Private Finance (private + finance)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Terms modified by Private Finance

  • private finance initiative

  • Selected Abstracts


    The Cost of Using Private Finance for Roads in Spain and the UK

    AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2010
    Jose Basilio Acerete
    Within the context of the growing worldwide tendency to fund road construction, operation and maintenance through a variety of private financing arrangements, this article explores the implications of recent road developments in Spain and England. Among other things, it shows that the use of private financing mechanisms is problematic in relation to the cost of risk transfer, and that the lack of information due to commercial sensitivity acts as a deterrent to objective assessment. The pessimistic conclusion is that, in these arrangements, downside risks are borne by the state, and the authors argue that using private financing for roads is another case of ,privatising the benefits and nationalising the costs'. [source]


    Appraising and Evaluating PFI for NHS Hospitals

    FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY & MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2001
    Julie Froud
    This paper explores the use of appraisal in the development of proposals to use private finance to provide acute hospitals under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). It addresses the extent to which value for money (VFM) and affordability (which must be satisfied to enable a scheme to be approved) are demonstrated in the documents prepared by hospital Trusts. It identifies a number of issues (such as the transfer of risk and the development of public sector comparators) that pose new problems for investment appraisal, which are specific to its application to PFI. [source]


    Redistribution or horizontal equity in Hong Kong's mixed public,private health system: a policy conundrum

    HEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2009
    Gabriel M. Leung
    Abstract We examine the distributional characteristics of Hong Kong's mixed public,private health system to identify the net redistribution achieved through public spending on health care, compare the income-related inequality and inequity of public and private care and measure horizontal inequity in health-care delivery overall. Payments for public care are highly concentrated on the better-off whereas benefits are pro-poor. As a consequence, public health care effects significant net redistribution from the rich to the poor. Public care is skewed towards the poor in part not only because of allocation according to need but also because the rich opt out of the public sector and consume most of the private care. Overall, there is horizontal inequity favouring the rich in general outpatient care and (very marginally) inpatient care. Pro-rich bias in the distribution of private care outweighs the pro-poor bias of public care. A lesser role for private finance may improve horizontal equity of utilisation but would also reduce the degree of net redistribution through the public sector. Copyright 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


    Organization, Management and Delegation in the French Water Industry

    ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2001
    Jihad C. Elnaboulsi
    The water industry is largely a natural monopoly. Water distribution and sewerage services are characterized by networks and its natural monopoly derives from the established local networks of drinking water and sewers: they are capital intensive with sunk costs and increasing returns to scale. In France, local communities have a local requirement of providing public services under optimum conditions in terms of techniques and cost-effectiveness, and subject to respect different kind of standards in terms of water quality and level of services. They are responsible for producing and distributing drinking water, and collecting and treating wastewater. Furthermore, the French water utilities are required to be financially self-sufficient. Rate-setting varies across regions and local territories due to a variety of organizational features of services and availability of water resources. The management of these local public services can be public or private: local governments have the right, by the constitution, to delegate water service management to private companies which operate under the oversight of local municipal authorities. Today, nearly 80 per cent of the French population receive private distributed water. Different reasons are responsible for the poor performance and low productivity of most French public water utilities: technical and operational, commercial and financial, human and institutional, and environmental. Thus, many water public utilities have looked for alternative ways to provide water and sanitation services more efficiently, to improve both operational and investment efficiency, and to attract private finance. The purpose of this paper is to present the French organizational system of providing drinking water services, and collecting and treating wastewater services: legal aspects, contracts of delegation, and competition. [source]


    Do PPPs in Social Infrastructure Enhance the Public Interest?

    AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2010
    Evidence from England's National Health Service
    This article outlines and critiques the main fiscal and economic rationales for the Private Finance Initiative , by far the dominant form of public-private partnership in the United Kingdom (UK) , and examines the impact of the policy on the long term financial viability of the National Health Service. It shows that the interest rate on private finance contains a significant element of ,excess return' to investors, and there is no evidence that this ,excess cost' to the public sector is offset by greater efficiency through the contracting process. It concludes that the private financing of public capital investment is highly problematic , and can have a serious impact on the finances and capacity of public authorities. [source]