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Project Value (project + value)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	75%

Selected Abstracts

Real Options: Meeting the Georgetown Challange

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2005
Thomas E. Copeland
In response to the demand for a single, generally accepted real options methodology, this article proposes a four-step process leading to a practical solution to most applications of real option analysis. The first step is familiar: calculate the standard net present value of the project assuming no managerial flexibility, which results in a value estimate (and a "branch" of a decision tree) for each year of the project's life. The second step estimates the volatility of the value of the project and produces a value tree designed to capture the main sources of uncertainty. Note that the authors focus on the uncertainty about overall project value, which is driven by uncertainty in revenue growth, operating margins, operating leverage, input costs, and technology. The key point here is that, in contrast to many real options approaches, none of these variables taken alone is assumed to be a reliable surrogate for the uncertainty of the project itself. For example, in assessing the option value of a proven oil reserve, the relevant measure of volatility is the volatility not of oil prices, but of the value of the operating entity,that is, the project value without leverage. The third step attempts to capture managerial flexibility using a decision "tree" that illustrates the decisions to be made, their possible outcomes, and their corresponding probabilities. The article illustrate various kinds of applications, including a phased investment in a chemical plant (which is treated as a compound option) and an investment in a peak-load power plant (a switching option with changing variance, which precludes the use of constant risk-neutral probabilities as in standard decision tree analysis). The fourth and final step uses a "no-arbitrage" approach to form a replicating portfolio with the same payouts as the real option. For most corporate investment projects, it is impossible to locate a "twin security" that trades in the market. In the absence of such a security, the conventional NPV of a project (again, without flexibility) is the best candidate for a perfectly correlated underlying asset because it represents management's best estimate of value based on the expected cash flows of the project. [source]

Economic Evaluation of Scale Dependent Technology Investments

PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2005
Phillip J. Lederer
We study the effect of financial risk on the economic evaluation of a project with capacity decisions. Capacity decisions have an important effect on the project,s value through the up-front investment, the associated operating cost, and constraints on output. However, increased scale also affects the financial risk of the project through its effect on the operating leverage of the investment. Although it has long been recognized in the finance literature that operating leverage affects project risk, this result has not been incorporated in the operations management literature when evaluating projects. We study the decision problem of a firm that must choose project scale. Future cash flow uncertainty is introduced by uncertain future market prices. The firm's capacity decision affects the firm's potential sales, its expected price for output, and its costs. We study the firm's profit maximizing scale decision using the CAPM model for risk adjustment. Our results include that project risk, as measured by the required rate of return, is related to the inverse of the expected profit per unit sold. We also show that project risk is related to the scale choice. In contrast, in traditional discounted cash flow analysis (DCF), a fixed prescribed rate is used to evaluate the project and choose its scale. When a fixed rate is used with DCF, a manager will ignore the effect of scale on risk and choose suboptimal capacity that reduces project value. S/he will also misestimate project value. Use of DCF for choosing scale is studied for two special cases. It is shown that if the manager is directed to use a prescribed discount rate that induces the optimal scale decision, then the manager will greatly undervalue the project. In contrast, if the discount rate is set to the risk of the optimally-scaled project, the manager will undersize the project by a small amount, and slightly undervalue the project with the economic impact of the error being small. These results underline the importance of understanding the source of financial risk in projects where risk is endogenous to the project design. [source]

Patents and R&D as Real Options

ECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 1 2004
Eduardo S. Schwartz
This article develops and implements a simulation approach to value patents and patent-protected R&D projects based on the Real Options approach. It takes into account uncertainty in the cost-to-completion of the project, uncertainty in the cash flows to be generated from the project, and the possibility of catastrophic events that could put an end to the effort before it is completed. It also allows for the possibility of abandoning the project when costs turn out to be larger than expected or when estimated cash flows turn out to be smaller than anticipated. This abandonment option represents a very substantial part of the project's value when the project is marginal or/and when uncertainty is large. The model presented can be used to evaluate the effects of regulation on the cost of innovation and the amount on innovative output. The main focus of the article is the pharmaceutical industry. The framework, however, applies just as well to other research-intensive industries such as software or hardware development. (J.E.L.:G31, O22, O32). [source]

Common and Private Values of the Firm in Tax Competition

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2001
David Scoones
We develop a simple model of interregional tax competition to explore how the balance between common and region-specific aspects of a project's value affects the magnitudes of tax breaks offered by governments, when the firm possesses private information on the region-specific values. We examine cases in which the tax applies to both the common and private values and to each component separately. The model predicts that when the common and observable part of the value of a project increases relative to the variance of the region-specific private values, the stringency of competition reduces the equilibrium tax rate. Conversely, if the competing regions are sufficiently different, bidding is less aggressive. One interpretation of the results is that firms that are observed to be large get better tax breaks. The intuition is closely related to the Bertrand model of differentiated product market competition. [source]