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Productivity Convergence (productivity + convergence)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Employment and Total Factor Productivity Convergence

KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 4 2006
David Greasley
SUMMARY Using a new 16-country data set we demonstrate a robust negative employment-total factor productivity trade-off 1870,2004. Widely disparate cross country employment growth had a powerful long term influence on productivity dispersion. Unexceptional US productivity growth principally resulted from her exceptional employment growth rather than from her initially high productivity levels. The negative externalities associated with higher employment are shown to have dominated the diminishing of total factor productivity gaps among the 16 countries, and led to the erosion of US productivity leadership over the twentieth century. [source]

Post-War Growth, Productivity Convergence and Reconstruction

OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, Issue 5 2000
Werner Smolny
In this paper, it is shown that aggregate cross-country analyses of the growth process of the industrial countries should take reconstruction effects into account. The enormous growth rates in many European countries and in Japan in the fifties which often appear as outliers in aggregate analyses of productivity convergence can be understood as a catching-up with respect to the past. Neoclassical capital deepening combined with arguments from growth models relying on the stock of knowledge, knowledge spillovers and technological diffusion as the source of economic growth can explain the fast reconstruction after the war, without referring to country-specific growth factors. [source]

Convergence in Structure and Productivity in European Manufacturing?

GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2004
Klaus Gugler
Structural convergence; productivity convergence; growth of industries; European integration Abstract. We find fast convergence in productivity for 99 three-digit European industries over the 1985,98 period. Half of any productivity gap is closed on average in about 10,15 years. We explicitly formulate the steady-state assumptions for structural convergence to hold. Convergence in industrial structure is much slower than productivity catch-up with a half-life of around 50 years, a stylized fact which cannot easily be explained by the existing models of trade and growth. [source]

Agricultural Growth and Inter-Sectoral Linkages in a Developing Economy

JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2000
N. Gemmell
Does growth in the manufacturing sector of an economy spillover to agriculture, or do sectors share similar growth rates only when they share some common exogenous stimuli? The limited number of investigations of this issue, for cross-sections of countries, have found some evidence in favour of spillovers, though the methodologies used cannot readily separate correlation from causation. Adapting the Feder (1982) model of sectoral externalities to a time-series context, we examine how far agricultural output in Malaysia has been affected by inter-sectoral spillovers. Our results suggest that expansion of manufacturing output, though associated with reduced agricultural output in the short-run, is associated with agricultural expansion over the long-run. Service output growth on the other hand seems to have been inimical to agricultural growth in both the short- and long-runs, while causality testing supports the case for spillovers rather than "common causes". Evidence on sectoral productivity is consistent with neoclassical arguments suggesting that the benefits of higher productivity in manufacturing tend to spill over to agriculture, encouraging productivity convergence. [source]

Post-War Growth, Productivity Convergence and Reconstruction

OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, Issue 5 2000
Werner Smolny
In this paper, it is shown that aggregate cross-country analyses of the growth process of the industrial countries should take reconstruction effects into account. The enormous growth rates in many European countries and in Japan in the fifties which often appear as outliers in aggregate analyses of productivity convergence can be understood as a catching-up with respect to the past. Neoclassical capital deepening combined with arguments from growth models relying on the stock of knowledge, knowledge spillovers and technological diffusion as the source of economic growth can explain the fast reconstruction after the war, without referring to country-specific growth factors. [source]

Future developments in global livestock and grains markets: the impacts of livestock productivity convergence in Asia-Pacific

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2000
Allan N. Rae
Increasing livestock product consumption in many Asian countries has been accompanied by growth in some countries' imports of feedgrains for their domestic livestock sectors. This contributes to debate over future levels of grain imports. Yet projections often pay little attention to developments in livestock production. The impacts of technological catch-up in livestock production on trade in livestock and grains products among countries in the Asia-Pacific region are assessed. Tests are conducted of the hypothesis that productivity levels in the Asia-Pacific region are converging. Projections of livestock productivity are made and incorporated in a modified GTAP model. The consequences for regional and global trade in livestock and grains products are explored. [source]