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Psychological Phenomena (psychological + phenomenon)
Selected AbstractsParanormal beliefs: their dimensionality and correlatesEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY, Issue 7 2006Marjaana Lindeman Abstract Lack of conceptual clarity and multivariate empirical studies has troubled research on superstitious, magical and paranormal beliefs. We defined paranormal beliefs as beliefs in physical, biological or psychological phenomena that feature core ontological properties of another ontological category. The aim was to bring together a range of beliefs and their potential correlates, to analyse whether the beliefs form independent subsets, and to test a structural model of the beliefs and their potential correlates. The results (N,=,3261) showed that the beliefs could be best described by one higher-order factor. There were also four lower-order factors of paranormal beliefs but their explanatory power was low. Magico-religious beliefs were best explained by high intuitive thinking, a humanistic world view and low analytical thinking. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Cross-Cultural PsychologyJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 1 2003Carl Ratner Carl Ratner and Lumei Hui, Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Cross-Cultural Psychology, pp. 67,93. Although cross-cultural psychology has advanced our understanding of cultural aspects of psychology, it is marred by theoretical and methodological flaws. These flaws include misunderstanding cultural issues and the manner in which they bear on psychology; obscuring the relation between biology, culture, and psychology; inadequately defining and measuring cultural factors and psychological phenomena; erroneously analysing data and drawing faulty conclusions about the cultural character of psychology. This article identifies fundamental theoretical and methodological errors that have appeared in prominent cross-cultural psychological research. Suggestions for overcoming them are then outlined. [source] Emotions and Interpersonal Relationships: Toward a Person-Centered Conceptualization of Emotions and CopingJOURNAL OF PERSONALITY, Issue 1 2006Richard S. Lazarus ABSTRACT This essay describes my theory of emotions. I make a case for studying discrete emotions in the context of four processes that represent the central features of my theoretical system: appraising, coping, flow of actions and reactions, and relational meaning. I explain why coping is a key feature of the emotion process, and I discuss issues related to the measurement of coping and the importance of understanding coping processes in the context of personality and situational demands. I make the argument that emotions are best studied as narratives, and I offer one such narrative in the form of a case study to demonstrate how emotions can best be understood in the context of an interpersonal relationship and by considering individual differences, interpersonal transactions, and relational meaning. I conclude this essay with a caution that field specialization may interfere with our understanding of emotions and other psychological phenomena, and I underscore the virtues of ipsative-normative research designs as a way to move closer to a person-centered personality psychology. [source] Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and EpistemologyMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2001Dale Jacquette Psychologism is a philosophical ideology that seeks to explain the principles of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology as psychological phenomena. Psychologism has been the storm center of concerted criticisms since the nineteenth century, and is thought by many to have been refuted once and for all by Kant, Frege, Husserl, and others. The project of accounting for objective philosophical or mathematical truths in terms of subjective psychological states has been largely discredited in mainstream analytic thought. Ironically, psychologism has resurfaced in unexpected guises in the form of intuitionistic logic and mathematics, cognitivism, and naturalized epistemology. I examine some of the principal objections to psychologism , distinguishing roughly between good and bad or philosophically acceptable versus unacceptable psychologism , and consider the extent to which a new wave of psychologism may be gaining prominence in contemporary philosophy, and the light its successes and failures may shed on the original concept and underlying perspective of classical psychologism. [source] | ||||||||||