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Primary Commodities (primary + commodity)
Selected AbstractsGROWTH, COMMODITY PRICES, INFLATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMEMETROECONOMICA, Issue 1 2007Harry Bloch ABSTRACT A primary commodity price boom is underway. Given the role of internationally traded primary commodities as inputs into the productive process in the industrialized world, an important question arises: namely what effects will this price-boom exert upon wage and price inflation in industrialized countries? In order to address this question, we specify and estimate a system of equations in which the key dependent variables are world commodity prices, the domestic inflation rate for finished goods and the rate of domestic industrial wage inflation. This model is estimated against data for each of three major industrialized countries: Japan, the UK and the USA and the implications of the results thus obtained are explored. [source] Implications of World Trade Organisation accession for China's agricultural trade patternsAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2002Colin A. Carter This paper examines the composition of China's international trade from 1980 to 1997, with a focus on agriculture and a view towards understanding agriculture's changing trade structure relative to other sectors. We analyse the time series behaviour of individually traded goods at the Standard Industrial Trade Classification three-digit level, categorised into three groups: agricultural commodities, ,other' primary commodities and manufactures. We find that China's agricultural trade has expanded along comparative advantage lines in only a very modest way, suggesting that World Trade Organization membership will have a large impact on China's agricultural trade patterns. [source] The impact of the Asian Crisis on Australia's primary exports: why it wasn't so badAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2000Ron Duncan This article explores the modest impact of the Asian Crisis on Australia's primary commodity exports. Simulations using a global general equilibrium model show: (i) as capital flees Asia, investment in Australia increases and the trade deficit grows; (ii) while terms of trade deteriorate in the short run, they improve in the medium run as import demand increases in the crisis countries; (iii) exports of primary commodities expand as the crisis countries try to export more; (iv) more income-elastic primary commodities fare less well than the income-inelastic foodstuffs as incomes decline in the crisis countries; (v) Australia's relatively low dependence on manufactured exports was a buffer as manufactured exports came under heavy pressure from exports from the crisis countries. [source] Low-Price Low-Capacity Traps and Government Intervention in the Québec Hog MarketCANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2004Bruno Larue This paper investigates the marketing of a primary commodity produced by competitive producers that sell to a single downstream processor. There is a significant lag between production and marketing decisions made by producers. If a credible price commitment cannot be made before producers make their output decision, it is a dominant strategy for the processor to buy producers' output at the world price adjusted for transportation costs. Producers fully anticipate this partial holdup ex ante and adjust production accordingly. When the processor's capacity is binding ex post, the equilibrium is described as a low-price, low-capacity trap. Under a specific condition, the processor finds it advantageous to credibly commit to a price increment before producers make their output decision. The ensuing equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the no-commitment equilibrium. We argue that the Québec hog/pork industry has experienced such a situation in the past few years. Government intervention is justified even if the processor has committed to a price increment. The modeling of strategic interactions between the government and the processor reveals that their price increments are strategic substitutes. However, given that the processor's (government's) payoff is increasing with the government's (processor's) price increment, the first-mover advantage entails committing early to a low-price increment to force one's rival to offer a high-price increment. Cet article analyse la mise en marché d'un produit primaire vendu par des producteurs preneurs de prix à un seul et unique transformateur. Les décisions de production et de mise en marché sont séparées dans le temps. Si le transformateur ne peut pas s'engager à payer un certain prix avant que les producteurs prennent leur décision de production, alors la stratégie dominante du transformateur est d'offrir aux producteurs le prix mondial diminué par les coûts de transport. Les producteurs anticipant ce hold-up partiel et réduisent leur production en conséquence. Lorsque le transformateur est confrontéà une contrainte de capacité ex post, les producteurs et le transformateur sont piégés dans un équilibre de « petit prix et petit volume ». Si une condition est respectée, il peut être avantageux pour le transformateur d'offrir un supplément aux producteurs avant leur décision de production. L'équilibre qui s'en suit constitue alors une amélioration au sens de Pareto. Nous soumettons que l'industrie porcine québécoise a vécu pareille expérience durant les dernières années. L'intervention du gouvernement demeure justifiée même si le transformateur s'est commis à payer un supplément. En fait, les interventions du transformateur et du gouvernement sont des substituts stratégiques. Puisque le gain du transformateur (gouvernement) croit avec le supplément offert par le gouvernement (transformateur), il y a un avantage àêtre le premier à se commettre à payer un faible supplément, tant pour le transformateur que pour le gouvernement, pour ainsi forcer l'autre partie à offrir un supplément plus généreux. [source] |