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Public Accountants (public + accountant)
Kinds of Public Accountants Selected AbstractsIndependence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental Investigation,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2003Nicholas Dopuch Abstract In this study, we use experimental markets to assess the effect of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) new independence rule on investors' perceptions of independence, investors' payoff distributions, and market prices. The new rule requires client firms to disclose in their annual proxy statements the amount of nonaudit fees paid to their auditors. The new disclosure is intended to inform investors of auditors' incentives to compromise their independence. Our experimental design is a 2 3 between-subjects design, where we control the presence (unbiased reports) or absence of auditor independence in fact (biased reports). While independence in fact was not immediately observable to investors, we controlled for independence in appearance by varying the public disclosure of the extent of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the client. In one market setting, investors were not given any information about whether the auditor provided such nonaudit services; in a second setting, investors were explicitly informed that the auditor did not provide any non-audit services; and in a third setting, investors were told that the auditor provided nonaudit services that could be perceived to have an adverse effect on independence in fact. We found that disclosures of nonaudit services reduced the accuracy of investors' beliefs of auditors' independence in fact when independence in appearance was inconsistent with independence in fact. This then caused prices of assets to deviate more from their economic predictions (lower market efficiency) in the inconsistent settings relative to the no-disclosure and consistent settings. Thus, disclosures of fees for nonaudit services could reduce the efficiency of capital markets if such disclosures result in investors forming inaccurate beliefs of auditor independence in fact - that is, auditors appear independent but they are not independent in fact, or vice versa. The latter is the maintained position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which argued against the new rule. Further research is needed to assess the degree of correspondence between independence in fact and independence in appearance. [source] Current issues challenging the professionJOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2010Jack T. Ciesielski The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants held its annual Current Securities and Exchange Commission and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Conference on December 7,9, 2009. As auditors deal with various client accounting issues, and serve as gatekeepers in the whole financial reporting process, the topics presented at the conference serve as reminders for smart auditors,who incorporate them into their audit plans. The authors provide an overview of the issues and challenges discussed at the conference. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] THE AICPA IN CRISIS AND HOW IT IMPACTS THE BUSINESS LAW DISPUTEJOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES EDUCATION, Issue 2 2002Sally Gunz The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) continues to strengthen the profession's reputation for integrity, objectivity and independence; reinforce core services such as tax, accounting, audit and attestation; and carve out new market space for virtually unlimited business opportunities for CPAs. [source] A new look at IT governanceJOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 5 2008Leslee N. Higgins IT governance has been named the number two technology issue in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' 2008 Top Ten Technology Initiatives list. And IT governance affects managers and IT users throughout a company. So what is the current state of IT governance, especially regarding risk management and compliance requirements? © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2000DENNIS H. CAPLAN Abstract Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost-effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' "deep pockets" provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness. [source] Machiavellianism in public accountants: some additional Canadian evidenceBUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 4 2009Anamitra Shome The current study surveys practising Canadian public accountants in Canada in both Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms to determine their orientation with respect to Machiavellianism, defined as ,attending to one's interests much more than to others'. Results indicate that while there are no significant differences in Machiavellianism between public accountants in the upper-level positions (managers and partners), partners are significantly less Machiavellian than seniors. These results are consistent with previous studies on Canadian public accountants. [source] Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2000DENNIS H. CAPLAN Abstract Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost-effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' "deep pockets" provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness. [source] |