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Public Reason (public + reason)
Selected AbstractsRESTRAINT ON REASONS AND REASONS FOR RESTRAINT: A PROBLEM FOR RAWLS' IDEAL OF PUBLIC REASONPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2006MICAH LOTT I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls' ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls' ideal of public reason. Because it is plausible to believe that such cases are widespread, the issue I am raising represents a serious problem for Rawls' account of public reason. After posing this problem, I consider potential responses on behalf of Rawls' view, and I reply to those responses. The moral of this story, as I see it, is that the kind of duty an ideal of public reason aims to place on citizens must be more modest than Rawls supposes. [source] RECOGNIZED RIGHTS AS DEVICES OF PUBLIC REASON*PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, Issue 1 2009G. F. Gaus First page of article [source] In Defense of "Public Reason": Supreme Court Justice William JohnsonJOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY, Issue 2 2007SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO For those of us who gravitate toward rebels and upstarts, Supreme Court Justice William Johnson has uncommon appeal, if only because he was the first member of the federal Bench to kick up his heels in a sustained, effective, and deliberate way. In 1954, Johnson's only biographer, Donald Morgan, proclaimed him "the first dissenter,"1 a force for democratization in the style of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, the man who persuaded Chief Justice John Marshall to compromise on the question of unitary opinions and institutionalize (if not applaud) publication of concurring or dissenting departures from the majority's official reasoning. [source] 11.,Toward Lasting Peace: Kant on Law, Public Reason, and CultureAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2009Marc Lucht Kant helps us understand the conditions for peace by reminding us that lasting peace requires both cosmopolitan legal reform and individual moral improvement, including resistance to egoism and the cultivation of cosmopolitan attitudes. The duty to pursue peace includes the duty to promote the rule of domestic and international law and work against its unilateral subversion. The juridical cosmopolitanism of a worldwide league of free peoples enables resistance to the dangers posed by authoritarian regimes and their dangerous willingness to manipulate their subjects and ignore international law. Constraining egoism enables people to overcome the tyranny of their desires and cultivates a sense of affiliation with the larger community of humanity in general, providing the moral foundation needed to support a cosmopolitan legal order. Moral development to a great extent is fostered through the arts and humanities, and a robust cultural life therefore ought to play a central role in the pursuit of global peace. [source] The Scope of Public ReasonPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2004Jonathan Quong This paper presents two conceptions of the scope of public reason. The narrow view asserts that the ideal of public reason must regulate questions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, but should not apply beyond this limited domain. The broad view claims that the ideal of public reason ought to be applied, whenever possible, to all political decisions where citizens exercise coercive power over one another. The paper questions whether there are any good grounds for accepting the narrow view. I survey and reject three potential reasons. The priority argument for the narrow view claims that constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are the only proper subjects of public reason because they have a special moral priority for our reasoning about justice. The basic interests argument supports the narrow view by arguing that public reasons only exist at the level of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Finally, the completeness argument defends the narrow view on the grounds that public reason can only be complete if it abstains from most legislative questions. I conclude that there are no good reasons for accepting the narrow view of the scope of public reason, whereas there are several reasons to prefer the broad view. [source] Permission to Speak: Religious Arguments in Public ReasonTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 2 2004SJ Patrick Riordan First page of article [source] Common Schools and Uncommon Conversations: Education, Religious Speech and Public SpacesJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2007KENNETH A. STRIKE This paper discusses the role of religious speech in the public square and the common school. It argues for more openness to political theology than many liberals are willing to grant and for an educational strategy of engagement over one of avoidance. The paper argues that the exclusion of religious debate from the public square has dysfunctional consequences. It discusses Rawls's more recent views on public reason and claims that, while they are not altogether adequate, they are consistent with engagement. The outcome of these arguments is applied to three ,hot button' issues in US education: creationism, an issue of gay rights, and teaching the Bible in schools. [source] Religion, Politics and Civic EducationJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 1 2005Robert Kunzman The proper role and influence of religion in the public sphere continues to be contested and has important implications for civic education in a liberal democracy. Paul Weithman and Michael Perry argue that religion makes valuable contributions to civic participation and that religiously grounded beliefs should be fully welcome in political decision-making. In response, this paper strives for a middle ground of preparing citizens to engage thoughtfully with a wide range of moral perspectives, religious and otherwise, while promoting a civic virtue that still honours a commitment to public reason. [source] RESTRAINT ON REASONS AND REASONS FOR RESTRAINT: A PROBLEM FOR RAWLS' IDEAL OF PUBLIC REASONPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2006MICAH LOTT I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls' ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls' ideal of public reason. Because it is plausible to believe that such cases are widespread, the issue I am raising represents a serious problem for Rawls' account of public reason. After posing this problem, I consider potential responses on behalf of Rawls' view, and I reply to those responses. The moral of this story, as I see it, is that the kind of duty an ideal of public reason aims to place on citizens must be more modest than Rawls supposes. [source] The Scope of Public ReasonPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2004Jonathan Quong This paper presents two conceptions of the scope of public reason. The narrow view asserts that the ideal of public reason must regulate questions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, but should not apply beyond this limited domain. The broad view claims that the ideal of public reason ought to be applied, whenever possible, to all political decisions where citizens exercise coercive power over one another. The paper questions whether there are any good grounds for accepting the narrow view. I survey and reject three potential reasons. The priority argument for the narrow view claims that constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are the only proper subjects of public reason because they have a special moral priority for our reasoning about justice. The basic interests argument supports the narrow view by arguing that public reasons only exist at the level of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Finally, the completeness argument defends the narrow view on the grounds that public reason can only be complete if it abstains from most legislative questions. I conclude that there are no good reasons for accepting the narrow view of the scope of public reason, whereas there are several reasons to prefer the broad view. [source] The Place of Religious Arguments in Civic DiscussionRATIO JURIS, Issue 2 2000Juha Räikkä I shall consider whether morality requires citizens of democratic societies to advance secular reasons in public debates on political questions. Is it wrong to give purely religious reasons in political discussion? I shall argue that the moral acceptability of public religious arguments that are not supported with secular reasons depends on the political context we are discussing, and that often there is nothing wrong with using religious considerations. I shall also discuss the so-called shared premises requirement in political argumentation. The overall aim of the paper is to clarify intuitions concerning the ideals of public reason on the one hand, and the commitment to religious liberty on the other. [source] The Scope of Public ReasonPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2004Jonathan Quong This paper presents two conceptions of the scope of public reason. The narrow view asserts that the ideal of public reason must regulate questions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, but should not apply beyond this limited domain. The broad view claims that the ideal of public reason ought to be applied, whenever possible, to all political decisions where citizens exercise coercive power over one another. The paper questions whether there are any good grounds for accepting the narrow view. I survey and reject three potential reasons. The priority argument for the narrow view claims that constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are the only proper subjects of public reason because they have a special moral priority for our reasoning about justice. The basic interests argument supports the narrow view by arguing that public reasons only exist at the level of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Finally, the completeness argument defends the narrow view on the grounds that public reason can only be complete if it abstains from most legislative questions. I conclude that there are no good reasons for accepting the narrow view of the scope of public reason, whereas there are several reasons to prefer the broad view. [source] | ||||||||||