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Regulatory Provisions (regulatory + provision)
Selected AbstractsRecent Changes in the Regulation of Financial Markets and Reporting in Canada,ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVES, Issue 1 2007Carla Carnaghan ABSTRACT The regulation of financial reporting and financial markets has undergone significant change in both the United States and Canada since 2000. In Canada, the regulatory regime is particularly complex and politically controversial, with much speculation about possible future directions. This paper's purpose is to explain the current regulatory environment as it stands in mid-2006 to assist those who teach or conduct research in this domain. On the basis of a review of existing regulations and related studies, this paper first provides an explanation of the major jurisdictional issues that affect financial reporting and regulation in Canada, including identifying the roles of the key players. Second, it identifies specific reporting changes that might be of particular relevance to prospective capital market researchers. Where relevant, comparisons are made with regulatory provisions in the United States, because the majority of capital markets research concerns U.S. securities exchanges regulation, and the Canadian regulations themselves often refer to U.S. regulations as a point of comparison. We find that the lack of a single national securities regulator in Canada and overlaps in federal and provincial jurisdiction and among regulatory bodies mean there is a large range of players involved in financial markets regulation. Ongoing efforts to improve integration include the new passport system, improved harmonization of securities regulation, and consideration of mergers between some of the involved organizations. Other changes have led to a greater emphasis in Canada on the regulation of continuous disclosure and corporate governance than was previously the case. Changes in specific reporting regulations and guidelines since 2002 have generally increased the amount of disclosure. [source] A Revised Role for Trade Unions as Designed by New Labour: The Representation Pyramid and ,Partnership'JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 3 2002Tonia Novitz A key objective of British unions is to develop their representative role so as to establish their relevance to the workforce and thereby reverse the overall decline in trade union membership. To many, the legislative reforms undertaken by New Labour since 1999 offer some hope that this can be achieved. These reforms seem to provide a pyramid of representation, whereby trade unions can establish their relevance when they ,accompany' individual employees in grievance and disciplinary proceedings, and when they act as recipients of information and consultation. By attracting members in this fashion, there would seem to be the promise that unions can reascend to the position of recognized and effective parties in collective bargaining. However, this paper suggests that a barrier to the achievement of this objective is the particular conception of ,partnership' adopted by New Labour, which deviates from that of the TUC. This ,partnership' is essentially individualistic in character, procedural in form, and unitary in specification. These characteristics are reflected in the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions and are therefore likely to inhibit the progression of a trade union to recognition in collective bargaining. [source] The Shadows of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the Problem of Regulatory ConflictLAW & POLICY, Issue 4 2003Fiona Haines Regulatory analyses often assume that compliance is desirable, with literature focusing on strategies to encourage "excellence" in adherence to regulatory goals. Yet, it is not unusual for disparate regulatory goals to exist that are based on competing values of what constitutes the "good society." It is this conflict that forms the substance of this paper. In cases of competing regulatory goals, techniques that encourage exemplary compliance in one area can create incentives to breach regulatory provisions of a competing regime. In such cases, generic regulatory techniques are unable to provide a useful means for resolving regulatory conflict but do allow a political delegation of conflict resolution to the "scientific" strategies of the regulator. In turn, the regulator places responsibility on companies for resolving competing regulatory demands. Successive delegation leads to juridification as well as regulators vying to retain primacy for their regime. This problem is examined through analysis of responsibilities for subcontractor safety under Australian health and safety law and sections of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 aimed at protecting competition. [source] The Australian grocery industry: a competition perspective,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2006Rhonda L. Smith This article discusses whether at a theoretical level the large and growing role of the vertically integrated supermarket chains raises a buyer-power concern because of potential harm to other retailers, suppliers, and/or consumers. Even if this is possible, whether it is a real concern depends on whether provision exists to constrain the exercise of that power through market responses, such as entry, or through regulatory provisions, such as those contained in the Trade Practices Act. [source] |