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Regulation Policy (regulation + policy)
Selected AbstractsProfile: air quality regulation policy in PortugalENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2004João F. P. Gomes Ten years after the publication of the first air quality laws in Portugal, and seven years after the publication of the respective emission limits, it seems appropriate to analyse the degree of law enforcement by the Portuguese manufacturing industry. Therefore, based on the emission measurements made regularly by ISQ as the only officially accredited laboratory, a set of about 400 sources is analysed in terms of the compliance with the emission limits regarding total suspended particulate, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and VOCs. The compliance is evaluated through a non-dimensional parameter and plotted versus the emission flow rate to derive conclusions: it was noticed that emission limits are generally respected regarding sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, which does not happen for the other pollutants considered in this study. However, the non-compliance occurs mainly for very low emission flow rates, which suggests some alterations in the emission limits' applicability, which is being revised at the moment. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Costly Public Funds and the Value of Private InformationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 5 2004Iñaki Aguirre In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those obtained by introducing distributional considerations. In particular we show that under constant marginal cost the full information policy is not implementable and that the optimal regulatory policy results in informational rents. The social value of private information and the firm's informational rents are both increasing functions of the cost of the public funds. [source] Disproportionately High Rate of Epileptic Seizure in Patients Abusing DextropropoxypheneTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL ON ADDICTIONS, Issue 5 2009Debasish Basu MD Dextropropoxyphene (DPP), a weak opioid, is often abused as a psychoactive substance. In this retrospective chart review to document, characterize and put in perspective the often-obtained history of epileptic seizures in patients with DPP abuse, we analyzed the case files of all patients with DPP abuse registered in our center (a tertiary-care drug de-addiction clinic in north India) from May 1, 2001 until April 30, 2007 and those with use of other opioids during the same period. Non-drug-related seizures were excluded from analysis. Out of 312 patients with DPP abuse, 63 (20.2%) had epileptic seizures related to DPP use, in contrast to 0.4% ,4.2% of other opioid users. The seizures were mostly characterized as generalized tonic-clonic seizures (87.3%), occurring around two hours following a higher-than-usual dose of DPP. Those with seizures had significantly greater duration of DPP use and higher rates of medical comorbidity compared to patients without seizure. Age, duration of use and medical comorbidity were better predictors of seizure than dosage of drug or use of multiple drugs. Thus, DPP-induced epileptic seizures are common (one in five), and much more frequent than seizures in patients using other opioids. The awareness of this phenomenon has implications for diagnosis and management, as well as for drug regulation policy. [source] The tragedy of the commons: property rights and markets as solutions to resource and environmental problemsAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2009Gary D. Libecap In one way or another, all environmental and natural resource problems associated with overexploitation or under provision of public goods, arise from incompletely defined and enforced property rights. As a result private decision makers do not consider or internalize social benefits and costs in their production or investment actions. The gap between private and social net returns results in externalities , harmful effects on third parties: overfishing, excessive air pollution, unwarranted extraction or diversion of ground or surface water, extreme depletion of oil and gas reservoirs. These situations are all examples of the ,The Tragedy of the Commons'. In this paper, I consider options for mitigating the losses of open access: common or group property regimes, government tax and regulation policy, more formal private property rights. I briefly summarize the problems and advantages of each option and describe why there has been move toward rights-based instruments in recent years: ITQ (individual transferable quotas), tradable emission permits, and private water rights. Introductions to the papers in the special issue follow. [source] |