules and inflexible enforcement as it is about regulating for results. The case of leaky buildings in New Zealand provides a cautionary tale of a flawed performance-based regulatory regime. It allowed for flexibility without sufficient accountability and in so doing showed the Achilles' heel of performance-based regulation. [source]


Regulatory regimes and accountability

REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2007
Peter J. May
Abstract This research considers accountability issues for new forms of regulation that shift the emphasis from prescribing actions to regulating systems or regulating for results. Shortfalls at various levels of accountability are identified from experiences with these regimes in the regulation of building and fire safety, food safety and nuclear power plant safety. These experiences illustrate how accountability shortfalls can undermine regulatory performance and introduce a potential for subtle forms of regulatory capture. These concerns underscore the importance of finding the right fit between regulatory circumstances and the design of regulatory regimes. [source]


Use of Forecasts of Earnings to Estimate and Compare Cost of Capital Across Regimes

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2006
Article first published online: 19 MAY 200, Peter Easton
Abstract: I critically examine several of the methods used in the recent literature to estimate and compare the cost of capital across different accounting/regulatory regimes. I focus on the central importance of expectations of growth beyond the short period for which forecasts of future pay-offs (dividends and/or earnings) are available. I illustrate, using the stocks that comprised the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) at December 31, 2004, as an example, the differences between the growth rates implied by the data, and growth rates that are often assumed in the literature. My analyses show that assumptions about growth beyond the (short) forecast horizon may seriously affect the estimates of the expected rate of return and may lead to spurious inferences. [source]


Evaluating extreme risks in invasion ecology: learning from banking compliance

DIVERSITY AND DISTRIBUTIONS, Issue 4 2008
James Franklin
ABSTRACT Increasing international trade has exacerbated the risks of ecological damage due to invasive pests and diseases. For extreme events such as invasions of damaging exotic species or natural catastrophes, there are no or very few directly relevant data, so expert opinion must be relied on heavily. Expert opinion must be as fully informed and calibrated as possible , by available data, by other experts, and by the reasoned opinions of stakeholders. We survey a number of quantitative and non-quantitative methods that have shown promise for improving extreme risk analysis, particularly for assessing the risks of invasive pests and pathogens associated with international trade. We describe the legally inspired regulatory regime for banks, where these methods have been brought to bear on extreme ,operational risks'. We argue that an ,advocacy model' similar to that used in the Basel II compliance regime for bank operational risks and to a lesser extent in biosecurity import risk analyses is ideal for permitting the diversity of relevant evidence about invasive species to be presented and soundly evaluated. We recommend that the process be enhanced in ways that enable invasion ecology to make more explicit use of the methods found successful in banking. [source]


Thalidomide, BSE and the single market: An historical-institutionalist approach to regulatory regimes in the European Union

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2007
SEBASTIAN KRAPOHL
In the last decade, the regulatory regime for pharmaceuticals has functioned without raising public concerns. The establishment of a European agency for pharmaceuticals in the early 1990s has been evaluated positively by both producers and consumers, and there have been no large scandals so far. At the same time, the food sector was subject to a whole range of crises, of which the BSE scandal was certainly the most significant one. In reaction to this, the regulatory regime for foodstuffs was reformed by setting up the European Food Safety Agency in 2002. This article adopts an historical-institutionalist approach, and thus tries to give an explanation for the striking differences between the two regulatory regimes. Accordingly, the development of supranational regulatory regimes is distinguished by two critical junctures: a crisis of consumer confidence and the establishment of a single market. It is crucial which of these occurred first. If a crisis of consumer confidence leads to the establishment of national regulatory authorities, these authorities act as stakeholders, which could be an obstacle for harmonization, but also ensures a necessary commitment to health and consumer protection once a single market is set up. If national regulatory authorities are missing, it might be easier to set up a single market, but a regulatory deficit is more likely to occur and, in case of a crisis, the whole regulatory regime has to be established at the supranational level. [source]


Worker representation in health and safety: options for regulatory reform

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 2 2002
Phil James
Worker representation in health and safety in Britain has received statutory support since the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977. Subsequent developments have, however, acted to undermine the effectiveness of these regulations. The paper consequently discusses a range of reforms that could be introduced to strengthen the present regulatory regime. [source]


Recent Changes in the Regulation of Financial Markets and Reporting in Canada,

ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVES, Issue 1 2007
Carla Carnaghan
ABSTRACT The regulation of financial reporting and financial markets has undergone significant change in both the United States and Canada since 2000. In Canada, the regulatory regime is particularly complex and politically controversial, with much speculation about possible future directions. This paper's purpose is to explain the current regulatory environment as it stands in mid-2006 to assist those who teach or conduct research in this domain. On the basis of a review of existing regulations and related studies, this paper first provides an explanation of the major jurisdictional issues that affect financial reporting and regulation in Canada, including identifying the roles of the key players. Second, it identifies specific reporting changes that might be of particular relevance to prospective capital market researchers. Where relevant, comparisons are made with regulatory provisions in the United States, because the majority of capital markets research concerns U.S. securities exchanges regulation, and the Canadian regulations themselves often refer to U.S. regulations as a point of comparison. We find that the lack of a single national securities regulator in Canada and overlaps in federal and provincial jurisdiction and among regulatory bodies mean there is a large range of players involved in financial markets regulation. Ongoing efforts to improve integration include the new passport system, improved harmonization of securities regulation, and consideration of mergers between some of the involved organizations. Other changes have led to a greater emphasis in Canada on the regulation of continuous disclosure and corporate governance than was previously the case. Changes in specific reporting regulations and guidelines since 2002 have generally increased the amount of disclosure. [source]


Corporate Governance in India

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2008
Rajesh Chakrabarti
The Indian corporate governance system has both supported and held back India's ascent to the top ranks of the world's economies. While on paper the country's legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the world, enforcement is a major problem, with overburdened courts and significant corruption. Ownership remains concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model, with significant pyramiding and evidence of tunneling activity that transfers cash flow and value from minority to controlling shareholders. But for all its shortcomings, Indian corporate governance has taken major steps toward becoming a system capable of inspiring confidence among institutional and, increasingly, foreign investors. The Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI), which was established as part of the comprehensive economic reforms launched in 1991, has made considerable progress in becoming a rigorous regulatory regime that helps ensure transparency and fair practice. And the National Stock Exchange of India, also established as part of the reforms, now functions with enough efficiency and transparency to be generating the third-largest number of trades in the world, just behind the NASDAQ and NYSE. Among more recent changes, the enactment of Sarbanes,Oxley type measures in 2004,which includes protections for minority shareholders in family- or "promoter"-led businesses,has contributed to recent increases in institutional and foreign stock ownership. And while family- and government-controlled business groups continue to be the rule, India has also seen the rise of successful companies like Infosys that are free of the influence of a dominant family or group and have made the individual shareholder their central governance focus. [source]


Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory Regimes: The Saga of Leaky Buildings

LAW & POLICY, Issue 4 2003
Peter J. May
Regulatory reformers have widely endorsed greater use of a performance-based approach to regulation that defines objectives in terms of desired outcomes. The appeal of the performance-based approach is as much about introducing a regime that overcomes problems of overly rigid rules and inflexible enforcement as it is about regulating for results. The case of leaky buildings in New Zealand provides a cautionary tale of a flawed performance-based regulatory regime. It allowed for flexibility without sufficient accountability and in so doing showed the Achilles' heel of performance-based regulation. [source]


Speaking Softly Without Big Sticks: Meta-Regulation and Public Sector Audit

LAW & POLICY, Issue 3 2003
Colin Scott
Australian government has undergone an "audit explosion" in the last twenty years. This article observes, first, that the constitutional function of public sector audit institutions (AIs) gives them a strong cultural commitment to the assessment of the regularity and legality of public expenditure. New functions connected with performance audit and evaluation of nonfinancial performance indicators are liable to be interpreted through the lens of these more traditional concerns. The second observation is that, if we think in terms of "regimes" of financial control, we find that AIs form only part of the overall regulatory regime. This calls into question the coherence and potential for effectiveness of regimes of financial control. However, AIs could also be conceived as "meta-regulators" with the capacity to steer the self-regulatory capacities of public sector organizations in respect of financial controls. Auditors may be effective as meta-regulators through speaking softly, even though they demonstrably lack big sticks. [source]


The impact of privatization and regulation on the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales: a translog cost function model

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 6 2000
David S Saal
After the ten Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) of England and Wales were privatized in November 1989, the successor Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) faced a new regulatory regime that was designed to promote economic efficiency while simultaneously improving drinking water and environmental quality. As legally mandated quality improvements necessitated a costly capital investment programme, the industry's economic regulator, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), implemented a retail price index (RPI)+K pricing system, which was designed to compensate the WASCs for their capital investment programme while also encouraging gains in economic efficiency. In order to analyse jointly the impact of privatization, as well as the impact of increasingly stringent economic and environmental regulation on the WASCs' economic performance, this paper estimates a translog multiple output cost function model for the period 1985,1999. Given the significant costs associated with water quality improvements, the model is augmented to include the impact of drinking water quality and environmental quality on total costs. The model is then employed to determine the extent of scale and scope economies in the water and sewerage industry, as well as the impact of privatization and economic regulation on economic efficiency. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


The Audit Commission: guiding, steering and regulating local government

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 3 2003
Josie Kelly
How does the non-executant state ensure that its agents are fulfilling their obligations to deliver nationally determined policies? In the case of elected local government in England and Wales, this function is carried out by the Audit Commission (AC) for Local Authorities and the Health Service for England and Wales. Since being established in 1983, it is the means by which local authorities are held to account by central government, both for its own purposes and on behalf of other interested stakeholders. Although the primary function of the AC is to ensure that local authorities are fulfilling their obligations, it does so by using different methods. By acting as a regulator, an independent expert, an opinion former and a mediator, the AC steers local authorities to ensure that they are compliant with the regulatory regime and are implementing legislation properly. [source]


Food Safety Regulation and the Conflict of Interest: The Case of MeatSafety and E. Coli 0157

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 3 2000
Richard Schofield
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) aims to remove the longstanding conflict of interest between producers and consumers which is thought to lie at the heart of the rising number of food safety problems of recent years, to restore consumer confidence, and to protect public health. This paper sets out firstly to understand what the conflicts are, how they arise and their implications for food safety, and secondly to provide some means of evaluating the proposals for the Food Standards Agency. It does this by examining the current food safety regulatory regime as it relates to e. coli 0157, one of the problems that gave rise to the FSA and an exemplar of the problems of meat safety, and places it in its wider economic context. The results show that the financial pressures on the food industry were such that food hygiene was largely dependent upon external regulation and enforcement. But the deficiencies in the conception, design and implementation of the Food Safety Act, which was fundamentally deregulatory and privileged producer interests, permitted the food safety problems to grow. The case also, by illustrating how the interests of big business predominate in the formulation of public policy at the expense of the public, reveals how the class nature of the state affects public policy and social relations. Without addressing these issues, the problems they give rise to will remain. While the case is based on experiences in Britain, the problem of food safety and the issues raised have an international significance. [source]


The effectiveness of the telecommunications regulatory regime: the case of Sri Lanka telecom

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2006
Asoka Balasooriya
Abstract This article examines the telecommunications industry in Sri Lanka and assesses the effectiveness of regulatory arrangements associated with the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry, from a management point of view. The review focuses on the scope of services, price and the quality of services available to customers after the liberalisation. This study finds that, despite the early establishment of the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) to monitor the telecommunications industry, its interventions have been only partially successful in making it conducive to service providers and customers. While liberalisation of the telecommunications industry has been favoured, the role of the regulator has been controversial with regard to its independence, impartiality, capability, transparency and accountability. We argue that the current model has failed to create favourable market conditions under the circumstances prevailing in the country, and hence a more appropriate model is yet to be developed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Mutual, non-profit or public interest company?

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2002
An evaluation of options for the ownership, control of water utilities
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate various organizational models for the ownership and control of natural monopolies , specifically the infrastructure of water and sewage provision in England and Wales. First, it summarizes recent discussion of who should own water assets in Britain. The paper notes the opportunity that has arisen for increased consumer involvement, and examines the relative merits of three models that have been suggested as alternatives: a non-profit trust or company, a public interest company, and a consumer mutual. Five criteria are suggested for evaluating the merits of each type: its ability to safeguard the interests of the most important stakeholder, the consumer; avoid the necessity for a heavy regulatory regime; incentivize management to manage efficiently but without ,producer capture'; raise capital relatively cheaply; and resist pressures to demutualize. The paper agrees with the recent paper in this Journal by Morse (2000) that, in theory, the consumer mutual has advantages. It draws on Hansmann's work that suggests consumer ownership of water would be less costly than investor-ownership, providing there are no large conflicts of interest between different types of consumer. Hansmann's thesis is expanded to consider the likely benefits from wider member participation, and the hidden costs of not taking members into account. It then tests out whether customers would be motivated in practice to be active members, introducing a theoretical model of what motivates members of co-operatives and mutuals to participate. The conclusions are that provided managers and board members are committed to encouraging member participation, the consumer mutual model would work well. It would need only light regulation, would avoid producer capture, and would be able to raise capital fairly easily, both from money markets and from members. It would need legislation to prevent it from being demutualized at some time in the future. However, if a participatory corporate culture cannot be guaranteed, or if there is a risk of decline of participation over time, other options such as a non-profit trust or a public interest company would be less risky. [source]


Public Sector Banks in India: Rationale and Prerequisites for reform

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2002
T.G. Arun
This paper contributes to the debate on public sector banks by suggesting several rationales for government ownership of banks in India. The paper then proceeds to argue that due to high economic costs, the current public sector banking system is unsustainable. Although a policy of wider private ownership was introduced in the 1990s, it is suggested that there are several prerequisites to be met before such a reform can be more fully implemented. It is argued that these prerequisites arise from the rationales for government ownership, and they include a credible bank regulatory regime, and government promotion of co-operative banks and credit unions. [source]


The Force of Law: Australian Auditing Standards and Their Impact on the Auditing Profession

AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 1 2009
Angela Hecimovic
This study examines the impact of the introduction of the legally enforceable Australian Auditing Standards (ASAs) on the auditing profession after the first year of implementation. The study compliments and extends the Australian Government's April 2006 pre-implementation Regulation Impact Statement, which identified potential costs, benefits and other impacts of the new regulatory regime. Relevant data were collected through interviews with the key stakeholders. Overall, the results suggest that the additional burden of compliance with the legally enforceable ASAs has not increased perceived audit quality or public confidence, which were the main aims of the government's regulatory intervention. [source]


Board Monitoring, Regulation, and Performance in the Banking Industry: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2010
Jens Hagendorff
ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: The specific monitoring effect of boards of directors versus industry regulation is unclear. In this paper, we examine how the interaction between bank-level monitoring and regulatory regimes influences the announcement period returns of acquiring banks in the US and twelve European economies. Research Findings/Insights: We study three board monitoring mechanisms , independence, CEO-chair duality, and diversity , and analyze their effectiveness in preventing underperforming merger strategies under bank regulators of varying strictness. Only under strict banking regulation regimes, do board independence and diversity improve acquisition performance. In less strict regulatory environments, corporate governance is virtually irrelevant in improving the performance outcomes of merger activities. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results indicate a complementary role between monitoring by boards and bank regulation. This study is the first to report evidence consistent with complementarity by investigating the effectiveness (rather than the prevalence) of governance arrangements across regulatory regimes. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our work offers insights to policymakers charged with improving the quality of decision-making at financial institutions. Attempts to improve the ability of bank boards to critically assess managerial initiatives are most likely to be successful if internal governance is accompanied by strict industry regulation. [source]


Thalidomide, BSE and the single market: An historical-institutionalist approach to regulatory regimes in the European Union

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2007
SEBASTIAN KRAPOHL
In the last decade, the regulatory regime for pharmaceuticals has functioned without raising public concerns. The establishment of a European agency for pharmaceuticals in the early 1990s has been evaluated positively by both producers and consumers, and there have been no large scandals so far. At the same time, the food sector was subject to a whole range of crises, of which the BSE scandal was certainly the most significant one. In reaction to this, the regulatory regime for foodstuffs was reformed by setting up the European Food Safety Agency in 2002. This article adopts an historical-institutionalist approach, and thus tries to give an explanation for the striking differences between the two regulatory regimes. Accordingly, the development of supranational regulatory regimes is distinguished by two critical junctures: a crisis of consumer confidence and the establishment of a single market. It is crucial which of these occurred first. If a crisis of consumer confidence leads to the establishment of national regulatory authorities, these authorities act as stakeholders, which could be an obstacle for harmonization, but also ensures a necessary commitment to health and consumer protection once a single market is set up. If national regulatory authorities are missing, it might be easier to set up a single market, but a regulatory deficit is more likely to occur and, in case of a crisis, the whole regulatory regime has to be established at the supranational level. [source]


Public Provision for Urban Water: Getting Prices and Governance Right

GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2008
EDUARDO ARARAL
Public sector monopolies are often associated with inefficiencies and inability to meet rising demand. Scholars attribute this to fundamental problems associated with public provision: (1) a tradition of below-cost pricing due to populist pressures, (2) owner,regulator conflicts of interest, and (3) perverse organizational incentives arising from non-credible threat of bankruptcy, weak competition, rigidities, and agency and performance measurement problems. Many governments worldwide have shifted to private provision, but recent experience in urban water utilities in developing countries has shown their limitations because of weak regulatory regimes compounded by inherent problems of information, incentives, and commitment. This article examines the paradoxical case of the Phnom Penh Water Supply in Cambodia to illustrate how public provision of urban water can be substantially improved by getting prices and governance right. Findings have implications for the search for solutions to provide one billion people worldwide with better access to potable water. [source]


Similar Ends, Differing Means: Contractualism and Civil Service Reform in Denmark and New Zealand

GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2004
Robert Gregory
State sector reform was an integral component of the radical economic and social policy changes enacted by New Zealand governments between 1984 and 1991. This reform replaced the traditional tenured public service with a contractual regime. Through a comparison with Denmark, it is shown that New Zealand's reforms were not unique. Similar reforms were enacted in Denmark. But contrary to what occurred in New Zealand, the Danish reforms had already begun in the 1960s, and have since been gradually expanded. The parallel contractual regimes introduced in the two countries are accounted for by an increasing demand among politicians to secure a civil service that is responsive to political executive demands. However, because of institutional differences and diverging regulatory regimes, the strategic approaches in the two countries have been different. Whereas the New Zealand approach was dominated by an appeal to a coherent and sophisticated body of theoretical knowledge, combined with strict formalization, the Danish strategy has been based on political bargaining with the civil service unions. In both cases the reforms rest on critical assumptions regarding their positive and negative implications. [source]


Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 2 2004
Anne-Marie Slaughter
Networks of government officials , police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators , are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century. Yet, these networks present significant accountability and legitimacy concerns. This article identifies and responds to the potential problems of government networks by suggesting means to increase their accountability and proposing norms to govern the relations of members of government networks with one another. Finally, the article develops the concept of disaggregated sovereignty, arguing that government networks have the capacity to enter into international regulatory regimes of various types and thereby are independently bound by the existing corpus of international law. [source]


Higher Education, Further Education and the English Experiment

HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2009
Gareth Parry
England has a two-sector system of higher education and further education. Shaped by legislation in 1988 and 1992, the architecture of this system was intended to concentrate each type of education in separate institutions and separate sectors. In recognition of these different missions, each territory came under different funding and regulatory regimes, with little or no movement of institutions anticipated between sectors. These arrangements continue, although Government policy is now to support and expand higher education in further education colleges. This policy turnaround is part of a larger strategy or experiment to change the future pattern of demand for, and supply of, undergraduate education. However, the college contribution to this new higher education is neither co-ordinated nor protected. Rather, further education colleges compete as well as collaborate with institutions in the higher education sector, under conditions of complexity, uncertainty and dependency. [source]


Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2002
Colin Scott
The centrality of regulation among the tools deployed by governments is well established in the social science literature. Regulation of public sector bodies by non-state organizations is an important but neglected aspect of contemporary governance arrangements. Some private regulators derive both authority and power from a legal mandate for their activities. Statutory powers are exercised by private regulators where they are delegated or contracted out. Contractual powers take collective (for example, self-regulatory) and individuated forms. But a further important group of private regulators, operating both nationally and internationally, lack a legal mandate and yet have the capacity to exercise considerable power in constraining governments and public agencies. In a number of cases private regulators operate more complete regulatory regimes (in the sense of controlling standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement elements) than is true of public regulators. While private regulators may enhance the scrutiny given to public bodies (and thus enhance regimes of control and accountability), their existence suggests a need to identify the conditions under which such private power is legitimately held and used. One such condition is the existence of appropriate mechanisms for controlling or checking power. Such controls may take the classic form of public oversight, but may equally be identified in the checks exercised by participation in communities or markets. [source]


Constructing Reform Coalitions: The Politics of Compensations in Argentina's Economic Liberalization

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 3 2001
Sebastián Etchemendy
ABSTRACT It is frequently argued that the key to "successful" economic liberalization is to marginalize interest groups that profit from existing regulatory regimes. This paper contends that some established interests can craft public policies to protect their rents in the new market setting. The state may shape the interests of social actors and create proreform constituencies out of old populist and interventionist groups. In Argentina, this coalition building was achieved by constructing reform policies that granted rents in new markets to business and organized labor and by deliberately avoiding unilateral deregulation in sectors where reform would hurt traditionally powerful actors. This argument is developed through a comparative analysis of policy reform in the labor market institutions and protected industrial sectors, areas where the costs of deregulation are said to be unavoidable for the established actors. [source]


Control Modes in the Age of Transnational Governance

LAW & POLICY, Issue 3 2008
DIRK LEHMKUHL
The article starts with the observation that there are overlaps in, so far, largely unrelated research programs concerned with the legalization in international relations, on the one hand, and transnational regulation and governance, on the other. The analysis of the literature at the interface between the "fourth strata of the geology of international law" and the "governance in the age of regulation" literatures reveals a substantial common interest in structures of transnational regulatory governance. At the same time, the theoretical toolkit of both strands of literature does not match the task of coping analytically with structures and processes in the overlapping realm. To sharpen the analytical edge, the article elaborates hierarchy, market, community, and design as four ideal types of control modes in transnational regulatory spaces. The application of this model to the empirical analysis of a number of regimes underpins the observation that control frequently occurs in hybrid regulatory constellations involving public and private actors across national and international levels. A key example concerns the prominence of domestic regulatory regimes in underpinning transnational governance processes, where national rules achieve extraterritorial effect as much through competitive as through hierarchical mechanisms. [source]


Regulation of Technology Transfer to Developing Countries: The Relevance of Institutional Capacity,

LAW & POLICY, Issue 1 2005
KEVIN E. DAVIS
This article revisits the debate over appropriate approaches to the regulation of technology transfer to developing countries. It begins by contrasting two stylized approaches, labeled for convenience the "New International Economic Order" model and the "Globalization" model, which have historically struggled for acceptance. It then explores the implications for the choice between these or alternative models of the fact that many developing countries presently lack the institutional capacity required to provide optimal regulation of technology transfer. Existing discussions appear either to assume that developing countries possess sufficient institutional capacity to design and implement sophisticated regulatory regimes, or to take the opposite approach and assume a drastic shortage of institutional capacity. Both approaches ignore the intermediate category of countries that do face constraints upon institutional capacity but are striving to overcome them. The analysis here is intended to demonstrate the general point that a country's present and future institutional capacity ought to be considered highly relevant to the design of central aspects of the regime that it uses to regulate technology transfer. The analysis is also designed to highlight the specific need for attention to the distinctive questions of regulatory design which arise in countries that are in the process of enhancing their institutional capacity in this and other regulatory contexts. [source]


Regulating Contested Local Hazards: Is Constructive Dialogue Possible Among Participants in Community Risk Management?

POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 3 2000
Angela C. Halfacre
This article uses focus group data to explore the connection between scientific uncertainty about environmental risks and the emergence of distrust among local populations, regulators, and technical experts affected by those risks. With data from a nationwide study of issues associated with the cleanup of U.S. nuclear weapons facilities, the article uses "dialogue theory" and focus group data from three locations to identify the sources of miscommunication and distrust among these actors. The authors conclude that, despite problems with perception and communication among these groups, enough common ground exists to be optimistic about expanding participation for all affected groups in the policymaking process. In fact, expanded participation should diminish the distrust developed from previous regulatory regimes. [source]


Counting on codes: An examination of transnational codes as a regulatory governance mechanism for nanotechnologies

REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2009
Diana M. Bowman
Abstract This article examines the rise of nanotechnology-specific codes of conduct (nano-codes) as a private governance mechanism to manage potential risks and promote the technology. It examines their effectiveness as well as their legitimacy as regulatory instruments in the public domain. The study first maps the rise of voluntary nano-codes and the roles played by different actors. Focusing on five specific nano-codes, the article then discusses their adequacy in terms of scientific uncertainty, gaps in existing regulatory regimes, and broader societal concerns. It concludes that these voluntary nano-codes have weaknesses including a lack of explicit standards on which to base independent monitoring, as well as no sanctions for poor compliance. At the same time it also highlights the potential power of these governance mechanisms under conditions of uncertainty and co-regulation with government. It is likely that nano-codes will become the "first cut" of a new governance regime for nanotechnologies. [source]


Regulatory regimes and accountability

REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2007
Peter J. May
Abstract This research considers accountability issues for new forms of regulation that shift the emphasis from prescribing actions to regulating systems or regulating for results. Shortfalls at various levels of accountability are identified from experiences with these regimes in the regulation of building and fire safety, food safety and nuclear power plant safety. These experiences illustrate how accountability shortfalls can undermine regulatory performance and introduce a potential for subtle forms of regulatory capture. These concerns underscore the importance of finding the right fit between regulatory circumstances and the design of regulatory regimes. [source]