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Popular Sovereignty (popular + sovereignty)
Selected AbstractsDemocracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional LegitimacyCONSTELLATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, Issue 2 2004Simone Chambers First page of article [source] European Integration: Popular Sovereignty and a Politics of BoundariesEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2000Hans Lindahl The problem raised by popular sovereignty in the framework of the EU is not whether it is relevant to European integration; it is. The problem is another, namely the identity and, thus, the boundary of a democratic polity. The very idea of ,European' integration suggests that integration is only imaginable by reference to the closure provided by an identity, a boundary that is normative rather than merely geographical. In this minimal sense, a European people is the necessary presupposition of integration, not merely its telos. Bluntly, there is no integration without inclusion and, also, no integration without exclusion. This, then, is the real problem raised by popular sovereignty in a European context: if there is no such thing as non-exclusionary integration, how can a reflection on the boundedness of European integration be more than a rationalisation of exclusion? [source] The institutionalisation of public opinion: Bentham's proposed constitutional role for jury and judgesLEGAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2007Oren Ben-Dor Jeremy Bentham's constitutional writings are innovative and radical. Unlike constitutional arrangements that sought to attain virtue though the institutional complexity entailed by the doctrine of Separation of Powers, Bentham's constitution was socially dynamic and designed to facilitate constant and efficient interaction between amorphous public opinion and officials. Furthermore, it was in constant and free interaction between public opinion and officials that Bentham envisioned the determination and effectuation of constitutional limits, namely both the justification and limitation of coercion. The paper begins by outlining Bentham's principles for a good constitution. It then discusses in detail Bentham's proposals for incorporating public opinion into legal proceedings through radical reform to the jury. Such incorporation, he believed, would intensify and help to focus public gaze by which officials' aptitude, and as a result a good government, would be attained with the minimal expense. The proposed institutionalisation of public opinion enabled Bentham to entrust the judiciary with a constitutional role. Judges were conceived as the interface between officialdom and focused manifestations of popular sovereignty. So entrusted, judges could determine constitutional limits, thus protecting against abuse of power. The reforms discussed in this paper are a testimony of the extent to which Bentham saw virtue both in the people and in free public debate. [source] Liberal nationalism and the sovereign territorial ideal1NATIONS AND NATIONALISM, Issue 1 2006GENEVIÈVE NOOTENS ABSTRACT. Even if most liberals nowadays recognise that liberalism depends on some nationalist justification of popular sovereignty and state boundaries, they still underestimate the consequences of the fact that the sovereign territorial ideal is at the heart of the modern state. Therefore, their normative stance either oscillates between fairness and stability requirements (Kymlicka) or is built on a distinction between self-rule and self-determination that contradicts the normative import of the modern idea of the nation (Tamir). However, there exist counter-traditions that may be helpful in challenging the assumption on behalf of the sovereign territorial state. National cultural autonomy is one of these; it is used here to show how starting from different premises, one may escape the ,statist assumption' and work out a political framework which would be fairer to minorities. [source] Is there a core national doctrine?NATIONS AND NATIONALISM, Issue 2 2001Erica Benner National doctrines are notoriously diverse, and often embody contradictory political values and criteria for membership. This article asks whether there is a ,core' national doctrine that connects republican, cultural, ethnic and liberal concepts of nationality. It considers two attractive candidates: one locating the ,core' in a doctrine about the political and psychological significance of pre-political cultural identities, the other in the constitutional principle of popular sovereignty. After assessing the limitations of both, I sketch a different core national doctrine. This doctrine is constitutive and geopolitical, not constitutional or cultural. It has deep roots in the security concerns specific to the modern, pluralistic system of sovereign states, and prescribes in general terms the form that any community should take in order to survive or distinguish itself in that system. It says very little about the appropriate basis for such communities; the choice of political, cultural, ethnic or even racial criteria is left wide open. More than other versions, this ,core' is able to identify the common ground between cultural, constitutional, and other national doctrines. It also puts a sharp focus on the reasons why, historically, national and liberal values have been so hard to combine. [source] I Support Ayatollah Khomeini's RepublicanismNEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2010MEHDI KARROUBI As the confrontation between the West and Iran over uranium enrichment comes to a head, the internal confrontation in Iran between the partisans of divine sovereignty, allied with the Revolutionary Guard, and popular sovereignty continues to simmer. In this section, the first president of the Islamic Republic, a leading cleric of the opposition, the Iranian human rights activist and Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi and a former British intelligence agent ponder what lies ahead. [source] Don't Sacrifice Democracy in Negotiations With IranNEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2010SHIRIN EBADI As the confrontation between the West and Iran over uranium enrichment comes to a head, the internal confrontation in Iran between the partisans of divine sovereignty, allied with the Revolutionary Guard, and popular sovereignty continues to simmer. In this section, the first president of the Islamic Republic, a leading cleric of the opposition, the Iranian human rights activist and Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi and a former British intelligence agent ponder what lies ahead. [source] The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional DemocracyTHE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 2 2002James Tully The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom. [source] | |||||||||||||