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R&D Costs (r&d + cost)
Selected AbstractsFinancial factors in R&D budget setting: the impact of interfunctional market coordination, strategic alliances, and the nature of competitionACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2004Alan S. Dunk Abstract Increasingly demanding markets, changes in technology and greater international competition have made the effective management of product R&D together with its associated costs essential. The magnitude of R&D costs are of concern to many companies, potentially inhibiting organizations from investing in new product development. Although rising costs of R&D and the growing dependence of companies on R&D for product leadership increase the need to plan and evaluate R&D activities more effectively, difficulties have been experienced in applying budgetary control systems to R&D. Despite such concerns, the published literature indicates that an emphasis on financial factors in setting the size of R&D budgets is becoming a competitive necessity. A review of the published literature suggests that interfunctional market coordination, the relative use of strategic alliances and the nature of competition in terms of product cost versus product innovation are potentially instrumental in influencing the degree of emphasis on financial factors in R&D budget setting. The results of the present study indicate that these three organizational and environmental variables result in an emphasis on financial factors in setting the size of R&D budgets. Implications drawn from the findings are discussed. [source] Relative Value Relevance of R&D Reporting: An International ComparisonJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 2 2002Ronald Zhao This study examines the relative value relevance of R&D reporting in France, Germany, the UK and the USA. France and the UK allow conditional capitalization of R&D costs, whereas Germany and the USA (except for the software industry) require the full and immediate expensing of all R&D costs. The relative value relevance of R&D reporting under different R&D accounting standards are compared while controlling for the reporting environment. Test results suggest that the level of R&D reporting has a significant effect on the association of equity price with accounting earnings and book value. The reporting of total R&D costs provides additional information to accounting earnings and book value in Germany and the USA (expensing countries), and the allocation of R&D costs between capitalization and expense further increases the value relevance of R&D reporting in France and the UK (capitalizing countries), including firms in the US software industry. [source] THE ROLE OF SUNK COSTS IN THE DECISION TO INVEST IN R&D,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009JUAN A. MÁÑEZ We present a dynamic empirical model of a firm's R&D decisions that is consistent with the existence of sunk R&D costs, taking into account that these costs may differ between small and large firms, and among different technological regimes. We estimate a multivariate dynamic discrete choice model using firm-level data of Spanish manufacturing for 1990,2000. Conditional on firm heterogeneity and serially correlated unobservable factors, we find that R&D history matters. This true state dependence allows inferring the existence of sunk R&D costs associated with performing R&D. Sunk R&D costs are found to be higher for large, high-tech firms. [source] DEFECTING FROM R&D COOPERATIONAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2006GAMAL ATALLAH This paper introduces defection into the strategic R&D model. In defecting, a firm cheats by choosing its R&D expenditures to maximise its own profits, instead of maximising the joint profits of the cooperating firms. Two cooperative environments are considered: R&D cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities; and RJV cartelisation, where firms coordinate R&D activities and share information. Under R&D cartelisation, defection entails an increase (decrease) in R&D and effective spillovers for low (high) spillovers; whereas under RJV cartelisation, defection always entails a decrease in R&D and effective spillovers. Under R&D cartelisation, consumer surplus and total welfare increase (decrease) with defection when spillovers are low (high). Whereas consumer surplus and welfare always decrease with defection under RJV cartelisation. Under R&D cartelisation, the incentives for defection first decrease then increase with spillovers; they also increase with the size of the market, but decline with production costs and R&D costs. Moreover, the incentives for defection are higher under RJV cartelisation. With low spillovers under RJV cartelisation, a firm prefers to be subject to defection by the other firm, to not cooperating at all. Punishment for defection is considered, under the form of abstaining from information sharing. [source] | ||||||||||