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R&D Subsidies (r&d + subsidy)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

The Effect of R&D Subsidies on Private R&D

ECONOMICA, Issue 294 2007
HOLGER GÖRG
This paper investigates the relationship between government support for R&D and R&D expenditure financed privately by firms using a comprehensive plant level data set for the manufacturing sector in the Republic of Ireland. We find that for domestic plants small grants serve to increase private R&D spending, while too large a grant may crowd out private financing of R&D. In contrast, evidence for foreign establishments suggests that grant provision causes neither additionality nor crowding out effects of private R&D financing, regardless of the size of the subsidy. [source]

Do R&D Subsidies Stimulate or Displace Private R&D?

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002
Evidence from Israel
In evaluating the effect of an R&D subsidy we need to know what the subsidized firm would have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy. Using data on Israeli manufacturing firms in the 1990s we find evidence suggesting that the R&D subsidies granted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade greatly stimulated company financed R&D expenditures for small firms but had a negative effect on the R&D of large firms, although not statistically significant. One subsidized New Israeli Shekel (NIS) induces 11 additional NIS of own R&D for the small firms. However, because most subsidies go to the large firms a subsidy of one NIS generates, on average, a statistically insignificant 0.23 additional NIS of company financed R&D. [source]

R&D Subsidies versus R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and Pollution

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2002
Emmanuel Petrakis
We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative, i.e. there should be a tax on R&D, depending on the extent of the appropriability problem and the degree of environmental damage. In a wide class of cases, depending on the parameter values, welfare in the case of R&D cooperation, is lower than welfare in the case of R&D subsidisation. [source]

R&D and subsidies at the firm level: an application of parametric and semiparametric two-step selection models

JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Issue 6 2008
Katrin Hussinger
This paper analyzes the effect of public R&D subsidies on firms' private R&D investment per employee and new product sales in German manufacturing. Parametric and semiparametric two-step selection models are applied to this evaluation problem. The results show that the average treatment effect on the treated firms' R&D intensity is positive. The estimated effects are robust with respect to the different selection models. Further results show that publicly induced R&D spending is as productive as private R&D investment in generating new product sales. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Do R&D Subsidies Stimulate or Displace Private R&D?

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002
Evidence from Israel
In evaluating the effect of an R&D subsidy we need to know what the subsidized firm would have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy. Using data on Israeli manufacturing firms in the 1990s we find evidence suggesting that the R&D subsidies granted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade greatly stimulated company financed R&D expenditures for small firms but had a negative effect on the R&D of large firms, although not statistically significant. One subsidized New Israeli Shekel (NIS) induces 11 additional NIS of own R&D for the small firms. However, because most subsidies go to the large firms a subsidy of one NIS generates, on average, a statistically insignificant 0.23 additional NIS of company financed R&D. [source]

R&D COMPETITION AND ENDOGENOUS SPILLOVERS

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 1 2006
JIM Y. JIN
The paper examines firms' choices between innovation and imitation in duopoly. We show that in the unique equilibrium asymmetric firms choose the same level of expenditure on imitation and the same ratio of innovative cost reduction to output. We evaluate the marginal contribution of innovation and imitation expenditure by small and large firms to consumer surplus and welfare, and discuss the desirability of differentiated R&D subsidies on innovation and imitation in terms of R&D tax rebates. [source]

Trade policy mix: IPR protection and R&D subsidies

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2006
Moonsung Kang
Abstract This paper analyses strategic R&D policy under circumstances where intellectual property rights protection resulting from firms' R&D investment is not perfect. By examining policy choices wherein a government chooses both R&D subsidies and IPR protection levels simultaneously, we show that it is optimal for a government to adopt sufficiently weak IPR protection and to subsidize R&D investments of domestic firms. Inducing R&D investment of foreign rival firms will increase the profits of domestic firms. Ce mémoire analyse une politique stratégique de R&D quand la protection des droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI) qui découlent d'investissements en R&D par les entreprises est imparfaite. En examinant les choix de politiques par lesquels un gouvernement définit simultanément les niveaux de subventions pour la R&D et de protection de la propriété intellectuelle, on montre qu'il est optimal pour un gouvernement d'adopter une protection des DPI suffisamment faible et de subventionner les investissements en R&D des entreprises nationales. Susciter un accroissement des investissements en R&D des entreprises étrangères rivales devrait augmenter les profits des entreprises nationales. [source]

Do R&D Subsidies Stimulate or Displace Private R&D?

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002
Evidence from Israel
In evaluating the effect of an R&D subsidy we need to know what the subsidized firm would have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy. Using data on Israeli manufacturing firms in the 1990s we find evidence suggesting that the R&D subsidies granted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade greatly stimulated company financed R&D expenditures for small firms but had a negative effect on the R&D of large firms, although not statistically significant. One subsidized New Israeli Shekel (NIS) induces 11 additional NIS of own R&D for the small firms. However, because most subsidies go to the large firms a subsidy of one NIS generates, on average, a statistically insignificant 0.23 additional NIS of company financed R&D. [source]

R&D Subsidies versus R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and Pollution

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2002
Emmanuel Petrakis
We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative, i.e. there should be a tax on R&D, depending on the extent of the appropriability problem and the degree of environmental damage. In a wide class of cases, depending on the parameter values, welfare in the case of R&D cooperation, is lower than welfare in the case of R&D subsidisation. [source]