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Policy Space (policy + space)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	57%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	42%

Selected Abstracts

Policy Space: What, for What, and Where?

DEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 4 2009
Jörg Mayer
This article examines how developing countries can use, and enlarge, existing policy space, without opting out of international commitments. It argues that: (i) a meaningful context for policy space must extend beyond trade policy and include macroeconomic and exchange-rate policies that will achieve developmental goals more effectively; (ii) policy space depends not only on international rules but also on the impact of international market conditions and policy decisions taken in other countries on the effectiveness of national policy instruments; and (iii) international integration affects policy space through several factors that pull in opposite directions; whether it increases or reduces policy space differs by country and type of integration. [source]

Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2003
Ronny Razin
In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one-dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit. [source]

The conditional party mandate: A model for the study of mass and elite opinion patterns

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2007
HENRY VALEN
What is the level of issue congruence between voters and elected leaders? The article introduces two ideas for the analysis of mass and elite opinion patterns. First, the authors challenge the unidimensional conception of mass-elite linkages, and argue that the opinion structure of political parties may best be understood in the context of a multidimensional policy space. Second, they contest the proximity logic of the traditional party mandate model. In so doing, they propose the ,conditional party mandate model', arguing that ,direction' rather than ,proximity' attracts voters' interest and attention. The authors contend that in issues of principle significance for a particular party (so-called ,core issues'), the party's voters and representatives will proceed in the same direction, but the representatives will stress their position more strongly than the voters. In issues that are less significant to the parties, the relationship between the two levels will be fortuitous and less clear. The analyses, which are based on elite and mass survey data from the Norwegian political system, support the authors' hypotheses concerning positional issues. When the direction of an issue is given, representatives are more extreme than voters. [source]

On the Popular Support for Progressive Taxation

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2003
Esteban F. Klor
The "popular support for progressive taxation theorem" (Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín, 1995) provides an important formalization of the intuition that a majority of relatively poor voters over rich ones leads to progressive income taxation. Yet the theorem does not provide an equilibrium outcome. In addition, it assumes an overly restrictive domain of tax schedules and no incentive effects of income taxation. This paper shows that none of these assumptions of the theorem can be relaxed completely. Most notably, it is shown that a majority of poor voters does not imply progressive taxation in a more general policy space and that a regressive tax schedule may obtain a majority over a progressive one when individuals' income is endogenous. [source]

Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany: an Empirical Social Choice Analysis

POLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2001
Thomas König
This paper analyses whether and how party politics transform German bicameralism. Based on the policy positions of bicameral legislators, the study computes the win sets, the yolks of each chamber and a Nash solution in order to analyse empirically the effects of party politics on German bicameralism. In comparison to the basic bicameral model, hypotheses on bicameral conflict and policy stability are tested in the case of similar and different party majorities in the two-dimensional policy space of German labour politics. The results show that party politics transform German bicameralism in two ways. Similar majorities collapse bicameral checks-and-balances, while different party majorities come close to the basic bicameral model with high policy stability and conflict between both chambers. [source]

The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 5 2006
B. Douglas Bernheim
We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics (where a Condorcet winner does not exist), the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near-dictator under relatively weak conditions. [source]