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Portfolio Theory (portfolio + theory)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting75%

Selected Abstracts

ORGANIZATIONAL PORTFOLIO THEORY: PERFORMANCE-DRIVEN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 4 2000
L DONALDSON
The article outlines some of the main ideas of a new organizational theory: organizational portfolio theory. The literature has empirically established that organizations tend not to make needed adaptive changes until they suffer a crisis of low organizational performance. Organizational portfolio theory takes this idea and constructs a theory of the conditions under which organizational performance becomes low enough for adaptive organizational change to occur. The focus is on the interaction between organizational misfit and the other causes of organizational performance. To model these interactions use is made of the concepts of risk and portfolio. [source]

Portfolio theory and how parent birds manage investment risk

OIKOS, Issue 10 2009
Scott Forbes
Investment theory is founded on the premise that higher returns are generally associated with greater risk, and that portfolio diversification reduces risk. Here I examine parental investment decisions in birds from this perspective, using data from a model system, a 16-year study of breeding red-winged blackbirds Agelaius phoeniceus. Like many altricial birds, blackbirds structure their brood into core (first-hatched) and marginal (later-hatched) elements that differ in risk profile. I measured risk in two ways: as the coefficient of variation in growth and survival of core and marginal offspring from a given brood structure; and using financial beta derived from the capital asset pricing model of modern portfolio theory. Financial beta correlates changes in asset value with changes in the value of a broader market, defined here as individual reproductive success vs. population reproductive success. Both measures of risk increased with larger core (but not marginal) brood size; and variation in growth and survival was significantly greater during ecologically adverse conditions. Core offspring showed low beta values relative to marginal progeny. The most common brood structures in the population exhibited the highest beta values for both core and marginal offspring: many parent blackbirds embraced rather than avoided risk. But they did so prudently with an investment strategy that resembled a financial instrument, the call option. A call option is a contingent claim on the future value of the asset, and is exercised only if asset value increases beyond a point fixed in advance. Otherwise the option lapses and the investor loses only the initial option price. Parents created high risk marginal progeny that were forfeited during ecological adversity (the option lapses) but raised otherwise (the option called); at the same time parents maintained a constant investment and return in low risk core progeny that varied little with changes in brood size or ecological conditions. [source]

The Impact of Organizational Form on Producer Contracting Decisions

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2004
Kimberly A. Zeuli
A variable that has not yet been considered in the contracting literature is the impact of agribusiness organizational form on the producer's contracting decision. Contracts with cooperatives are more complicated decisions for producers than a standard marketing contract with noncooperatives because of the requisite membership capital investment in the firm. Contracting with cooperatives requires producers to make a dual supply and investment decision. Individual membership equity holdings in all agricultural cooperatives are increasing, but they are generally most substantial in the value-added, new-generation cooperatives. Portfolio theory is used to analyze the producer's decision to contract with three alternatively structured value-added processing organizations in an uncertain environment: a traditional cooperative, a new-generation cooperative and an investor-oriented firm. In the cooperative cases, the contract requires both supply and equity investment. Une variable dont n'ont pas encore tenu compte ceux qui écrivent sur les contrats est l'impact du type d'organisation sur les décisions du producteur. Les décisions que ce dernier doit prendre au sujet des ententes avec les coopératives sont plus complexes que les décisions de commercialization ordinaires en raison de l'investissement que suppose l'adhésion à la coopérative. Avant de conclure une entente avec une coopérative, l'agriculteur doit prendre une décision sur les approvisionnements et une autre sur l'investissement. L'actif des coopératives venant des droits d'adhésion est à la hausse, mais il est généralement plus important chez les coopératives à valeur ajoutée de la nouvelle génération. Les auteurs recourent à la théorie du portefeuille pour analyser les décisions des agriculteurs quant à la conclusion d'une entente avec trois organisations de types différents, fabriquant des produits transformés à valeur ajoutée dans des conditions économiques incertaines: une coopérative classique, une coopérative de la nouvelle génération et une entreprise avec participation à l'investissement. L'entente avec les deux coopératives suppose un investissement au niveau de l'actif et des approvisionnements. [source]

Financial Globalization, Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2009
BONG-CHAN KHO
ABSTRACT We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the "direct effect" of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the "indirect effect") in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from "good governance" countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in "poor governance" countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country-level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm-level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. [source]

ORGANIZATIONAL PORTFOLIO THEORY: PERFORMANCE-DRIVEN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 4 2000
L DONALDSON
The article outlines some of the main ideas of a new organizational theory: organizational portfolio theory. The literature has empirically established that organizations tend not to make needed adaptive changes until they suffer a crisis of low organizational performance. Organizational portfolio theory takes this idea and constructs a theory of the conditions under which organizational performance becomes low enough for adaptive organizational change to occur. The focus is on the interaction between organizational misfit and the other causes of organizational performance. To model these interactions use is made of the concepts of risk and portfolio. [source]

Investment Decisions for Retirement Savings

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2010
HAZEL BATEMAN
We conducted a choice experiment to investigate whether retirement savers follow simple portfolio theory when choosing investments. We modeled experimental survey data on 693 participants using a scale-adjusted version of the latent class choice model. Results show that underlying variability in response was explained by age and "risk profile" score and that preferences varied with income and age. Younger individuals were conventionally risk averse, but older, higher-income individuals may react positively to both higher returns and increasing risk, when risk is presented as widening ranges of possible outcomes. Respondents tended to choose among a few similar investment options. [source]

Portfolio theory and how parent birds manage investment risk

OIKOS, Issue 10 2009
Scott Forbes
Investment theory is founded on the premise that higher returns are generally associated with greater risk, and that portfolio diversification reduces risk. Here I examine parental investment decisions in birds from this perspective, using data from a model system, a 16-year study of breeding red-winged blackbirds Agelaius phoeniceus. Like many altricial birds, blackbirds structure their brood into core (first-hatched) and marginal (later-hatched) elements that differ in risk profile. I measured risk in two ways: as the coefficient of variation in growth and survival of core and marginal offspring from a given brood structure; and using financial beta derived from the capital asset pricing model of modern portfolio theory. Financial beta correlates changes in asset value with changes in the value of a broader market, defined here as individual reproductive success vs. population reproductive success. Both measures of risk increased with larger core (but not marginal) brood size; and variation in growth and survival was significantly greater during ecologically adverse conditions. Core offspring showed low beta values relative to marginal progeny. The most common brood structures in the population exhibited the highest beta values for both core and marginal offspring: many parent blackbirds embraced rather than avoided risk. But they did so prudently with an investment strategy that resembled a financial instrument, the call option. A call option is a contingent claim on the future value of the asset, and is exercised only if asset value increases beyond a point fixed in advance. Otherwise the option lapses and the investor loses only the initial option price. Parents created high risk marginal progeny that were forfeited during ecological adversity (the option lapses) but raised otherwise (the option called); at the same time parents maintained a constant investment and return in low risk core progeny that varied little with changes in brood size or ecological conditions. [source]

Illiquidity and Pricing Biases in the Real Estate Market

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2007
Zhenguo Lin
This article addresses the micro-analytic foundations of illiquidity and price dynamics in the real estate market by integrating modern portfolio theory with models describing the real estate transaction process. Based on the notion that real estate is a heterogeneous good that is traded in decentralized markets and that transactions in these markets are often characterized by costly searches, we argue that the most important aspects defining real estate illiquidity in both residential and commercial markets are the time required for sale and the uncertainty of the marketing period. These aspects provide two sources of bias in the commonly adopted methods of real estate valuation, which are based solely on the prices of sold properties and implicitly assume immediate execution. We demonstrate that estimated returns must be biased upward and risks downward. These biases can be significant, especially when the marketing period is highly uncertain relative to the holding period. We also find that real estate risk is closely related to investors' time horizons, specifically that real estate risk decreases when the holding period increases. These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that real estate is more favorable to long-term investors than to short-term investors. They also provide a theoretical foundation for the recent econometric literature, which finds evidence of smoothing of real estate returns. Our findings help explain the apparent risk-premium puzzle in real estate,that is, that ex post returns appear too high, given their apparent low volatility,and can lead to the formal derivation of adjustments that can define real estate's proper role in the mixed-asset portfolio. [source]