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Regulatory Failure (regulatory + failure)
Selected AbstractsRegulatory Failure and the Collapse of Japan's Home Mortgage Lending Industry: A Legal and Economic AnalysisLAW & POLICY, Issue 3-4 2000Curtis Milhaupt This article analyzes the dynamics of contemporary cooperation and conflict in Japanese financial regulation through the prism of the "jusen problem," the collapse of Japan's home mortgage lending industry in the 1990s. The jusen problem is one of the most striking examples of regulatory failure, strategic interest group bargaining, and large-scale dispute resolution in Japanese history. [source] UK Corporate Reporting of Human Capital: A Regulatory Failure to EvolveBUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 3 2004JOHN STITTLE First page of article [source] Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory FailuresPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2 2000Oliver James Regulation is normally thought of as government regulation of the private sector, particularly business. However, there is a developing literature on regulation inside government, exploring the ways in which government regulates itself through a range of bodies which set standards for public sector organizations, monitor them and seek to bring about compliance with those standards. Reading across economic theories of business regulation to regulation inside government, this article suggests that the current wave of reform inside the UK public sector implicitly reflects a public interest view of regulation. However, the analogous public interest justification for the regulation of business has been heavily criticized and regulatory failures have been suggested including regulation in the interest of regulated bodies, regulation in the interest of regulators and the high costs of operating regulatory systems. [source] HOW TO CLEAR UP THE PENSIONS MESSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003David Simpson All three pillars of the British pensions system are crumbling. The basic state pension is unsustainable in its present form. Defined benefit occupational pension schemes are fast disappearing, and with them the retirement hopes of millions of workers. A further 3 million low-income earners are not saving enough for their retirement. And uncertainty about pensions choices is widespread. In each case the primary cause of the problem is governmental or regulatory failure. The paper makes eight general and four specific proposals for restoring the system. [source] THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION IN AUSTRALIAECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2004Gary Banks Chairman The paper examines the existing scope and role of regulations in Australia. While there are many benefits from regulation, there is also a myriad of, often underplayed, costs associated with regulations. While compliance costs are large, probably the most significant costs arise from behavioural responses to regulations that reduce efficiency or compromise social goals. These adverse effects are often unanticipated and arise from complex interactions between regulations. The main reasons for regulatory failure are excessive ambition (underestimating the deficiencies of the regulatory ,solution'), capture of regulatory agencies, and poor regulatory processes and institutions. The paper offers some guidelines for producing better regulation. [source] Regulatory Failure and the Collapse of Japan's Home Mortgage Lending Industry: A Legal and Economic AnalysisLAW & POLICY, Issue 3-4 2000Curtis Milhaupt This article analyzes the dynamics of contemporary cooperation and conflict in Japanese financial regulation through the prism of the "jusen problem," the collapse of Japan's home mortgage lending industry in the 1990s. The jusen problem is one of the most striking examples of regulatory failure, strategic interest group bargaining, and large-scale dispute resolution in Japanese history. [source] The Old and the New Politics of International Financial StabilityJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 5 2009LOUIS W. PAULY The cross-border financial crisis that began in the United States in the summer of 2007 tested a 30-year experiment in international integration. In the background were expanding macroeconomic imbalances that leading states had neglected to address. Spawned by imprudence and regulatory failures, the crisis soon deepened and the collaborative impulse that might have prompted earlier and more fundamental macro-policy action became focused on emergency management. Ad hoc policy co-ordination ensued as liquidity was injected into turbulent markets and troubled financial intermediaries were recapitalized or reorganized. The collective performance was inelegant, not least inside the European Union. The crisis shed a harsh spotlight on the weak fiscal foundations of the Union and on the now-pressing need for collaborative adjustments in national macroeconomic policies. Since overt political innovation on such matters remains difficult, both within Europe and globally, the crisis underlined the crucial importance of much better collaborative instruments for the oversight and stabilization of integrating financial markets. [source] Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory FailuresPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2 2000Oliver James Regulation is normally thought of as government regulation of the private sector, particularly business. However, there is a developing literature on regulation inside government, exploring the ways in which government regulates itself through a range of bodies which set standards for public sector organizations, monitor them and seek to bring about compliance with those standards. Reading across economic theories of business regulation to regulation inside government, this article suggests that the current wave of reform inside the UK public sector implicitly reflects a public interest view of regulation. However, the analogous public interest justification for the regulation of business has been heavily criticized and regulatory failures have been suggested including regulation in the interest of regulated bodies, regulation in the interest of regulators and the high costs of operating regulatory systems. [source] Too small for concern?AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Issue 4 2007Public health, nanotechnology Abstract While advances in nanotechnology promise to deliver significant benefits to many aspects of health care, there is increasing concern that regulatory regimes do not adequately capture the potential risks associated with this new technology. Concerns have arisen due to preliminary evidence suggesting that some engineered nanoparticles may display undesirable toxicological properties, presenting potential risks to human and environmental health and safety. Within this context, the role of Australia's National Industrial Chemicals and Assessment Scheme and the Therapeutic Goods Administration in regulating nano-based substances is explored. Drawing on earlier regulatory failures, combined with the scientific uncertainty surrounding nanotechnology, this article recommends that Australia adopt a proactive regulatory approach to nanotechnology through amendments to present legislative regimes. The approach articulated in this article strikes a balance between the current approach and that of the European Union's comprehensive new chemicals regime. Immediate regulatory change is called for in order to ensure that the health of the Australian public is adequately protected over the coming years. [source] | |||||||||||||