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Regulatory Model (regulatory + model)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	37%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	37%

Selected Abstracts

Testing the Regulatory Model: The Expansion of Stansted Airport

FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2004
DAVID STARKIE
This paper examines the application of price-cap regulation to the UK airport industry, with particular reference to the expansion of London-Stansted. This expansion is relevant to the debate concerning investment incentives inherent in the RPI,X approach and whether the UK style of regulation encourages the ,sweating of assets' at the expense of new investment. Stansted's expansion also suggests a willingness of the authorities to accept the leveraging of market power in pursuit of perceived public-interest goals; it provides an insight into the behaviour of economic agents when capital market disciplines are mute; and it illustrates some unintended consequences that can follow from market intervention. [source]

Business,Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games in European Utility Markets

GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2005
DAVID COENArticle first published online: 13 JUN 200
Although regulation is on the rise in the European Union, the liberalization of the telecommunication and energy markets has not created a uniform European Regulatory model. The principle focus of this article is to examine the interaction and regulatory learning between national regulatory authorities and business in the U.K. and German utility markets to assess the degree of convergence and demonstrate how the regulatory relationship has evolved beyond that envisaged in the initial delegation of powers to the regulator. The article shows that independent regulatory authorities have moved from distant and often confrontational relationships with business to strategic working relationships driven by exchanges of information and reputation building and that regulatory learning and trust have evolved at distinct speeds in sectors and countries depending on the number of regulatory authorities in a market place, the degree to which there are concurrent powers between authorities, their discretion in the consultation process, and the length of time that regulatory authorities had existed. Consequently, significant variance is continuously seen in the business,regulator relationships in comparing the young legalist German regulatory authorities with the established independent and discretion-based regulators in the U.K. [source]

Assessing the regulatory model for water supply in Jakarta

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 4 2008
Michiko Iwanami
Abstract This article assesses the regulatory model for urban water supply services in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. Water supply services have been privately operated there since February 1998 after two companies,Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ), operating in Eastern Jakarta, and PAM Lyonnaise Jaya (PALYJA), operating in Western Jakarta,signed 25-years concession contracts with the state-owned Jakarta City Water Company (PAM Jaya). An independent regulatory body, the Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) was established in 2001. The article compares the regulatory system in Jakarta with the French and English approaches to water regulation. It then assesses this regulatory system from the perspective of customers in order to assess how well customer protection, a central purpose of regulation, is being performed. The article concludes that although the essential regulatory mechanisms and activities are operating in Jakarta, the key regulatory role of customer protection is not being performed because customers do not perceive that they receive an acceptable level of water supply services. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Legitimacy for a Supranational European Political Order,Derivative, Regulatory or Deliberative?

RATIO JURIS, Issue 1 2002
Massimo La Torre
This paper discusses some models purported to legitimise a European supranational legal order. In particular, the author focuses on an application of the so-called regulatory model to the complex structure of the European Community and the European Union. First of all, he tackles the very concept of legitimacy, contrasting it with both efficacy and efficiency. Secondly, he summarises the most prominent positions in the long-standing debate on the sources of legitimation for the European Community. Thirdly, in this perspective, he analyses several, sometimes contradictory, notions of the rule of law. His contention is that we can single out five fundamental notions of the rule of law and that some but not all of them are incompatible with or oppose democracy. Finally, the paper addresses the regulatory model as a possible application of the rule of the law to the European supranational order. The conclusion is that the regulatory model should be rejected if it is presented as an alternative to classical democratic thought, though it might be fruitful if reshaped differently and no longer assessed from a functionalist standpoint of deliberation. [source]

Economies of Scale and Scope, Contestability, Windfall Profits and Regulatory Risk

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 6 2000
Michael J. Ryan
In this paper I introduce new results on economies of scale and scope and develop implications of these results for contestability and regulation. This is done using a goal programming approach which endogenizes regulatory frameworks in a multiperiod and multiregion monopolistic and oligopolistic analysis. This explicitly spatial approach leads to useful distinctions between industrial contestability and market contestability and a multiperiod contestability-based regulatory model. That model is then extended to a state preference framework with regulatory risk and windfall gains and losses. [source]

Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2005
David Coen
This article investigates how the relationship between regulators and stakeholders evolves as a function of market developments and political learning. Drawing on a comparative case study of the UK and German telecommunication sector, the paper illustrates how regulators constrained by administrative and business traditions have asserted their discretion over politicians by developing sophisticated political relationship with a wide range of stakeholders. The paper concludes that while regulators have undoubtedly diverged from the initial delegation of powers, there is little evidence to suggest that European regulators will converge on a single regulatory model. [source]