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Political Incentives (political + incentive)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

Comparing modes of privatisation: a study of the telecommunications sectors in Argentina and Mexico, 1990,2000

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 2 2007
John P. TumanArticle first published online: 20 FEB 200
ABSTRACT This article examines the variation in the post-privatisation pattern of labour and employment relations in the telecommunications sectors of Argentina and Mexico. The findings suggest that the initial mode of privatisation,negotiated vs. imposed reform,shaped changes in employment, subcontracting and work rules in the period following privatisation. The research also suggests, however, that negotiated reform is more likely to emerge only when certain political incentives are present. [source]

Balancing the funds in the New Cooperative Medical Scheme in rural China: determinants and influencing factors in two provinces

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2010
Luying Zhang
Abstract In recent years, the central government in China has been leading the re-establishment of its rural health insurance system, but local government institutions have considerable flexibility in the specific design and management of schemes. Maintaining a reasonable balance of funds is critical to ensure that the schemes are sustainable and effective in offering financial protection to members. This paper explores the financial management of the NCMS in China through a case study of the balance of funds and the factors influencing this, in six counties in two Chinese provinces. The main data source is NCMS management data from each county from 2003 to 2005, supplemented by: a household questionnaire survey, qualitative interviews and focus group discussions with all local stakeholders and policy document analysis. The study found that five out of six counties held a large fund surplus, whilst enrolees obtained only partial financial protection. However, in one county greater risk pooling for enrolees was accompanied by relatively high utilisation levels, resulting in a fund deficit. The opportunities to sustainably increase the financial protection offered to NCMS enrolees are limited by the financial pressures on local government, specific political incentives and low technical capacities at the county level and below. Our analysis suggests that in the short term, efforts should be made to improve the management of the current NCMS design, which should be supported through capacity building for NCMS offices. However, further medium-term initiatives may be required including changes to the design of the schemes. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

The political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture: an empirical study

AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2000
Johan F.M. Swinnen
Abstract The paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision-making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture. We use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures (PARI). The empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses. The analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers, but also to invest in public agricultural research. Furthermore, the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision-making on PARI is non-linear and conditional on other factors. Regarding the impact of political institutions, the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers (agricultural protection), nor to lower investment in public goods (PARI). ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. [source]

Conditional Partisanship and Institutional Responsibility in Presidential Decision Making

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2000
CONSTANTINE J. SPILIOTES
The interaction of political incentives and institutional structures significantly shapes the nature of presidential decision making. This interaction generates a unique effect,institutional responsibility,which substantially constrains presidential response to partisan and electoral incentives present in the policy-making environment. After discussing institutional responsibility in the theoretical context of presidential decision making and political economy, the article illustrates this effect in the empirical context of economic policy making in the Eisenhower and Carter administrations. The article demonstrates that the interaction produces an institutionally generated incentive for responsible decision making that often works at cross-purposes with other exogenous incentives for presidential behavior. In doing so, the article develops complementary notions of conditional partisanship and institutional responsibility. [source]