Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Rational Choice Theory (rational + choice_theory)
Selected AbstractsA Rational Choice Approach to Explaining Policy Preferences and Concern for Representing Women among State LegislatorsPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 1 2010DONALD E. WHISTLER Rational choice theory predicts that women, when significantly involved in the production of private competitive goods and services, will adopt the same self-interested political orientation as similarly economically situated men. Guided by this approach, this nationwide survey of state legislators finds that competitive occupational background significantly reduces support for representing distributive,redistributive policy among both women and men legislators. However, it also finds that women legislators in general, as well as women holding leadership positions, retain a significant concern for representing women. Democratic Party affiliation and noncompetitive occupational background predict support for distributive,redistributive policies among women and men legislators, while only Democratic Party affiliation predicts concern for representing women among women and men legislators. Other explanatory variables (i.e., lower education, liberal ideology, African-Americans, lower-socioeconomic status districts, and political ambition) are in the direction hypothesized to influence representing distributive,redistributive policies and women but are not all statistically significant. La teoría de la decisión racional predice que cuando las mujeres se involucran significativamente en la producción de bienes y servicios competitivos, adoptarán la misma orientación política de búsqueda de sus intereses personales que los hombres similarmente situados económicamente. Guiados por este enfoque, esta encuesta nacional de los legisladores estatales encuentra que los antecedentes profesionales competitivos reducen significativamente el apoyo entre mujeres así como hombres legisladores para representar políticas distributivas-redistributivas. Sin embargo, encuentra que en general, las mujeres legisladoras, así como aquellas mujeres que desempeñan posiciones de autoridad, conservan una preocupación significativa por representar a las mujeres. Por su parte, tanto afiliación al Partido Demócrata como antecedentes ocupacionales no-competitivos, predicen apoyo entre las mujeres y los hombres legisladores, a políticas distributivas-redistributivas, mientras que sólo afiliación al Partido Demócrata predice preocupación entre las mujeres y los hombres legisladores por representar a las mujeres. Otras variables que pueden explicar esto (i.e., educación baja, ideología liberal, Afroamericanos, distritos con bajo nivel socioeconómico, y ambición política) están en la dirección hipotetizada para influir la representación de las políticas distributivas-redistributivas y de mujeres, pero no todas son estadísticamente significativas. [source] Free and Cheap Riding in Strict, Conservative ChurchesJOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION, Issue 2 2005DANIEL V. A. OLSON Iannaccone (1994) uses rational choice theory to argue that strict rules (e.g., no smoking or drinking) raise average commitment levels in conservative churches because strictness discourages free riding. Tests of this assertion have been hampered, in part, by uncertainties concerning how free riding should be measured. We introduce a new, indirect measure of free (and cheap) riding, the level of positive skewness of a congregation's money contributions,that is, the extent to which a few members give much more than the mean amount while the majority gives much less. Using a study of giving in five denominations, we find that strict, conservative congregations have both higher mean giving and less skewness in the pattern of their giving. The higher mean-contribution levels at strict, conservative congregations are not simply due to each member giving more or a few members giving a lot more. Instead, as Iannaccone's model predicts, some combination of strict rules and/or conservative theology appears to systematically limit the proportion of free- and cheap-riding members giving far less than the mean and thus increase the proportion giving at or above the mean. [source] Never on Sunny Days: Lessons from Weekly Attendance CountsJOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION, Issue 2 2004Laurence R. Iannaccone Congregational attendance data are abundant, accessible, and relevant for religious research. Weekly attendance histories provide information about worshippers, congregations, and denominations that surveys cannot capture. The histories yield novel measures of commitment, testable implications of rational choice theory, and compelling evidence that attendance responds strongly to changes in the opportunity cost of time. [source] Rational Choice and Interpretive Evidence: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place?POLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2010Iain Hampsher-Monk Following Green and Shapiro's critique, debate about the value of rational choice theory has focused upon the question of its relationship to what we call ,external', largely quantitative, empirical evidence. We argue that what is most striking about rational choice theory is, however, its neglect of interpretive evidence. Our survey of 570 articles, published in the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of Political Science between 1984 and 2005 employing rational choice theory, revealed that only 139 made even the most cursory use of interpretive evidence. Does this matter? We argue that the absence of interpretive evidence undermines rational choice's explanatory credentials. However, we also argue that the admission of interpretive evidence risks rendering redundant the rational choice element of any explanation. This is the rock and the hard place between which rational choice is caught. In the final part of the article we distinguish those cases where rational choice may prove useful, namely those circumstances in which interpretive evidence either cannot be relied upon or does not subsume that which an explanation is intended to achieve. [source] Persuasion in International Politics: A Rationalist AccountPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 4 2005James I. Walsh Governments offer us the promise of rewards or the threats of punishment to secure favorable international bargains, but they also draw on reasoned arguments to convince their bargaining partners to accept mutually beneficial agreements. Works that have studied such attempts at persuasion hold that it is most likely to succeed when the states involved share important normative values or are uncertain about what is the "right" action to take. Drawing on rational choice theory of strategic communication, this study seeks to expand understanding the conditions under which attempts at persuasion in international politics succeed or fail. Persuasion can occur for reasons other than shared values; under some conditions, one state can persuade another by altering the latter's beliefs about the rewards associated with available foreign policy options. [source] Unraveling the Logic of ASEAN's Decision-Making: Theoretical Analysis and Case ExaminationASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 3 2010Yi-hung Chiou Throughout its history, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has based decisions on consensus and consultation, producing a loosely defined, weak regional organization. The results of nonbinding and watered-down resolutions make substantial progress for ASEAN difficult. This article explores the logic of ASEAN's decision-making by applying rational choice theory. It argues that the characteristics of ASEAN's decision-making mechanism allow member states to base their actions on how individual nations perceive their interests to be best served by group resolutions. By constructing a series of hypotheses to pattern ASEAN's decision-making, this article examines four cases and how players resolved each. The findings suggest that the constraints of group decision-making and divergent interests between member states play a major role in shaping the effectiveness of resolutions. [source] | ||||||||||