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Redistribution Policy (redistribution + policy)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Time Consistent Optimal Redistribution Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2004
Oliver Lorz
This paper analyzes optimal redistribution policy in a two-period version of the overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals and asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. The government of the first period determines redistribution transfers for the first period but is not able to set the policy variables for the second period. With respect to savings the paper considers two scenarios: In the first scenario savings are observable and the government can set individual savings levels in addition to redistributive transfers. In the second scenario savings and capital incomes are not observable. In both cases the redistribution equilibrium is not second-best efficient. [source]

EVALUATING EU POLICIES ON PUBLIC SERVICES: A CITIZENS' PERSPECTIVE

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010
Judith Clifton
ABSTRACT,:,This article evaluates EU policies on public services , particularly public network services , from the citizens' point of view. It is first argued that citizens' perceptions are important because the provision of fundamental services is at stake and because they constitute the infrastructure necessary for social and economic development. Citizens',voice' can, therefore, be known, analyzed and used in the design of improved policy on public services along with other indicators. Changing EU policy on public services is synthesized and classified into two main phases in section two. Citizen satisfaction with public services as revealed through surveys from 1997 to 2007 is explored in the third section. In the discussion, the prospects for EU policy on public services are considered and, it is argued that, from the perspectives of subsidiarity and proportionality, policy towards strengthening the common market is being increasingly uploaded to the supranational level in the form of directives, whilst cohesion and redistribution policies are being downloaded to the national level or dealt with at the supranational level by ,soft' instruments. [source]

A Theory of Poverty Aversion and Civil Society Development

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2003
Paul Azam
A simple model is used to discuss the political economy of the emergence of relative poverty as a foundation for redistribution policy in rich countries, as opposed to the dominant concept of absolute poverty, which prevails in the rest of the world. This issue is analyzed in connection with that of the development of civil society and its role relative to the state in fighting poverty. [source]

POLICY UNCERTAINTY, ELECTORAL SECURITIES, AND REDISTRIBUTION,

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2010
Andrea Mattozzi
This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy-contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no "policy-insurance market" is available. This implies that in economies with well-developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy-insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers. [source]

Time Consistent Optimal Redistribution Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2004
Oliver Lorz
This paper analyzes optimal redistribution policy in a two-period version of the overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals and asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. The government of the first period determines redistribution transfers for the first period but is not able to set the policy variables for the second period. With respect to savings the paper considers two scenarios: In the first scenario savings are observable and the government can set individual savings levels in addition to redistributive transfers. In the second scenario savings and capital incomes are not observable. In both cases the redistribution equilibrium is not second-best efficient. [source]

Fiskalischer Wettbewerb und Einkommensumverteilung

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2000
Lars P. Feld
Fiscal competition is supposed to lead to the collapse of the welfare state because, first, it will become difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy a redistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, and second, such a policy, if undertaken in one jurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from other jurisdictions and erode the internal redistribution policy. In this paper, theoretical and empirical studies concerning the impact of taxes and transfer payments on residence decisions of taxpayers are reviewed. The relationship of fiscal competition and the erosion of the welfare state is illustrated with aggregate data on income redistribution in Switzerland. [source]