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Regulatory Powers (regulatory + power)
Selected AbstractsDelegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed PolityEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2002Giandomenico Majone It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation-of-powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ,mixed government',a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ,estates' representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation-of-powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule-making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ,regulatory estate'. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need. [source] Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are IncompleteJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2010DAVID BARTOLINI The investment of a regulated firm affects the service/good provided on many dimensions. Should an integrated regulator take care of them all? Or is it better to have separate regulators responsible for them? We analyze the effect of the separation of regulatory powers on the regulated firm's,ex ante,incentive to invest in a "cooperative" innovation. The effects of the innovation are not verifiable and the cost of investing is sunk, hence, there is a problem of hold-up. We find that when the innovation produces opposite effects the,ex ante,firm's incentive to invest is larger in the case of separation than in the case of integrated regulation. We also stress the risk of over-investment that the separation of regulatory powers may induce. We maintain that along with classical incentive regulation,which mainly provides incentives for the firm to be efficient,the separation of regulatory powers may play a role in providing an incentive for cooperative innovations. [source] Land Commodification: New Land Development and Politics in China since the Late 1990sINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2009JIANG XU Abstract This article examines the development of the land market in China since the late 1990s. It analyses new practices in which urban space is commodified through ad hoc market development, and argues that the structure of the land market is indeed becoming more complicated and that land sales are pervasive and rampant. Under such circumstances, the state has rearticulated its function in land governance in order to apply a more consolidated regulatory power. The politics behind the development of the land market and the rearticulation of the state are explored with reference to the changing role of the state in land commodification. It is argued that, if we understand the market as an emerging institution, the development of the market has been supported by the state. Regulatory land control is becoming a new way for the state to be involved in space commodification. Résumé Cet article porte sur l'évolution du marché foncier en Chine depuis la fin des années 1990. Il analyse de nouvelles pratiques par lesquelles l'espace urbain est marchandiséà travers le développement de marchés spécifiques; de plus, il montre que la structure du marché foncier devient vraiment plus compliquée et que les ventes de terrains se généralisent à grande échelle. Face à cette situation, l'État a réorganisé sa fonction en matière de gouvernance foncière afin d'exercer un pouvoir régulateur plus intégré. La politique à la base de l'essor du marché foncier et la réorganisation étatique sont examinées au regard du nouveau rôle de l'État dans la marchandisation des terrains. Si on considère le marché comme une institution émergente, son développement a donc reçu le soutien de l'État. Ce dernier trouve dans le contrôle régulateur du foncier une nouvelle façon d'être partie prenante dans la marchandisation de l'espace. [source] Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed PolityEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2002Giandomenico Majone It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation-of-powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ,mixed government',a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ,estates' representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation-of-powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule-making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ,regulatory estate'. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need. [source] The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of ParliamentarizationGOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2002Giandomenico MajoneArticle first published online: 17 DEC 200 The idea of an inevitable process of centralization in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) is a myth. Also, the metaphor of "creeping competences," with its suggestion of a surreptitious but continuous growth of the powers of the Commission, can be misleading. It is true that the functional scope of EC/EU competences has steadily increased, but the nature of new competences has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the evolution of the methods of harmonization. The original emphasis on total harmonization, which gives the Community exclusive competence over a given policy area, has been largely replaced by more flexible but less "communitarian" methods such as optional and minimum harmonization, reference to nonbinding technical standards, and mutual recognition. Finally, the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam explicitly excluded harmonization for most new competences. Thus, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU has not automatically increased the powers of the Commission, but has actually weakened them in several respects. In addition, the progressive parliamentarization of the Commission risks compromising its credibility as an independent regulator, without necessarily enhancing its democratic legitimacy. Since the member states continue to oppose any centralization of regulatory powers, even in areas essential to the functioning of the internal market, the task of implementing Community policies should be entrusted to networks of independent national and European regulators, roughly modeled on the European System of Central Banks. The Commission would coordinate and monitor the activities of these networks in order to ensure the coherence of EC regulatory policies. More generally, it should bring its distinctive competence more clearly into focus by concentrating on the core business of ensuring the development and proper functioning of the single European market. This is a more modest role than that of the kernel of a future government of Europe, but it is essential to the credibility of the integration process and does not overstrain the limited financial and legitimacy resources available to the Commission. [source] Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are IncompleteJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2010DAVID BARTOLINI The investment of a regulated firm affects the service/good provided on many dimensions. Should an integrated regulator take care of them all? Or is it better to have separate regulators responsible for them? We analyze the effect of the separation of regulatory powers on the regulated firm's,ex ante,incentive to invest in a "cooperative" innovation. The effects of the innovation are not verifiable and the cost of investing is sunk, hence, there is a problem of hold-up. We find that when the innovation produces opposite effects the,ex ante,firm's incentive to invest is larger in the case of separation than in the case of integrated regulation. We also stress the risk of over-investment that the separation of regulatory powers may induce. We maintain that along with classical incentive regulation,which mainly provides incentives for the firm to be efficient,the separation of regulatory powers may play a role in providing an incentive for cooperative innovations. [source] Institutional arrangements for managing the great lakes of the world: Results of a workshop on implementing the watershed approachLAKES & RESERVOIRS: RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2001Lisa Borre Abstract The conceptual framework for lake management has evolved at an accelerating rate in recent years to include the basic principles of a watershed approach: (i) citizen and stakeholder involvement is important throughout the planning and management process; (ii) the geographic focus for management activities includes the lake and its entire watershed; and (iii) mechanisms need to be in place to promote cooperation among different government jurisdictions and organizations in the watershed. Creating effective institutional arrangements for implementing this watershed approach in lake regions is perhaps the most challenging and important issue facing the world's lakes. LakeNet organized a workshop at the 8th International Conference on the Conservation and Management of Lakes in May 1999. This article is a synthesis of the results of the workshop and the eight case reports prepared by the workshop participants published in this special issue. Seven major threats to lakes were identified: (i) accelerated eutrophication; (ii) invasive species; (iii) toxic contamination; (iv) overfishing; (v) water diversion, (vi) acidification; and (vii) climate change. Institutions and institutional arrangements for addressing these issues and for implementing a watershed approach are just beginning to emerge on lakes around the world. All of the institutions described in the case reports were established or formalized during the 1980s and 1990s. The legal mechanisms creating these institutions range from cooperative agreements among jurisdictions for purposes of policy and planning to national laws and international treaties with full regulatory powers. The knowledge base, political will and financial resources for these activities were very small in comparison with the complexity of the task at hand. [source] POWER LEARNING OR PATH DEPENDENCY?PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2 2010INVESTIGATING THE ROOTS OF THE EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY A key motive for establishing the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was restoring public confidence in the wake of multiplying food scares and the BSE crisis. Scholars, however, have paid little attention to the actual political and institutional logics that shaped this new organization. This article explores the dynamics underpinning the making of EFSA. We examine the way in which learning and power shaped its organizational architecture. It is demonstrated that the lessons drawn from the past and other models converged on the need to delegate authority to an external agency, but diverged on its mandate, concretely whether or not EFSA should assume risk management responsibilities. In this situation of competitive learning, power and procedural politics conditioned the mandate granted to EFSA. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council shared a common interest in preventing the delegation of regulatory powers to an independent EU agency in food safety policy. [source] | |||||||||||||