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Political Goals (political + goal)
Selected AbstractsProtocol-based care: the standardisation of decision-making?JOURNAL OF CLINICAL NURSING, Issue 10 2009Jo Rycroft-Malone Aim., To explore how protocol-based care affects clinical decision-making. Background., In the context of evidence-based practice, protocol-based care is a mechanism for facilitating the standardisation of care and streamlining decision-making through rationalising the information with which to make judgements and ultimately decisions. However, whether protocol-based care does, in the reality of practice, standardise decision-making is unknown. This paper reports on a study that explored the impact of protocol-based care on nurses' decision-making. Design., Theoretically informed by realistic evaluation and the promoting action on research implementation in health services framework, a case study design using ethnographic methods was used. Two sites were purposively sampled; a diabetic and endocrine unit and a cardiac medical unit. Methods., Within each site, data collection included observation, postobservation semi-structured interviews with staff and patients, field notes, feedback sessions and document review. Data were inductively and thematically analysed. Results., Decisions made by nurses in both sites were varied according to many different and interacting factors. While several standardised care approaches were available for use, in reality, a variety of information sources informed decision-making. The primary approach to knowledge exchange and acquisition was person-to-person; decision-making was a social activity. Rarely were standardised care approaches obviously referred to; nurses described following a mental flowchart, not necessarily linked to a particular guideline or protocol. When standardised care approaches were used, it was reported that they were used flexibly and particularised. Conclusions., While the logic of protocol-based care is algorithmic, in the reality of clinical practice, other sources of information supported nurses' decision-making process. This has significant implications for the political goal of standardisation. Relevance to clinical practice., The successful implementation and judicious use of tools such as protocols and guidelines will likely be dependant on approaches that facilitate the development of nurses' decision-making processes in parallel to paying attention to the influence of context. [source] Mortality and World HungerMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2001Rüdiger Bittner Why does world hunger hold an inferior place on the contemporary moral agenda? Proposed answer: because it is a political, not a moral problem. It is not a moral problem, because morality needs two conditions fulfilled: that those be in some way close to the agent unto whom that agent is doing something that is to be morally assessed; and that the relevant good or bad states or events can be clearly credited to some particular agent or agents. Neither condition is fulfilled in the case of world hunger. This explains morality's failure to come to grips with it. Yet, while lacking morality's endorsement, the abolition of world hunger may still be a political goal. [source] Race, Colorblindness, and Continental PhilosophyPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 6 2006Michael J. Monahan The "colorblind" society is often offered as a worthy ideal for individual interaction as well as public policy. The ethos of liberal democracy would seem indeed to demand that we comport ourselves in a manner completely indifferent to race (and class, and gender, and so on). But is this ideal of colorblindness capable of fulfillment? And whether it is or not, is it truly a worthy political goal? In order to address these questions, one must first explore the nature of "race" itself. Is it ultimately real, or merely an illusion? What kind of reality, if any, does it have, and what are the practical (moral and political) consequences of its ontological status? This paper will explore the issue of colorblindness, focusing particularly on recent developments dealing with this topic in Continental philosophy. Beginning with the question of racial ontology, I will argue that race has a social reality that makes the practice of colorblindness, at least for the time being, politically untenable, and it may remain suspect even as a long-term goal. [source] New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?DISASTERS, Issue 4 2001Fiona Fox There is a ,new humanitarianism' for the new millennium. It is ,principled', ,human-rights based' and politically sensitive. Above all it is new. It marks a break from the past and a rejection of the traditional principles that guided humanitarianism through the last century. New humanitarians reject the political naivety of the past, assess the long-term political impact of relief and are prepared to see humanitarian aid used as a tool to achieve human rights and political goals. New Humanitarianism is compelling, in tune with our times and offers a new moral banner for humanitarians to cling to as we enter the new millennium. Or does it? After outlining the key elements of new humanitarianism, including the human rights approach and developmental relief, the paper spells out some of the dangers. The author claims that new humanitarianism results in an overt politicisation of aid in which agencies themselves use relief as a tool to achieve wider political goals. The paper shows how this approach has spawned a new conditionality which allows for aid to be withheld and has produced a moral hierarchy of victims in which some are more deserving than others. The paper concludes with a plea for a revival of the principle of universalism as the first step to a new set of principles. [source] Think Locally, Act Globally: Toward a Transnational Comparative Politics,INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, Issue 2 2010Terrence Lyons Political dynamics and outcomes around the globe have been transformed by globalization, new patterns of human mobility, and the development of innovative transnational social networks. These new political processes are rooted in communities and networks that are not restricted by geographic location. Although politics has been delinked from territory in this way with regard to processes and actors, this does not mean that transnational politics focuses exclusively on universal issues or global approaches to social justice. Rather much of the new transnational politics is intensely focused on specific locations, identities, and issues (for example, "globalized" neighborhood associations, ethnicities, patrimonialism). Transnational politics also includes new conceptions and practices of citizenship and accountability (for example, legislative seats reserved for expatriate labor migrants) as the body politic becomes increasing mobile, political affinities delinked from geographic proximity, and critical constituencies reside outside of the territory of the state. This article outlines a new approach to investigating the actors and processes at the heart of contemporary transnational politics, with a particular focus on the ways in which diasporas are strategically constructed and mobilized to advance political goals through the use of salient symbols, identity frames, and social networks. [source] The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the BalkansINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2008Alan J. Kuperman This article explores a perverse consequence of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or "Responsibility to Protect," contrary to its intent of protecting civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing. The root of the problem is that such genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. The emerging norm, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence. It creates moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur. Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate that in at least two recent cases the moral-hazard hypothesis explains why members of a vulnerable group rebelled and thereby triggered genocidal retaliation. The article concludes by exploring whether potential interveners could mitigate genocidal violence by modifying their intervention policies to reduce moral hazard. [source] Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged?ANALYSES OF SOCIAL ISSUES & PUBLIC POLICY, Issue 1 2002Charles L. Ruby Recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon have accentuated the threat of terrorism. However, it appears that the attackers are popularly thought of as mentally deranged individuals who are evil. This article suggests that such an understanding is a misperception of these people and may interfere with an adequate response to prevent future attacks. The article reviews the extant literature on psychological theories of terrorism and concludes that terrorists are not dysfunctional or pathological; rather, it suggests that terrorism is basically another form of politically motivated violence that is perpetrated by rational, lucid people who have valid motives. The only real difference between terrorism and conventional military action is one of strategy. Terrorists lack the necessary resources to wage war in furtherance of their political goals. [source] Government Underpricing of Share-Issue PrivatizationsANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2004by Claude Laurin This paper develops three models of SIP underpricing: one based on revenue goals, one based on political goals and an inclusive model which supposes that the level of underpricing depends on both government revenue goals and political goals. These models are estimated using an international sample of 104 SIPs from 25 countries. We find that, on average, SIPs are underpriced by approximately the same amount as private sector initial public offerings (IPOs). This is not consistent with the sole goal of revenue maximization because SIPs should not require the same degree of underpricing as IPOs. The inclusive regression fits the data well and indicates that both revenue and political goals affect the level of SIP underpricing. [source] Public-private partnerships in Canada: Theory and evidenceCANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 1 2008Aidan R. Vining It focuses primarily on infrastructure projects and addresses three questions: 1) What goals do governments expect to achieve through P3s? 2) How effective are P3s likely to be at delivering value to governments and citizens? 3) What lessons can be derived from the use of P3s? The article reviews the government's intended social goals for P3s and evaluates how effective P3s have been in fulfilling them. It then formulates a more comprehensive framework and outlines a "positive theory" perspective of P3s that takes into account the divergent goals of the partners , profit maximization goals of private-sector participants and the political goals of the public sector. The article evaluates and summarizes the findings and implications of ten Canadian P3s. The appropriate test of success, from a social (normative) perspective, is whether P3s have lower total social costs, including production costs and all of the transaction costs and externalities associated with the project. The ten case studies indicate that the potential benefits of P3s are often outweighed by high contracting costs due to opportunism generated by goal conflict. These costs are particularly high when construction or operating complexity is high, revenue uncertainty (use-risk) is high, both of these risks have been transferred to the private-sector partner, and contract management effectiveness is poor. In infrastructure projects, it rarely makes sense to try to transfer large amounts of risk to the private sector. Sommaire: Le présent article élabore une théorie et examine la mise en ,uvre et la performance de partenariats des secteurs public/privé canadiens (P3). Il se penche essentiellement sur des projets d'infrastructure et aborde quatre questions : 1) quels objectifs les gouvernements prévoient-ils atteindre en ayant recours aux P3 ? 2) Dans quelle mesure les P3 seront efficaces à fournir de la valeur aux gouvernements et aux citoyens ? 3) Quelles leçons peut-on tirer des P3? L'article passe en revue les justifications normatives avancées par le gouvernement pour les P3 et examine leur efficacité. Ensuite, il formule un cadre normatif plus exhaustif. Puis, il présente les grandes lignes d'une perspective de «théorie positive» des P3 en tenant compte des objectifs divergents des partenaires : à savoir, les objectifs de maximisation des profits pour les participants du secteur privé et les objectifs politiques du secteur public. Par la suite, l'article passe en revue et évalue dix études de cas de P3 canadiens. Le test du succès, selon une perspective (normative) sociale, consiste à déterminer si les P3 ont des coûts sociaux totaux inférieurs, y compris les coûts de production, et tous les coûts de transactions et coûts externes associés au projet. Les dix études de cas indiquent que les avantages potentiels des P3 sont souvent surpassés par les frais élevés de passation de contrats dûs à l'opportunisme généré par les conflits en matière d'objectifs. Ces coûts sont particulièrement élevés lorsque la complexité de la construction ou de l'exploitation est élevée et que l'incertitude des revenus (le risque d'utilisation) est forte, que ces deux risques ont été transférés au partenaire du secteur privé, et que l'efficacité de la gestion du contrat est médiocre. Dans les projets d'infrastructure, il est souvent absurde d'essayer de transférer de grands montants de risque d'utilisation au secteur privé. [source] Litigation in Canadian referendum politicsCANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 3 2003Gregory Tardi The Canada-wide referendum on the Charlottetown Constitutional Accord in 1992, the Quebec sovereignty referendum in 1995, and the British Columbia referendum on aboriginal treaty negotiations in 2002 are the most interesting and the most significant examples. The core issue in each case was determining the political direction a government or a jurisdiction should follow. In each of these instances, interested citizens representing a segment of public opinion sought court injunctions to stop the vote. The focus of this article is the use of the courts on the political process. In each of the three cases, the applications for injunction were denied and the referendum proceeded. Nevertheless, the legal proceedings highlighted the increasing impact of law in politics under the Charter, as well as the greater willingness of political actors to use litigation to achieve political goals. These trends point out lessons for democracy that public administrators ought not ignore. Sommaire: Au cows de la demière dénnie, divers governments au Canada ont organisé des référendums pour déterminer leurs options concemant des questions faisant l'objet de séneuses controversies. Le référendum Canadian de 1992 sur l Accord constitutional de Charlottetown, le référendum de 1995 sur la souverainets du Québec et le refbrendurn qui s'est tenu en 2002 en Colombie-Britan-nique sur les négociations des droits issus de traités des Autochtones sont les référendums les plus intéressants et les plus marquants. Dans chaque cas, le point essential consistait à determiner l'orientation politique que le gouvemement ou une juridiction devrait adopter. Dans chacun de ces examples, des citoyens concernés représentant un segment de l'opinion publique ont tenté d'empêcher la tenue du vote en solicitant des injunctions auprès des tribunaux. Le present article porte sur le recours à des moyens légaux pour influer sur le processus politique. Dans chacun des trois cas, les demandes d'injonctions ont été refusées et le réféerendum a eu lieu. Néanmoins, les actions en justice ont souligné l'impact grandissant du juridique dam le domaine des politiques, sous l'influence de la Charte, et une plus grande acceptance de la part des responsables politiques à recourir à des litiges pour atteindre des objectifs politiques. Ces tendances soulignent pour la démocratie des leçons que les administrateurs publics ne devraient pas ignorer. [source] |