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Regulatory Instruments (regulatory + instruments)
Selected AbstractsThe role of organizational capabilities in cleaner technology adoption: an analysis of the response of the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector in Ireland to IPC licensing regulationsENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2006Rachel M. Hilliard Abstract In introducing integrated pollution control licensing, regulators hope to achieve economic advantages as well as environmental benefits. The licensing is used as a vehicle for encouraging firms to adopt cleaner technology, potentially allowing firms to achieve economic advantages through process efficiencies and reduced environmental control costs. In Ireland, the regulatory approach has been to require firms to make managerial changes in the belief that this is a necessary precursor to the take-up of new technology. This paper examines how the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector has responded to environmental regulations that require cleaner technology adoption and managerial changes. Quantitative indicators are developed using data reported to the Irish Environmental Protection Agency. Analysis shows that firms were differentially able to implement both cleaner technology and the mandated managerial processes. The implications for policy are that regulatory instruments designed to stimulate cleaner technology may not be sufficient to promote change in firms, given that the influence of these instruments is mediated by the role of firm-specific, experience-based organizational capabilities. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Transport and environment: policy directions for europeENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001Robert Tinch Transport externalities are among the most important environmental problems affecting quality of life in Europe. Forecasts suggest that past environmental improvements may now be rolled back by traffic growth, and current traffic trends are not sustainable. The theory of environmental policy proposes pricing external costs at their marginal social costs as one solution. Although full marginal social cost pricing is impracticable, advances in tolling technology and environmental valuation mean that it is now a viable option to approximate such charging. There are signs that the European Commission and other bodies are starting to favour pricing over regulatory instruments. However, often overlooked is the potential for non-convexities in the transport sector or between transport and the rest of the economy. For example it may be that small increases in resources for public transport would not result in welfare gains, whereas large increases would. Non-convexities would mean that market forces under marginal social cost pricing might lead away from the optimal transport system. This is one reason why pricing instruments cannot in themselves be a panacea for transport externalities or bring about a sustainable transport system. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment [source] The potential role for economic instruments in drought management,IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE, Issue 4 2004Stephen Merrett changement du climat; gestion des sécheresses; irrigation; prix de l'eau Abstract Climate change in the twenty-first century will likely reduce the return period of drought events, indicating that drought management will be even more important in the future than it is already. In the case of England's Anglian region it is shown that two principal institutions are responsible for drought management,the Environment Agency and Anglian Water Services (AWS). The region has a fast-growing population of more than 5 million people, it has 58% of the most productive agricultural land in England and Wales, and in some summers irrigation can make up 50% of water use. An examination of the drought plans of the Agency and AWS demonstrates that in both cases the policy instruments that they deploy to manage drought are informational, infrastructural and regulatory. In neither case would they use water pricing as a management tool. Moreover, the government's drought plan guidelines for the water utilities make no reference to economic instruments of drought management nor do they suggest that utilities should review the economic impact on their customers of regulatory action. The principal issues that would arise if water charging were to be deployed as a drought management instrument are then reviewed. The paper concludes by proposing that national government should evaluate the feasibility, costs, benefits and risks of replacing the regulatory instruments of drought management by economic instruments. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Avec les changements climatiques prévus au vingt-et-unième siècle les périodes de sècheresse deviendront probablement plus fréquentes et la gestion de ces sécheresses deviendra plus problématique. Cet article indique que dans la région Anglian de l'Angleterre deux institutions ont la responsabilité de cette gestion: "the Environment Agency" et "Anglian Water Services". Un examen des plans d'action pour la sécheresse de ces deux institutions montre que, dans les deux cas, les instruments qui seront déployés seront soit informationels soit infrastructurels soit règlementaires. Il n'y a pas dans ces plans une seule référence au prix de l'eau comme instrument de gestion. De même les conseils du gouvernement national pour la préparation de ces plans ignorent les instruments économiques. L'article conclut que le gouvernement doit réviser la faisabilité des instruments de gestion des sécheresses, et d'estimation de leurs coûts et bénéfices pour introduire davantage d'instruments économiques. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Regulation and Social SolidarityJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 3 2006Tony Prosser Justifications for regulation are commonly based on the identification of market failures. This is however inadequate to account for much regulation, and sees regulation as inherently second best to market allocations. This article argues that, although some regulation will be based on market failure, other justifications can be found in the protection of rights and in the maintenance of social solidarity. Theoretical support for this last rationale can be found in the work of Durkheim and Duguit and the concept of public service. To accept this rationale for regulation has important implications both for regulatory policies and regulatory instruments. [source] Privatisierung/Deregulierung/Marktverfassung: Die Sicht der RegulierungsbehördePERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2003Matthias Kurth This is an opportunity to recall the legislative rationale of liberalization and the regulatory instruments chosen, and to assess how the markets have developed. Aware that telecommunications were not one of the state's core tasks and that there were obvious advantages to services being provided by private companies in a competitive environment, the lawmakers framed the conditions for competition in the provisions of the Telecommunications Act (TKG). In retrospect, these arrangements have largely proved their worth, even if the global economic crisis of the last two years has made itself felt in the telecommunications markets as well. Hence the forthcoming amendment should reflect the TKG's pro-competition philosophy and seek only to improve upon the regulatory instruments where they have been found wanting. [source] Counting on codes: An examination of transnational codes as a regulatory governance mechanism for nanotechnologiesREGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2009Diana M. Bowman Abstract This article examines the rise of nanotechnology-specific codes of conduct (nano-codes) as a private governance mechanism to manage potential risks and promote the technology. It examines their effectiveness as well as their legitimacy as regulatory instruments in the public domain. The study first maps the rise of voluntary nano-codes and the roles played by different actors. Focusing on five specific nano-codes, the article then discusses their adequacy in terms of scientific uncertainty, gaps in existing regulatory regimes, and broader societal concerns. It concludes that these voluntary nano-codes have weaknesses including a lack of explicit standards on which to base independent monitoring, as well as no sanctions for poor compliance. At the same time it also highlights the potential power of these governance mechanisms under conditions of uncertainty and co-regulation with government. It is likely that nano-codes will become the "first cut" of a new governance regime for nanotechnologies. [source] Regulation lite: The rise of emissions tradingREGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2008Robert Baldwin Abstract Emissions trading is the governmentally promoted hope for a sustainable world. In different contexts, trading regimes display varying potential , both in absolute terms and in comparison with other regulatory instruments. Emissions trading, however, is a device that raises urgent issues regarding its objectives, cost-effectiveness, fairness, transparency, and legitimacy. Its use places emphasis on its "acceptability" and the virtues of regulation that is "lite" because it is non-threatening to the most powerful interests. Emissions trading is resonant with assumptions that are highly contentious , notably that it is acceptable because it involves no losers, or because, in desperate global circumstances, we have no choice but to use it. There is a need to confront the difficult issues presented by emissions trading and to face the challenges of combining "market" and "democratic" systems of legitimization. It is also necessary to avoid taking refuge in all too comfortable beliefs in cumulative checks and balances. [source] | ||||||||||