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Pricing Decisions (pricing + decision)
Selected AbstractsThe Dark Side of Information and Market Efficiency in E-Markets,DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 3 2006Varun Grover ABSTRACT Price dispersion reflects the differences in prices for identical products. While in physical markets such dispersion is prevalent due to high search costs, many researchers argue that search costs and price dispersion will be much lower in electronic markets (e-markets). Empirical evidence does not support this contention, and researchers have studied search costs, market factors, and service-quality factors to explain this dispersion. Previous research has largely assumed that more information is better. By ignoring the dark side of information, we argue that only a partial understanding of price dispersion is possible. In this article, information overload and equivocality are studied as two dark attributes of information that lead sellers to different pricing decisions in e-markets. Hypotheses relating these attributes to price dispersion are supported through analysis of 161 product markets. This work opens up new avenues in the study of e-markets and discusses the implications of these findings for research and practice on consumer and seller decisions. [source] Activity-Based Pricing in a MonopolyJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003V. G. Narayanan abstract In this article, I study the interaction between cost accounting systems and pricing decisions in a setting where a monopolist sells a base product and related support services to customers whose preference for support services is known only to them. I consider two pricing mechanisms,activity-based pricing (ABP) and traditional pricing,and two cost-accounting systems,activity-based costing (ABC) and traditional costing, for support services. Under traditional pricing, only the base product is priced, whereas support services are provided free because detailed cost-driver volume information on the consumption of support services by each customer is unavailable. Under ABP, customers pay based on the quantities consumed of both the base product and the support services because detailed cost-driver volume information is available for each customer. Likewise, under traditional costing for support services the firm makes pricing decisions on cost signals that are noisier than they are under ABC. I compare the equilibrium quantities of the base product and support services sold, the information rent paid to the customers, and the expected profits of the monopolist under all four combinations of cost-driver volume and cost-driver rate information. I show that ABP helps reduce control problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems, for the supplier and increases the supplier's ability to engage in price discrimination. I show that firms are more likely to adopt ABP when their customer base is more diverse, their customer support costs are more uncertain, their costing system has lower measurement error, and the variable costs of providing customer support are higher. Firms adopt ABC when their cost-driver rates for support services under traditional costing are noisier measures of actual costs relative to their cost-driver rates under ABC and when the actual costs of support services are inherently uncertain. I also show that cost-driver rate information and cost-driver volume information for support services are complements. Although the prior literature views ABC and activity-based management (ABM) as facilitating better decision making, I show that ABC and ABP (a form of ABM) are useful tools for addressing control problems in supply chains. [source] Consumer Stockpiling and Price Competition in Differentiated MarketsJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2007Liang Guo In many storable-goods markets, firms are often aware that consumers may strategically adjust purchase timing in response to expected price dynamics. For example, in periods when prices are low, consumers stockpile for future consumption. This paper investigates the dynamic impact of consumer stockpiling on competing firms' strategic pricing decisions in differentiated markets. The necessity of equilibrium consumer storage for storable products is re-examined. It is shown that preference heterogeneity generates differential consumer stockpiling propensity, thereby intensifying future price competition. As a result, consumer storage may not necessarily arise as an equilibrium outcome. Economic forces are also investigated that may mitigate the competition-intensifying effect of consumer inventories and that, hence, may lead to equilibrium consumer storage. [source] Optimal dynamic pricing for sports games with habitual attendanceMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2008Dong C. Won This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the optimal pricing decisions of a sports team that maximizes lifetime profits in sports markets where game attendance is habit-forming for sports fans. The long-run equilibrium price and attendance level are found to be greater than the counterparts of the static framework, respectively. The infinite horizon model shows that the pricing strategy of the firm brings about an upward-crossing of two different dynamic price paths where the price path with stronger habit formation initially stays below, catches up, and ultimately rises above the price path with weaker habit formation. It is worth noting that the upward-crossing phenomenon is not fully understood in a finite-period model. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] How Should a Firm Manage Deteriorating Inventory?PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2007Mark E. Ferguson Firms selling goods whose quality level deteriorates over time often face difficult decisions when unsold inventory remains. Since the leftover product is often perceived to be of lower quality than the new product, carrying it over offers the firm a second selling opportunity, a product line extension to new and unsold units, and the ability to price discriminate. By doing so, however, the firm subjects sales of its new product to competition from the leftover product. We present a two period model that captures the effect of this competition on the firm's production and pricing decisions. We characterize the firm's optimal strategy and find conditions under which the firm is better off carrying all, some, or none of its leftover inventory. We also show that, compared to a firm that acts myopically in the first period, a firm that takes into account the effect of first period decisions on second period profits will price its new product higher and stock more of it in the first period. Thus, the benefit of having a second selling opportunity dominates the detrimental effect of cannibalizing sales of the second period new product. [source] MIXED OLIGOPOLY, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND COMPETITION FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICES,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 3 2006PEDRO CANTOS-SÁNCHEZ This paper explores frequency and pricing decisions in a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly when there is competition between means of transport and where one of the firms need not necessarily maximize profits. The private and the mixed duopoly are compared and distortions from the social optimum are identified, both analytically and numerically. A mixed duopoly does not recover the socially optimal solution. However, the presence of a (public) non-profit maximizing operator is a useful measure to get closer to the social optimum. When both operators are (private) profit maximizers, some control measures such as price caps and minimum service availability would reduce the distortions from the social optimum. [source] Coordination of staffing and pricing decisions in a service firmAPPLIED STOCHASTIC MODELS IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, Issue 4 2008an A. Serel Abstract Customer demand is sensitive to the price paid for the service in many service environments. Using queueing theory framework, we develop profit maximization models for jointly determining the price and the staffing level in a service company. The models include constraints on the average waiting time and the blocking probability. We show convexity of the single-variable subproblem under certain plausible assumptions on the demand and staffing cost functions. Using numerical examples, we investigate the sensitivity of the price and the staffing level to changes in the marginal service cost and the user-specified constraint on the congestion measure. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] | ||||||||||