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Auction Theory (auction + theory)
Selected AbstractsAN EVALUATION OF THE 1997 EDWARDS AQUIFER IRRIGATION SUSPENSION,JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION, Issue 4 2000Keith O. Keplinger ABSTRACT: In early 1997, the Texas Edwards Aquifer Authority implemented a pilot Irrigation Suspension Program with the objectives of increasing springflow and providing relief to municipalities during drought. Irrigators were paid an average of $234 per acre to suspend water use, a price higher than regional land rental rates. Auction theory and program implementation details suggest that the program implementation partially caused inflated bids. The Irrigation Suspension Program is also compared to two alternative programs: (1) subsidizing more efficient irrigation technology and (2) buying land. The irrigation suspension is found to be more cost-effective relative to subsidizing improved irrigation efficiency because it can be put in place only when aquifer levels are low. Land purchase is a cheaper alternative if the bid levels remain at the levels observed. [source] Bookbuidling, Auctions, and the Future of the IPO ProcessJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2005William J. Wilhelm Jr. Auction theorists predict that bookbuilding, long the standard process for selling equity IPOs in the U.S., is about to give way to an Internet-based IPO auction process that is both more efficient and more fair. The promise of auctions is that, by using an electronic platform that gives all investors the opportunity to bid on IPOs, the underpricing of IPOs and commissions to underwriters will be reduced, leading to an increase in net proceeds to issuers. Largely missing from such arguments, however, is an appreciation of why bookbuilding has dominated U.S. practice (and continues to supplant auctions in IPOs in most countries outside the U.S) and the role of undepricing in the IPO process. Rather than canvassing all investors, bookbuilding involves eliciting expressions of interest from institutional investors, and then allocating shares mainly according to the strength of their professed interest. In contrast to auctions, which allocate shares according to a set of explicit rules, bookbuilding involves a set of implicit "rules" that provide considerable room for judgment by the underwriter. This does not mean that the rules are arbitrary or not well understood by participants, particularly after thousands of IPOs conducted over the better part of two centuries. But to manage the exchange of information between issuers and investors, and the potential conflicts of interest in representing both groups, such rules must be administered by an intermediary with a considerable stake in protecting its reputation for fair dealing. Investment banks that deal with both issuers and the investment community on a regular basis are well positioned to perform this function. The underpricing of IPOs is best viewed not as a transfer of wealth from issuers to favored investors but rather as compensation to the large influential investors that play a major role in the price discovery process. By opening the process to all comers, auctions will discourage these large investors from bidding aggressively because less sophisticated investors will be able to "free ride" on their research and due diligence. To the extent this happens, auctions may suc ceed in reducing underpricing (in fact, they may even lead to over pricing), but they will also reduce the net proceeds for issuers. Nevertheless, recent advances in communications technology and auction theory will undoubtedly reshape current securities underwriting practices. In particular, Internet auctions are likely to replace bookbuilding in debt IPOs and less risky equity issues (say, IPOs of LBOs). But the argument that Bookbuilding will be completely cast aside in favor of largely untested alternatives fails to appreciate a successful institutional response to major market imperfections, some of which can never be wholly eliminated. Especially in the case of risky (first-time) equity IPOs, there will continue to be an important role for managing the information exchange between issuers and investors that is critical to the IPO process. [source] Auctions within E-Sourcing EventsPRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2007Wedad Elmaghraby The paper presents a survey of current industry practices in designing and running auctions as part of e-sourcing events. We report our findings from numerous interviews with auction makers in leading e-sourcing application vendors. The differences between auction theory and auction practice pose a number of interesting and important research questions for the Operations Management community; we conclude with a discussion of lessons learned and open research questions. [source] Price Formation Under Small Numbers Competition: Evidence from Land Auctions in SingaporeREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2006Joseph T.L. Ooi This article examines the price formation process under small numbers competition using data from Singapore land auctions. The theory predicts that bid prices are less than the zero-profit asset value in these first-price sealed-bid auctions. The model also shows that expected sales price increases with the number of bidders both because each bidder has an incentive to offer a higher price and because of a greater likelihood that a high-value bidder is present. The empirical estimates are consistent with auction theory and show that the standard land attributes are reflected in auction prices as expected. [source] Naturally Occurring Markets and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of the Winner's Curse,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 528 2008Glenn W. Harrison We examine the relevance of experimental findings from laboratory settings that abstract from the field context of the task that theory purports to explain. Using common value auction theory as our guide, we identify naturally occurring settings in which one can test the theory. Experienced agents bidding in familiar roles do not fall prey to the winner's curse. Yet, experienced agents fall prey to the winner's curse when bidding in an unfamiliar role. We conclude that the theory predicts field behaviour well when one is able to identify naturally occurring field counterparts to the key theoretical conditions. [source] | |||||||||||||