Private Banks (private + bank)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Morocco: First Private Bank

AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SERIES, Issue 1 2010
Article first published online: 8 MAR 2010
No abstract is available for this article. [source]


A POST-KEYNESIAN STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT MODEL FOR DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCK ON BANKING BEHAVIOUR

METROECONOMICA, Issue 3 2008
Edwin Le Heron
ABSTRACT We try to make Keynes' approach compatible with an endogenous theory of the money supply. For that purpose, the principle of liquidity preference is generalized within a competitive banking framework. Private banks can impose a monetary rationing independently of the central bank. Then, we analyse the consequences of a monetary policy shock on the financial behaviour of banks. We clarify the dynamic process between the monetary policy and net investment within a Minskyan approach. First, we build a Post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent model with a private-bank sector introducing more realistic features. Second, we perform some simulations. [source]


DO WE REALLY NEED CENTRAL BANKS?

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2009
Roland Vaubel
An analysis of economic theory and economic history suggests that central banks, with a monopoly of money-issuing services, are not necessary. The often-levelled arguments against private banks issuing money in competition with each other and with central banks do not stand up to close scrutiny. [source]


Managing the Bank-System Crisis in Coordinated Market Economies: Institutions and Blame Avoidance Strategies in Sweden and Japan

GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2006
TORSTEN SVENSSON
Sweden and Japan represent two different positions regarding policymaking when faced with similar crises of the bank systems. Different institutional settings led the main actors to different paths of reactions in order to avoid blame. In the Japanese case, the very close relationship between private banks and the Ministry of Finance, in combination with the lesser degree of widespread perceptions of a system crisis, made it more urgent as well as possible to conceal the actual state of affairs for the politicians. Confronted with the threat of losing power over the financial administration to a new agency, the ministry postponed the reforms in order to conceal the deep financial problems. The institutional setting was different in Sweden. Deregulation had separated the government from the administration of banks. Among the public deteriorating economic conditions were easily connected to the banks. This brought about political unity. It was possible to put the blame on the banks and take the credit for the efforts to tidy up the mess without losing credibility. [source]