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Policy Reaction Functions (policy + reaction_function)
Kinds of Policy Reaction Functions Selected AbstractsMonetary Frameworks and Institutional Constraints: UK Monetary Policy Reaction Functions, 1985,2003OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, Issue 4 2005Christopher Adam Abstract Monetary policy reaction functions are estimated for the UK over three periods , 1985,90, 1992,97 and 1997,2003 , in order to disentangle two effects: the switch from an emphasis on exchange rate stabilization to inflation targeting, and the introduction of instrument-independence in 1997. The external factors considered include US as well as German interest rates, and this leads to the identification of ,domestic' and ,international' models of the reaction function. The results suggest that it is the changes in the institutional arrangements rather than those in the targeting regime which have been decisive in the development of policy in this period. [source] Monetary Policy Reaction Functions in Australia,THE ECONOMIC RECORD, Issue 253 2005GORDON De BROUWER Interest-rate functions are estimated to assess the stability of Australian monetary policy in the post-float period. The results indicate that the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is forward-looking, focusing on outcomes 1 year ahead. The weight on inflation in the RBA reaction function has increased, and that on output has decreased, since inflation targeting. This is robust to various definitions of the output gap. The RBA also appears to take modest account of sustained movements in the effective exchange rate. Point estimates of the implied neutral rate of interest are from 5 to 5½ per cent. [source] Forecasting the Direction of Policy Rate Changes: The Importance of ECB WordsECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 1-2 2009Carlo Rosa This paper evaluates the predictive power of different information sets for the European Central Bank (ECB) interest-rate-setting behaviour. We employ an ordered probit model, i.e. a limited dependent variable framework, to take into account the discreteness displayed by policy rate changes. The results show that the forecasting ability of standard Taylor-type variables, such as inflation and output gap, is fairly low both in-sample and out-of-sample, and is comparable to the performance of the random walk model. Instead by using broader information sets that include measures of core inflation, exchange rates, monetary aggregates and financial conditions, the accuracy of the forecasts about ECB future actions substantially improves. Moreover, ECB rhetoric considerably contributes to a better understanding of its policy reaction function. Finally, we find that that the ECB has been fairly successful in educating the public to anticipate the overall future direction of its monetary policy, but has been less successful in signalling the exact timing of rate changes. [source] Monetary policy rules in practice: evidence from TurkeyINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2004Hakan Berument Abstract This paper estimates a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey by considering the period from 1990:01 to 2000:10. When the spread between the interbank rate and depreciation rate of the local currency is taken as a policy tool, the empirical evidence suggests that the Turkish Central Bank responds to its foreign exchange reserves, output and M2 growth not the forward, current or lagged inflation. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Using Taylor Rules to Understand European Central Bank Monetary PolicyGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Stephan Sauer Taylor rule; European Central Bank; real-time data Abstract. Over the last decade, the simple instrument policy rule developed by Taylor has become a popular tool for evaluating the monetary policy of central banks. As an extensive empirical analysis of the European Central Bank's (ECB) past behaviour still seems to be in its infancy, we estimate several instrument policy reaction functions for the ECB to shed some light on actual monetary policy in the euro area under the presidency of Wim Duisenberg and answer questions like whether the ECB has actually followed a stabilizing or a destabilizing rule so far. Looking at contemporaneous Taylor rules, the evidence presented suggests that the ECB is accommodating changes in inflation and hence follows a destabilizing policy. However, this impression seems to be largely due to the lack of a forward-looking perspective in such specifications. Either assuming rational expectations and using a forward-looking specification, or using expectations as derived from surveys result in Taylor rules that do imply a stabilizing role of the ECB. The use of real-time industrial production data does not seem to play such a significant role as in the case of the United States. [source] Monetary and Fiscal Policy SwitchingJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 4 2007HESS CHUNG regime change; policy interactions; Taylor rule; fiscal theory of the price level A growing body of evidence finds that policy reaction functions vary substantially over different periods in the United States. This paper explores how moving to an environment in which monetary and fiscal regimes evolve according to a Markov process can change the impacts of policy shocks. In one regime monetary policy follows the Taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with debt; in another regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and taxes are exogenous. An example shows that a unique bounded non-Ricardian equilibrium exists in this environment. A computational model illustrates that because agents' decision rules embed the probability that policies will change in the future, monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth effects. When it is possible that fiscal policy will be unresponsive to debt at times, active monetary policy (like a Taylor rule) in one regime is not sufficient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime and it can have the unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand effects of tax shocks. The paper also considers the implications of policy switching for two empirical issues. [source] Monetary Frameworks and Institutional Constraints: UK Monetary Policy Reaction Functions, 1985,2003OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, Issue 4 2005Christopher Adam Abstract Monetary policy reaction functions are estimated for the UK over three periods , 1985,90, 1992,97 and 1997,2003 , in order to disentangle two effects: the switch from an emphasis on exchange rate stabilization to inflation targeting, and the introduction of instrument-independence in 1997. The external factors considered include US as well as German interest rates, and this leads to the identification of ,domestic' and ,international' models of the reaction function. The results suggest that it is the changes in the institutional arrangements rather than those in the targeting regime which have been decisive in the development of policy in this period. [source] Do the Central Banks of Australia and New Zealand Behave Asymmetrically?THE ECONOMIC RECORD, Issue 261 2007Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Functions We test for evidence of asymmetric behaviour in the monetary policy reaction functions of the central banks of Australia and New Zealand. For the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, we found little evidence of asymmetric behaviour, whereas the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) appears to react more aggressively to negative output relative to positive output gaps of the same size. We impose additional structure on our model to help distinguish whether the asymmetric response originates from non-linearity in the inflation equation or from non-linearity in an approximate representation of the RBA's preferences over macroeconomic outcomes. We find that the preferences of the RBA may drive the asymmetry: the RBA appears to dislike negative output gaps more than positive output gaps of the same magnitude. We show this generates only a small increase in the conditional mean of inflation that is statistically indistinguishable from the target rate of inflation. [source] | ||||||||||