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Profit Sharing (profit + sharing)
Selected AbstractsThe Impact of Profit Sharing on the Performance of Financial Services Firms*JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 4 2005Michel Magnan abstract Relying on macro theories (agency and organizational control) as well as micro theories (goal setting and expectancy), this study investigates the impact of profit-sharing plan (PSP) adoption on the value creation process of financial services firms. The study relies on a comprehensive methodological approach that is both quantitative, with a dual cross-sectional/longitudinal (pre-post) design that compares PSP adopters with a control group of PSP non-adopter firms, and qualitative through interviews with some adopting firms' managing directors. Results show that firms adopting a PSP enhance their profitability in comparison to both their own prior performance and to firms that are not adopting a PSP. Results also show that the adoption of a PSP: (a) positively influences only profit drivers that are under employee control; and (b) is more likely to have a long term, positive impact on external profit drivers than on internal profit drivers. Qualitative data from field interviews corroborate and enrich these quantitative findings. [source] Corporate social performance: Creating resources to help organizations excelGLOBAL BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE, Issue 2 2008Bryan Dennis The most commonly employed theories of corporate social performance (CSP) tend to ignore firm-level processes and structures as sources of competitive advantage. But, by taking a resource-based view (RBV), and by enhancing a firm's capability to engage in socially responsible activities, it can potentially create its own competitive advantages. We examine four major components of CSP,community relations, the environment, diversity, and employee relations. And we show that the ability of a firm to develop its knowledge and skills,as well as policies and implementation plans and procedures,in each of these areas is a potential resource that may in fact provide competitive advantages and higher organizational performance, bringing benefits to both society and the firm. The community dimension evaluates the firm's performance in relationship to philanthropic giving and community support. The environmental aspect considers such firm stewardship activities as pollution prevention, global warming, and recycling. The diversity component measures CSP considering such factors as board member diversity and a firm's hiring, evaluation, training, and promotion policies concerning women and minorities. The employee relations dimension examines such socially responsible human resource practices as innovative employee involvement programs and profit sharing. Together, these capabilities can provide tangible and intangible resources that can provide the firm with competitive advantages. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Profit-sharing plans and affective commitment: Does the context matter?HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2009Alberto Bayo-Moriones Abstract This article analyzes the relationship between profit-sharing plans (PSP) and affective commitment and how it is affected by the context of the PSP application. Overall, there is a positive relationship between profit sharing and commitment that is strongest in very small firms. The efficacy of a PSP in improving employees' affective commitment appears to be greatest in firms with low job-related employee participation. Its application in workplaces where employees enjoy high levels of participation appears to have little impact and may even result in slight declines in affective commitment. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Using profit sharing to enhance employee attitudes: A longitudinal examination of the effects on trust and commitmentHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2002Jacqueline A-M. The ability of profit sharing to increase organizational performance via positive changes in employee attitudes has yielded mixed results. Drawing on principal agent, expectancy, and organizational justice theories, we assess how perceptions of profit sharing (capacity for individual contribution and organizational reciprocity) alter organizational commitment and trust in management using longitudinal data provided by 141 engineering employees. Favorable perceptions of profit sharing served to increase organizational commitment while only organizational reciprocity predicted trust in management. The relationship between organizational reciprocity and commitment was partially mediated by trust in management. Implications for the design of profit sharing initiatives are noted. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Attitudes, Expectations and SharingLABOUR, Issue 4 2003Sarah Brown Forward Links to Citing Articles Apology. Labour 19:4 801. Online publication date: 16-Dec-2005. Abstract., We explore the relationship between performance-related pay and the attitudes and expectations of a representative sample of British workers. Our results suggest that employees who participate in productivity-linked bonus schemes, discretionary bonus schemes, share ownership or profit sharing are more optimistic about future employment and pay and are generally more satisfied with their work environment. However, employees participating specifically in profit-sharing schemes are less likely to work as hard as they can, ceteris paribus. This is an intriguing finding, insinuating as it does that group-sharing schemes are unable to rout the temptation to free ride and thereby ensure a first best cooperative equilibrium. [source] Sourcing Through Auctions and AuditsPRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008Ying-Ju Chen Buyers often find that obtaining complete information about suppliers is costly. In such scenarios, there is a trade-off between the costs of obtaining information and the benefits that accrue to the owners of such information. There are also various ways in which the missing information can be obtained or inferred. In this paper, we compare the efficiency of obtaining information via the classical mechanism design approach, which relies on the information available before the contracts are designed, with that of an "audit-based" approach, which relies on the information obtained after the fact. In our model, a single buyer (the Stackelberg leader) wishes to procure a package of products or services from various competing suppliers that possess private cost information. We allow for arbitrary cost and revenue functions and can incorporate multiple cost and revenue drivers. We show how the buyer can optimize her profit and at the same time coordinate the channel by using a contract scheme involving auctions, audits, and profit sharing. We also examine the behavior of this mechanism when the supplier can exert effort to reduce cost but the cost of effort cannot be verified. We propose several mechanisms for different precontract informational scenarios and compare their performance. [source] Ownership, incentives, and the hold-up problemTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2006Tim Baldenius Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems. This ignores the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. I develop a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and "empire benefits." Owners of a vertically integrated firm will then provide division managers with low-powered incentives to induce them to bargain more cooperatively, resulting in higher investments and overall profit as compared with nonintegration. Vertical integration therefore mitigates hold-up problems even without profit sharing. [source] |