Public Good Provision (public + good_provision)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2007
PAUL PECORINO
We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large. [source]


Ambiguity and Public Good Provision in Large Societies

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 5 2005
RALPH W. BAILEY
In this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be unique. We examine how provision of the public good changes as the size of the population increases. We show that when there is uncertainty, there may be less free-riding in large societies. [source]


Conjectural Variations and Voluntary Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2003
ichi Itaya
The purpose of this paper is to show how conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision of public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with maximal sustainable equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all of a community's members is maximized for both quadratic and Cobb,Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibrium in the underlying repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge as long as people place positive weight on the future, and that those conjectures are positively related to the discount factor. [source]


Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 534 2009
Paul Pecorino
In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for consumption also increases. This raises the marginal utility of income and increases the opportunity cost of contributing to the public good. [source]


Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods

GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2000
Richard Cornes
In the pure public good model, the Nash equilibrium associated with one initial income distribution may Pareto dominate the equilibrium associated with another distribution of the same aggregate income. We explore this possibility and examine its implications for Pareto-improving policy intervention by undertaking a comparative static analysis of Pareto-improving tax-financed increases in pure public good provision. Under some circumstances, a government can engineer policies that raise public good provision while increasing the well-being of contributors and non-contributors. Crucial factors promoting this outcome involve a large number of non-contributors, a high marginal valuation for the public good by non-contributors and a large aggregate response of contributors to changes in their income. [source]


Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2007
PAUL PECORINO
We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large. [source]


Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2002
Jean Hindriks
It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision. [source]


Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 534 2009
Paul Pecorino
In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for consumption also increases. This raises the marginal utility of income and increases the opportunity cost of contributing to the public good. [source]