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Psychological Structure (psychological + structure)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Psychology75%

Selected Abstracts

Work values: Development of a new three-dimensional structure based on confirmatory smallest space analysis

JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, Issue 7 2010
Sean T. Lyons
We tested the psychological structure of the work values ratings of 119,167 Canadian workers using confirmatory smallest space analysis (SSA). Contrary to our hypotheses, the SSA did not support a two-dimensional radex structure, but suggested a three-dimensional cylindrex structure composed of three facets: (a) A modality facet comprised of four types of work values (cognitive, instrumental, social, and prestige) forming angular sectors of a circle; (b) a growth-orientation facet with growth-related work aspects located closest to the center of the circle and context-related work aspects located in the peripheral ring; and (c) a level of focus facet that divided the overall cylindrical structure into three separate vertical levels (individual, job/organizational, and societal). The findings extend the theory of work values by providing a richer typology of work values and a more complete picture of the complex structure of their inter-relations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Working through the end of civilization

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, Issue 2 2007
JONATHAN LEAR
This is an account of how a civilization works through the problems it faces when it is threatened with destruction. It focuses on the example of the Crow Nation, an Indian tribe of the northwest plains of North America, and their last great chief Plenty Coups. Psychoanalytic ideas play a crucial role in explaining how a creative response was possible. In particular, their collective use of dream-visions and dream-interpretation made possible the creation of a new ego ideal for the tribe. This allowed for the transformation of traditional allocations of shame and humiliation. It also allowed for the possibility of transformation of psychological structure. And it opened up new possibilities for what might count as flourishing as a Crow. Conversely, the threat of civilizational collapse allows us to see new possibilities for the conceptual development of psychoanalysis. In particular, psychoanalysis needs to recognize that destruction can occur at the level of the culture while the individuals are not physically harmed. The psychological states of these individuals can be various and complex and cannot be neatly summed up under the category of trauma. A culture can be devastated, while there is no one-to-one relation to the psychological states of the individuals who participate in that culture. It is also true that a collapse of a way of life makes a variety of psychological states impossible. Coming to understand these phenomena is essential to understanding how a culture works through threats to its very existence. [source]

Approaching archetypes: reconsidering innateness

THE JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2010
Erik Goodwyn
Abstract:, The question of innateness has hounded Jungian psychology since Jung originally postulated the archetype as an a priori structure within the psyche. During his life and after his death he was continually accused of Lamarckianism and criticized for his theory that the archetypes existed as prior structures. More recently, with the advent of genetic research and the human genome project, the idea that psychological structures can be innate has come under even harsher criticism even within Jungian thought. There appears to be a growing consensus that Jung's idea of innate psychological structures was misguided, and that perhaps the archetype-as-such should be abandoned for more developmental and ,emergent' theories of the psyche. The purpose of this essay is to question this conclusion, and introduce some literature on psychological innateness that appears relevant to this discussion. Translations of Abstract La question de l'innéité a talonné la psychologie jungienne dès le moment où Jung postula que l'archétype était une structure a priori contenue dans la psyché. Tout au long de sa vie et après sa mort, il fut constamment accusé de lamarckisme et critiqué pour sa théorie de l'existence des archétypes comme structures a priori. Plus récemment, avec l'avènement des recherches en génétique et le projet du génome humain, l'idée que les structures psychologiques pourraient être innées a suscité les foudres de la critique, y compris au sein même de la pensée jungienne. Il semblerait qu'il y ait un consensus croissant quant au caractère erroné de la théorie de Jung de l'existence de structures psychologiques innées, ainsi qu'une tendance générale à considérer que l'archétype-en-soi devrait être abandonné au profit de théories psychiques plus développementales et «émergentes ». Le but de cet essai est d'interroger une telle conclusion et d'introduire un peu de littérature sur l'innéité psychologique afin d'alimenter la discussion. Die Frage nach dem Angeborenen hat die jungianische Psychologie umgetrieben seit Jung den Archetyp als eine a priori in der Psyche vorhandene Struktur postulierte. Während seines Lebens und nach seinem Tode wurde er fortwährend des Lamarckismusses beschuldigt und für seine Theorie kritisiert, nach der die Archetypen als a-priori-Strukturen vorhanden sein sollen. Unlängst, mit dem Aufblühen der genetischen Forschung und dem Projekt der Entschlüsselung des menschlichen Genoms, erntete die Idee, daß psychische Strukturen angeboren sein könnten, selbst im jungianischen Denken noch harschere Kritik. Es scheint einen wachsenden Konsens darüber zu geben, daß Jungs Idee der angeborenen psychischen Strukturen irreführend sei und daß vielleicht der Archetyp-an-sich aufgegeben werden sollte zugunsten von entwicklungspsychologischen und ,emergenten' Theorien des Seelischen. Der Zweck dieses Essays ist es, diesen Schluß in Frage zu stellen und einige Literatur zum psychisch Angeborenen vorzustellen, die für diese Diskussion relevant zu sein scheint. La questione dell' innato ha perseguitatola psicologia junghiana da quando originariamente Jung considerò l'archetipo come una struttura a priori all'interno della psiche. Durante la vita e anche dopo la morte venne continuamente accusato di Lamarchismo e criticato per la sua teoria degli archetipi come struttura a priori. Più recentemente, con l'avvento della ricerca genetica e del progetto del genoma umano, l'idea che strutture psicologiche possano essere innate è stata criticata ancora più duramente anche all'interno del pensiero junghiano. Sembra esserci un crescente consenso al fatto che l'idea junghiana di strutture psicologiche innate sia sviante e che forse l'archetipo in quanto tale debba essere abbandonato in favore di teorie della psiche più evolutive e ,emergenti'. Lo scopo di questo lavoro è di mettere in discussione tale conclusione, e porta della letteratura su aspetti psicologici innati rilevante per questa discussione. La pregunta sobre lo innato ha acosado a la psicología Jungiana desde que Jung postuló originalmente el arquetipo como una estructura a priori dentro de la psique. Durante su vida y después su muerte fue acusado continuamente de Lamarckianismo y criticado para su teoría de que los arquetipos existieron como a priori. Más recientemente, con el advenimiento de investigación genética y el proyecto genoma humano, la idea que las estructuras psicológicas puedan ser innatas, ha surgido una crítica más dura aún dentro del pensamiento Jungiano. Allí parece haber un consenso creciente en relación a que la idea de Jung de estructuras psicológicas innatas fue confusa, y que quizás la idea del arquetipo como-tal, debe ser abandonada y dar cabida a teorías más desarrolladas y ,actualizadas' de la psique. El propósito de este ensayo es de cuestionar esta conclusión, e introducir alguna literatura sobre lo innato psicológico, la cual pereciera pertinente en esta discusión. [source]