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Rational Requirement (rational + requirement)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

THE SCOPE OF RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 238 2010
John Brunero
Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow-scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide-scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow-scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow-scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement somewhere thereby puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement everywhere. My argument against Kolodny is analogous to arguments which use holism about reasons to defend moral particularism. [source]

IX,Against Requirements of Rationality

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1part2 2008
A. W. Price
Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form ,if , ought ,' or ,ought , if ,'? If the latter, how are we to understand the ,if'? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications (often involving bootstrapping) if ,ought' connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also be a requirement forbidding self-contradiction (not that one's current beliefs can be consciously contradictory). It is a good question whether self-contradiction constitutes, or evidences, irrationality; but talk of a rational requirement causes trouble. [source]

THE SCOPE OF RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 238 2010
John Brunero
Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow-scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide-scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow-scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow-scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement somewhere thereby puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement everywhere. My argument against Kolodny is analogous to arguments which use holism about reasons to defend moral particularism. [source]