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Property System (property + system)
Selected AbstractsIntellectual Property System in China: A Study of the Grant Lags and RatiosTHE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 1 2007Deli Yang This article examines the intellectual property (IP) system in China with a particular focus on grant lags and grant ratios in patents, utility models, industrial designs and trademarks of residents and non-residents. The findings are derived from the empirical study of IP statistics (1985,2002). They demonstrate that trademark applicants endure the longest and patents enjoy the shortest grant lags in China according to the best models, and residents are overall more favoured than non-residents. The research concludes that national treatment of residents and non-residents should apply in both economic policy and practice, which also provides a new research domain. [source] The Chilean Agrarian Transformation: Agrarian Reform and Capitalist ,Partial' Counter-Agrarian Reform, 1964,1980JOURNAL OF AGRARIAN CHANGE, Issue 1 2007Free-Market Neoliberalism, Part 1: Reformism, Socialism This article, which is published in two parts, is an empirical analysis of the Chilean agrarian reform (1964,1973) and ,partial' counter-agrarian reform (1974,1980). Its aim is to explain and interpret their logic and the changes they brought to Chile's agrarian property regime in particular and Chilean life in general. Chile's agrarian reform was successful in expropriating (under the Frei and Allende administrations, 1964,1973) the great estates of the hacienda landed property system. The capitalist ,partial' counter-reform then redistributed them (under the military, 1974,1980). CORA, the country's agency for agrarian reform, expropriated and subsequently redistributed 5809 estates of almost 10 million hectares, or 59 per cent of Chile's agricultural farmland. A large amount of the expropriated land (41 per cent) benefited 54,000 peasant households with small-sized family farms and house-sites. The rest of the farmland benefited efficient and competitive commercial farmers and agro-business and consolidated medium-sized farms. Of central concern is the role of the agrarian reform and subsequent ,partial' counter-reform processes in fostering the transformation of the erstwhile agrarian structure of the hacienda system toward agrarian capitalism. The redistribution of the agricultural land previously expropriated made possible the formation of an agro-industrial bourgeoisie, small commercial farmers, an open land market and a dynamic agricultural sector. While, however, under military rule, a selected few benefited with family farms and became independent agricultural producers, a large majority of reformed and non-reformed campesinos were torn from the land to become non-propertied proletarians in a rapidly modernizing but highly exclusionary agricultural sector. [source] Reflections on Lack of a Patent System throughout China's Long HistoryTHE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 2 2009Deming Liu The accepted wisdom is that the patent system originated in Europe and that China did not have such an indigenous system throughout its history. The reasons for the lack of such a system are not often explored among legal scholars although, for decades, historians have debated on a related matter of why the Industrial Revolution did not start in China after its centuries' lead in science and technology. It appears that legal scholars generally accept that Confucian philosophy precluded an intellectual property system in China including a patent system. The article aims to dispute this belief by showing that socioeconomic and geographical factors underscored the main reasons for the lack of a patent system in ancient China. [source] Fishing Rights as an Example of the Economic Rhetoric of Privatization: Calling for an Implicated Economics,CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY/REVUE CANADIENNE DE SOCIOLOGIE, Issue 3 2000Melanie G. Wiber Au cours des dernières années, toutes les sciences sociales ont eu à produire des travaux de recherche aux répercussions d'ordre public. Mais dans quelle mesure ces sciences sociales devraient-elles inter-venir dans le domaine de l'ordre public quand leurs recommandations dans ce domaine créent des situations inattendues et préjudiciables? Dans cet article, nous nous penchons sur cette question en étudiant l'exemple de l'économie et des modèles de droits privés de propriété dans les pêcheries des provinces de l'Atlantique. Ces modèles sont comparés et mis en contraste avec les modèles anthropologiques et juridiques afin de montrer dans quel domaine et pour quelle raison l'économie s'est égarée dans l'élaboration de modèles de droits de propriété sur les ressources halieutiques. De ce fait, les recommandations de politique économique en matière de droits de propriéte dans l'industrie de la pêche sont erronées. En conclusion, nous proposons que les économistes soignent leur rhétorique afin de susciter des attentes et de créer des solutions qui donnent un caractère plus raisonnable à leurs recommandations. In recent years, all the social sciences have come under pressure to produce research that has public policy implications. But how implicated should those social sciences be when their policy advice leads to unexpected and perhaps detrimental outcomes? This paper explores this issue using the example of economics and private property rights in the Canadian Maritime fisheries. It compares and contrasts economic models of property rights with those in anthropology and law to show where and why economics has gone astray in its fish property rights models. It suggests that, having gone astray, economic policy advice on fisheries property systems is flawed. It concludes that economists should pay more attention to the role of their rhetoric in the construction of expectations and outcomes that make their recommendations seem the more reasonable. [source] |