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Public Goods (public + goods)
Kinds of Public Goods Selected AbstractsTHE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODSECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 4 2007MARTIN SEFTON A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero-sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment. (JEL C92) [source] ESTIMATING THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM BENEFITS OF LARGE CHANGES IN SPATIALLY DELINEATED PUBLIC GOODS*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2004Holger Sieg The purpose of this article is to report a new approach for measuring the general equilibrium willingness to pay for large changes in spatially delineated public goods such as air quality. We estimate the parameters of a locational equilibrium model and compute equilibria for alternative scenarios characterizing the availability of public goods within a system of communities. Welfare measures take into consideration the adjustments of households in equilibrium to nonmarginal changes in public goods. The framework is used to analyze willingness to pay for reductions in ozone concentrations in Southern California between 1990 and 1995. [source] THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTSAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2010JOHN CREEDY This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects. [source] Individual Greed and Public GoodsCONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Issue 4 2003Richard B. Norgaard No abstract is available for this article. [source] Robust International Comparisons of Distributions of Disposable Income and Regional Public GoodsECONOMICA, Issue 303 2009NICOLAS GRAVEL The paper provides robust normative comparisons of 12 OECD countries based on their distributions of disposable income and access to two regional public goods: infant mortality and pupil,teacher ratios at public schools. Comparisons are performed using two and three-dimensional dominance criteria that coincide with the unanimity of utilitarian judgments taken over specific classes of utility functions. The criteria succeed in ranking conclusively about 30% of all possible comparisons in the two-dimensional case, compared with 67% for one-dimensional income-based comparisons and 6% for three-dimensional ones. Introducing local public goods seems to worsen the relative standing of Anglo-Saxon countries. [source] Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public GoodsGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2000Richard Cornes In the pure public good model, the Nash equilibrium associated with one initial income distribution may Pareto dominate the equilibrium associated with another distribution of the same aggregate income. We explore this possibility and examine its implications for Pareto-improving policy intervention by undertaking a comparative static analysis of Pareto-improving tax-financed increases in pure public good provision. Under some circumstances, a government can engineer policies that raise public good provision while increasing the well-being of contributors and non-contributors. Crucial factors promoting this outcome involve a large number of non-contributors, a high marginal valuation for the public good by non-contributors and a large aggregate response of contributors to changes in their income. [source] Global Public Goods for Health.HEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2004David Woodward, Edited by Richard Smith, Health Economic, Nick Drager., Public Health Perspectives, Robert Beaglehole No abstract is available for this article. [source] The Reform of Support Mechanisms for Upland Farming: Paying for Public Goods in the Severely Disadvantaged Areas of EnglandJOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2007Nick Hanley Abstract The incomes of hill-farmers in ,Less Favoured Areas' of the UK have traditionally been supported by payments related to their production levels. Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and changes in policy objectives within the UK imply a need to change this basis of support. We investigate the option of paying for public goods produced, focusing on landscape features and habitats. A choice experiment study is used to estimate willingness to pay for different landscape features in four Severely Disadvantaged Areas of England. We find significant differences in the value of landscape features, both within and across regions, and parallel differences in the aggregate value of different policy options for upland areas. We discuss briefly how this information could be included in a spatially differentiated payments scheme. [source] Creative Politics: Taxes and Public Goods in a Federal System by Glenn BeamerJOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2002Gordon A. MacInnes [source] Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: A GeneralizationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2009KENJI FUJIWARA In this note we examine if the proposition offered by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) and Wirl (1996) in the context of a dynamic voluntary provision model with a linear production function can be generalized to a more general CES formulation. By comparing the steady-state stocks of a public good in open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria with that under the cooperative solution, we demonstrate that their ranking among the steady-state stocks is indeed preserved under the CES framework. [source] Strategyproof Cost Sharing of Multiple Excludable Public GoodsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 5 2007SURESH MUTUSWAMI In a model of cost sharing of multiple excludable public goods, we examine the properties of mechanisms satisfying strategyproofness, no subsidy, outcome non-bossiness, budget balance, individual rationality and consumer sovereignty. We show that such mechanisms in general will not satisfy the equity property of equal treatment of equals. This contrasts with the single excludable public good case. [source] Interpersonal Interaction and Economic Theory: The Case of Public GoodsANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2000Nicholas Bardsley Interpersonal interaction in public goods contexts is very different in character to its depiction in economic theory, despite the fact that the standard model is based on a small number of apparently plausible assumptions. Approaches to the problem are reviewed both from within and outside economics. It is argued that quick fixes such as a taste for giving do not provide a way forward. An improved understanding of why people contribute to such goods seems to require a different picture of the relationships between individuals than obtains in standard microeconomic theory, where they are usually depicted as asocial. No single economic model at present is consistent with all the relevant field and laboratory data. It is argued that there are defensible ideas from outside the discipline which ought to be explored, relying on different conceptions of rationality and/or more radically social agents. Three such suggestions are considered, one concerning the expressive/communicative aspect of behaviour, a second the possibility of a part-whole relationship between interacting agents and the third a version of conformism. [source] Factor Endowments and the Private Provision of Public GoodsBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2004Simon Vicary H4 Abstract The paper examines the consequences of increasing the size of the community in the standard model of the private provision of public goods when costs are variable. In contrast to an economy with fixed costs, the provision of the public good can fall with a larger community, and an increased provision of the public good is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for individual utility to rise. The paper also contributes to the literature on immiserizing growth in that it shows that capital accumulation can possibly result in lower utility for all individuals. [source] Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public GoodsBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 1 2003Alessandro Balestrino Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public,good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation. [source] Elites, Rent-Cycling and Development: Adjustment to Land Scarcity in Mauritius, Kenya and Côte d'IvoireDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 4 2010Richard M. Auty According to rent-cycling theory, low rent aligns the interests of the elite and the majority in providing public goods and efficiency incentives to promote economic growth, while high rent risks deflecting the elite into self-enriching rent deployment, which distorts the economy and triggers a collapse from which recovery is protracted because rent recipients resist reform. The theory also predicts, however, that this collapse will self-correct by shrinking per capita rent, which strengthens incentives for wealth creation. This article tests the prediction in Mauritius, Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire where intensifying land scarcity has shrunk per capita rent; Mauritius meets the prediction, but Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire do not. [source] Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in IndiaECONOMETRICA, Issue 5 2004Raghabendra Chattopadhyay This paper uses political reservations for women in India to study the impact of women's leadership on policy decisions. Since the mid-1990's, one third of Village Council head positions in India have been randomly reserved for a woman: In these councils only women could be elected to the position of head. Village Councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas. Using a dataset we collected on 265 Village Councils in West Bengal and Rajasthan, we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved Village Councils. We show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided. Specifically, leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders. [source] PRINCIPLES AND THEORIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2006Peter A. Watt The role of local government is viewed in the context of the overall role of government per se. A particular advantage of local government lies in its ability to arrange for the provision of local public goods in line with local tastes and preferences. A number of arguments suggest that local governments should be assigned adequate powers of local taxation to finance their expenditure responsibilities rather than having to rely on central government grant. [source] Robust International Comparisons of Distributions of Disposable Income and Regional Public GoodsECONOMICA, Issue 303 2009NICOLAS GRAVEL The paper provides robust normative comparisons of 12 OECD countries based on their distributions of disposable income and access to two regional public goods: infant mortality and pupil,teacher ratios at public schools. Comparisons are performed using two and three-dimensional dominance criteria that coincide with the unanimity of utilitarian judgments taken over specific classes of utility functions. The criteria succeed in ranking conclusively about 30% of all possible comparisons in the two-dimensional case, compared with 67% for one-dimensional income-based comparisons and 6% for three-dimensional ones. Introducing local public goods seems to worsen the relative standing of Anglo-Saxon countries. [source] Political Competition in Weak StatesECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2001Eliana La Ferrara In the developing areas, politics is often undemocratic, states lack a monopoly over violence, and politicians play upon cultural identities. To analyze politics in such settings, we develop a model in which politicians compete to build a revenue yielding constituency. Citizens occupy fixed locations and politicians seek to maximize rents. To secure revenues, politicians must incur the costs of providing local public goods and mobilizing security services. Citizens must participate, i.e. pay taxes; but can choose which leader to support. The model enables us to explore the impact of cultural identities and varying notions of military power. [source] A Competitive, Sustainable and Diverse Agriculture: A View of the CAP Beyond 2013 Pour une agriculture compétitive, durable and variée : un point de vue sur la PAC après 2013 Eine wettbewerbsfähige, nachhaltige und vielfältige Landwirtschaft: Ein Ausblick auf die GAP nach 2013EUROCHOICES, Issue 2 2010Kris Peeters Summary A Competitive, Sustainable and Diverse Agriculture: A View of the CAP Beyond 2013 New challenges make clear that past achievements of the CAP cannot be taken for granted. A strong European agricultural policy remains necessary after 2013, at the service of Europe's citizens and agricultural sector. However, in order to realise the vision embedded in the European agricultural model, the CAP will have to evolve. Beyond dealing with the negative consequences of the economic crisis, more attention should go to competitiveness and entrepreneurship. The functioning of the supply chain should be improved leading to a fairer distribution of costs and benefits. Producer organisations should be expanded and strengthened. Work is needed to put into practice the concept of green growth and to explore the synergy between the demand for public goods and the need for higher farm income. An improved system of direct support remains justified, to compensate for extra costs and to stabilise income. The CAP post-2013 should offer a strong EU framework, able to meet shared challenges, with clear objectives and sufficient funding. Within that framework, diversity is a fact, and regions should be able to deploy CAP policies and funds in a more flexible way to accommodate local needs and problems and to be able to react to changing circumstances. De par l'apparition de nouveaux défis, il est clair que les réalisations antérieures de la PAC ne peuvent être considérées comme acquises.Une politique agricole européenne forte, au service des citoyens et du secteur agricole de l'Europe, reste indispensable après 2013. Cependant, pour concrétiser la vision comprise dans le modèle agricole européen, la PAC devra évoluer. Au-delà du traitement des conséquences négatives de la crise économique, l'attention doit se porter davantage sur la compétitivité et l'esprit d'entreprise. Il faudrait améliorer le fonctionnement de la filière de l'offre pour obtenir une répartition des coûts et des avantages plus équitable. Les organisations de producteurs devraient se développer et se renforcer. Des travaux sont nécessaires pour mettre en pratique le concept de croissance verte et pour étudier les synergies entre la demande de biens d'intérêt public et le renforcement nécessaire des revenus agricoles. Un système de soutien direct amélioré reste justifié, pour compenser les coûts supplémentaires et stabiliser les revenus. La PAC d'après 2013 devrait fournir un cadre européen solide, capable d'atteindre les défis partagés, avec des objectifs clairs et des financements suffisants. Au sein de ce cadre, la diversité est un fait et les régions devraient pouvoir déployer les politiques et les fonds de la PAC de manière plus flexible pour répondre aux besoins et problèmes locaux et pour permettre de réagir aux changements. Neue Herausforderungen lassen erkennen, dass die früheren Erfolge der GAP nicht als selbstverständlich angesehen werden können.Nach 2013 wird zum Wohle der Bürger und des Agrarsektors in Europa nach wie vor eine stabile europäische Agrarpolitik gebraucht. Die GAP wird sich jedoch weiterentwickeln müssen, um der Vision aus dem europäischen Agrarmodell entsprechen zu können. Das Augenmerk sollte hierbei nicht nur auf den Umgang mit den negativen Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftskrise, sondern ebenfalls auf Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Unternehmertum gerichtet werden. Die Funktionsfähigkeit der Wertschöpfungskette sollte erhöht werden und zu einer gerechteren Verteilung von Kosten und Nutzen führen. Erzeugerorganisationen sollten ausgeweitet und gestärkt werden. Es muss viel getan werden, um das Konzept des Grünen Wachstums umzusetzen und die Synergien zwischen der Nachfrage nach öffentlichen Gütern und der Notwendigkeit für höhere Einkommen in der Landwirtschaft zu untersuchen. Ein verbessertes System für die Direktzahlungen ist nach wie vor gerechtfertigt, um zusätzliche Kosten auszugleichen und die Einkommen zu stabilisieren. Nach 2013 sollte die GAP einen stabilen EU-Rahmen bieten, um den gemeinsamen Herausforderungen mit klaren Zielen und ausreichender Finanzierung begegnen zu können. Innerhalb dieses Rahmens ist Platz für Diversität, und die Regionen sollten dazu in der Lage sein, die Politikmaßnahmen der GAP flexibler einzusetzen, um auf die Bedürfnisse vor Ort reagieren und sich den wechselnden Bedingungen anpassen zu können. [source] A conceptual framework for understanding global and transnational public goods for healthFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2002Todd Sandler Abstract The paper presents two taxonomies for classifying global and transnational health-promoting activities according to three parameters of publicness , non-rivalry of benefits, non-excludability of non-payers and the aggregation technologies. Based on these taxonomies and their implications for efficiency and equity, this paper identifies the need for international cooperation in some, but certainly not all, areas concerning the provision of such health-promoting activities. Additionally, institutional responses are evaluated in light of the various health-promoting activities. The roles of multilaterals, non-governmental organisations, foundations and nations are addressed. A host of current global health issues , for example, public-private partnerships, international orphan drug legislature and patent protection , are addressed. [source] Environmental Values and Water PolicyGEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003Jeff Bennett Abstract The emergence of water markets has heralded the prospect of increased efficiency in the use of the resource for extractive purposes. However, water markets have not encompassed all elements of demand for the resource. Notably, demands for the environmental public goods provided by river flows have not been revealed in markets. State Governments have instituted regulations requiring ,environmental flows' to be quarantined from the market allocation process. This policy has triggered negative responses from irrigators and conservationists. Lobby groups have found that the process of determining environmental flows is a prospective site for rent seeking. To avoid policy being driven by rent seeking, information on the costs and benefits of environmental flows is useful. Whereas the costs of environmental flows are readily assessed through reference to market data on irrigators' surpluses foregone, the benefits must be estimated through the use of non-market, stated preference valuation techniques. These techniques , including contingent valuation and choice modelling , remain controversial. Some argue that they should not be used on ethical grounds. Others argue that they cannot be used on technical grounds. These arguments are discussed in this paper, using the context of the water policy debate. The evidence is that stated preference techniques are being used, and applications have been performed in Australia in the context of riverine health. However their use remains restricted relative to the scale of the Australian natural resource management task. Some possible explanations for this limited up-take are provided along with some suggested ways forward. [source] The value of formative investment in organizational federationsHUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH, Issue 1 2001AJ Flanagin Public goods theories highlight an incentive system that rewards ,free riding' on the contributions of early contributors toward collective actions. However, because such theories focus on creation of the good, they may underestimate returns that accrue to early contributors subsequent to the good's realization. The concept of formative investment is introduced here to describe the extent to which organizations help to create public goods such as interorganizational linkages like participatory federations. Data from the CEOs of 48 organizations involved in a participatory federation were used to assess how an organization's level of formative investment is related to later patterns of dependency and interaction among federation members. Findings suggest that from a long-term perspective, and for goods that involve communication and interaction, the incentive structure may not be so favorable for free riders. To the extent that organizations with high formative investment have the capability to envision the future and communicate that vision to potential federation partners, they may be able to both reduce free riding and secure for themselves advantageous positions in the subsequent network of relations. [source] The American national interest and global public goodsINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2002Joseph S. Nye Jr Since the end of the Cold War, Americans have been divided over how to be involved with the rest of the world. In the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks, the debate between those who favour a unilateral foreign policy and those who advocate a multilateral approach has been brought to the fore in American politics and the media. In this article, Joseph Nye proposes a conception of the American national interest grounded in multilateralism. He argues that, although the United States remains the world's leading power, it cannot act alone to solve global problems such as transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global warming. Although the United States is the only country in a position to take the lead in protecting ,global public goods', such as an open international economic system and international stability, it will maintain its current predominance only if it works to establish international consensus on issues of global importance. [source] ESTIMATING THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM BENEFITS OF LARGE CHANGES IN SPATIALLY DELINEATED PUBLIC GOODS*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2004Holger Sieg The purpose of this article is to report a new approach for measuring the general equilibrium willingness to pay for large changes in spatially delineated public goods such as air quality. We estimate the parameters of a locational equilibrium model and compute equilibria for alternative scenarios characterizing the availability of public goods within a system of communities. Welfare measures take into consideration the adjustments of households in equilibrium to nonmarginal changes in public goods. The framework is used to analyze willingness to pay for reductions in ozone concentrations in Southern California between 1990 and 1995. [source] Determinants of Voter Support for a Five-Year Ban on the Cultivation of Genetically Modified Crops in SwitzerlandJOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008Felix Schläpfer D62; D72; Q26 Abstract While much effort has been devoted to estimating market premiums for non-genetically modified (GM) food, the results of such research are largely silent about the preferences for the public good aspects, or externalities, of GM food production. For public goods, the closest substitute of private consumption decisions is voting on referenda. In November 2005, 55.7% of 2 million Swiss voters approved a five-year moratorium (ban) on the commercial cultivation of GM plants in Switzerland. The present study examines how individual voting decisions were determined by: (i) socioeconomic characteristics; (ii) political preference/ideology; and (iii) agreement with a series of arguments in favour and against the use of GM plants in Swiss agriculture. The analysis is based on the data of the regular voter survey undertaken after the national-level voting in Switzerland. The results suggest that current concerns about the use of genetically engineered plants in agriculture may not automatically decrease with higher levels of education/knowledge and generational change. Furthermore, analysis of voter motives suggests that public support for a ban on GM crops may be even larger in other countries, where industrial interests in crop biotechnology are less pronounced. [source] The Reform of Support Mechanisms for Upland Farming: Paying for Public Goods in the Severely Disadvantaged Areas of EnglandJOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2007Nick Hanley Abstract The incomes of hill-farmers in ,Less Favoured Areas' of the UK have traditionally been supported by payments related to their production levels. Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and changes in policy objectives within the UK imply a need to change this basis of support. We investigate the option of paying for public goods produced, focusing on landscape features and habitats. A choice experiment study is used to estimate willingness to pay for different landscape features in four Severely Disadvantaged Areas of England. We find significant differences in the value of landscape features, both within and across regions, and parallel differences in the aggregate value of different policy options for upland areas. We discuss briefly how this information could be included in a spatially differentiated payments scheme. [source] Decomposing the Value of Agricultural Multifunctionality: Combining Contingent Valuation and the Analytical Hierarchy ProcessJOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2007Zein Kallas Q18; Q11; Q25 Abstract Agricultural multifunctionality is the recognition of the joint exercise of economic, environmental and social functions by this sector. Nevertheless, not all these contributions to society are valued in markets, moreover a large share of them are public goods. For this reason, in order to make this concept of multifunctionality operative for the design of public policies, it is necessary to estimate the social demand of such functions. The objective of this article was to implement an empirical application along these lines. For this purpose, the agricultural system of cereal steppes in Tierra de Campos in Spain is taken as a case study. The economic valuation technique used relies on a combined implementation of contingent valuation and the analytical hierarchy process. The results obtained demonstrate the existence of a significant demand for the different attributes included in the multifunctionality concept, although this demand is heterogeneous and is based on the socioeconomic characteristics of individual persons. [source] A general model of the public goods dilemmaJOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, Issue 6 2010S. A. Frank Abstract An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection favours individual contribution to public goods only when some benefit to the individual offsets the cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio, parasite virulence, microbial metabolism, punishment of noncooperators, and nearly all aspects of sociality have been analysed as public goods shaped by kin and group selection. Here, I develop two general aspects of the public goods problem that have received relatively little attention. First, variation in individual resources favours selfish individuals to vary their allocation to public goods. Those individuals better endowed contribute their excess resources to public benefit, whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute less to the public good. Thus, purely selfish behaviour causes individuals to stratify into upper classes that contribute greatly to public benefit and social cohesion and to lower classes that contribute little to the public good. Second, if group success absolutely requires production of the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively high. By contrast, if group success depends weakly on the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively weak. Stated in this way, it is obvious that the role of baseline success is important. However, discussions of public goods problems sometimes fail to emphasize this point sufficiently. The models here suggest simple tests for the roles of resource variation and baseline success. Given the widespread importance of public goods, better models and tests would greatly deepen our understanding of many processes in biology and sociality. [source] The political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture: an empirical studyAGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2000Johan F.M. Swinnen Abstract The paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision-making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture. We use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures (PARI). The empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses. The analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers, but also to invest in public agricultural research. Furthermore, the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision-making on PARI is non-linear and conditional on other factors. Regarding the impact of political institutions, the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers (agricultural protection), nor to lower investment in public goods (PARI). ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||