			Home About us Contact

Pricing Rule (pricing + rule)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	85%

Distribution within Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting

General & Introductory Economics	32%

Selected Abstracts

Rules Governing the Transfer of Ownership: Wealth Effects and the Influence of Ownership Structure

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2000
Henk Berkman
This paper studies a unique change in regulation governing the transfer of share ownership in New Zealand. The new regulation requires all listed firms to adopt one of three proposed takeover regimes, ranging from almost free transferability of shares to a uniform pricing rule. Our empirical results indicate that a higher proportion of shares held by blockholders makes adoption of a liberal takeover regime more likely. We also find that an increase in the proportion of non-beneficial shares held by directors and shares held by trust companies increases the probability that a firm adopts a more restrictive takeover regime. Furthermore, the results from an event study show that firms adopting the liberal takeover regime experience substantial positive abnormal returns compared to firms adopting the standard or restrictive regime. [source]

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2004
David S. Sibley
What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market. [source]

PRICE-SETTING BEHAVIOR IN TURKISH INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA

THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 4 2008

E30; D40 This study investigates the price-setting behavior of Turkish industries based on the results of a survey that was conducted by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The results show that, under normal conditions, the majority of the firms follow a time-dependent pricing rule but when significant events occur a substantial fraction of them alter their behavior to state-dependent reviewing. The median Turkish firm reviews its prices every month, but changes its prices four times a year. Price reviews and changes are affected by: the market share, price discrimination, customer type, firm size, and the existence of regulated prices. [source]

Nonlinear Pricing in General Equilibrium Models with Joint Production

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2001
Kazuya Kamiya
This paper considers general equilibrium models of public utilities which produce either public goods or private goods. In the models, cases of increasing returns are not a priori excluded. The products of the public utilities and their costs are allocated to the consumers according to a rule that is dependent on information communicated to the public utilities. We show that if the public utilities follow a nonlinear pricing rule, the equilibrium allocations are always Pareto-optimal. Moreover, the message space is of finite dimensions. JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D60, H41, H42. [source]

Growth versus Margins: Destabilizing Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2008
PHILIPPE AGHION
ABSTRACT We develop a model in which a firm can devote effort either to increasing sales growth, or to improving per-unit profit margins. If the firm's manager cares about the current stock price, she will favor the growth strategy when the market pays more attention to growth numbers. Conversely, it can be rational for the market to weight growth measures more heavily when it is known that the firm is following a growth strategy. This two-way feedback between firms' strategies and the market's pricing rule can lead to excess volatility in real variables, even absent any external shocks. [source]

WELFARE-MAXIMISING PRICING IN A MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2010
CHI-TING CHIN
This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model with imperfect competition and consumption externalities, and uses it to examine whether the marginal cost pricing rule in the partial equilibrium framework can apply to the general equilibrium framework. It is shown that, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set equal to marginal cost if consumption externalities are either absent or positive. However, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set higher than marginal cost in the presence of negative consumption externalities. [source]

Natural Disaster Insurance and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off

JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 1 2008
Pierre Picard
This article investigates the role of private insurance in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. We characterize the equity-efficiency trade-off faced by the policymakers under imperfect information about individual prevention costs. It is shown that a competitive insurance market with actuarial rate making and compensatory tax-subsidy transfers is likely to dominate regulated uniform insurance pricing rules or state-funded assistance schemes. The model illustrates how targeted tax cuts on insurance contracts can improve the incentives to prevention while compensating individuals with high prevention costs. The article highlights the complementarity between individual incentives through tax cuts and collective incentives through grants to the local jurisdictions where risk management plans are enforced. [source]