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Potential Entrants (potential + entrant)
Selected AbstractsGames Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure MarketsJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2005Leemore S. Dafny Strategic investment models, though popular in the theoretical literature, have rarely been tested empirically. This paper develops a model of strategic investment in inpatient procedure markets, which are well-suited to empirical tests of this behavior. Potential entrants are easy to identify in such markets, enabling the researcher to accurately estimate the entry threat faced by different incumbents. I derive straightforward empirical tests of entry deterrence from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition. Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence of entry-deterring investment. These findings suggest that competitive motivations play a role in treatment decisions. [source] Regulation of an Open Access Essential FacilityECONOMICA, Issue 300 2008AXEL GAUTIER A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both firms use the same essential input. The regulator's objectives are (i) to ensure financing of the essential input and (ii) to generate competition in the downstream market. The regulatory mechanism grants non-discriminatory access of the essential facility to the entrant provided it pays a two-part tariff to the incumbent. The optimal mechanism generates inefficient entry. The inefficient entry captures the trade-off between market efficiency and infrastructure financing resulting from incomplete information and non-discriminatory access. [source] Buyers' Miscoordination, Entry and Downstream Competition,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 531 2008Chiara Fumagalli This article shows that buyers' coordination failures might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent firm and a more efficient potential entrant. If there were a single buyer, or if all buyers formed a central purchasing agency, coordination failures would be avoided and efficient entry would always occur. More generally, exclusion is less likely the lower the number of buyers. For any given number of buyers, exclusion is less likely the more fiercely buyers compete in the downstream market. First, intense competition may prevent miscoordination equilibria from arising; second, in cases where miscoordination equilibria still exist, it lowers the maximum price that the incumbent can sustain at such exclusionary equilibria. [source] DISTANCE, BANK HETEROGENEITY AND ENTRY IN LOCAL BANKING MARKETS,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008ROBERTO FELICI We examine the determinants of entry into Italian local banking markets during the period 1991,2002 and build a simple model in which the probability of branching in a new market depends on the features of both the local market and the potential entrant. Econometric findings show that banks are more likely to expand into those markets that are closest to their pre-entry locations. Large banks are also more able to cope with distance-related entry costs than small banks. Finally, banks have become increasingly able to open branches in distant markets, due to the advent of information and communication technologies. [source] Lifetime Employment Contract and Strategic Entry Deterrence: Cournot and BertrandAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2001Kazuhiro Ohnishi This paper is based on a two-stage model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, and studies both quantity-setting competition and price-setting competition. We consider a lifetime-employment-contract policy as a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve. Furthermore, demand functions are classified into two cases in terms of the strategic relevance between both firms. Therefore, we examine the following four cases: ,quantity-setting competition with strategic substitutes', ,quantity-setting competition with strategic complements', ,price-setting competition with strategic substitutes' and ,price-setting competition with strategic complements'. The purpose of this paper is to analyse entry deterrence in the four cases and to show the effectiveness of the lifetime-employment-contract policy as a result of its analyses. [source] The development of competition in the English and Welsh water and sewerage industryFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2001John W. Sawkins Abstract This paper examines the introduction of competition into the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry following privatisation of the 10 regional water authorities in 1989. It outlines the development of comparative, capital and product market competition, arguing that the greatest opportunities now lie with the last through the introduction of common carriage agreements, the extension of Inset appointments and the introduction of transferable abstraction licences. Despite competitive innovations, the industry remains highly regulated, complex and difficult to enter. One of Ofwat's outstanding challenges for the next decade is to examine the means by which the regulatory burden might be lightened and barriers to entry lowered, to encourage potential entrants to compete with incumbents. [source] False Uniqueness: the Self-Perception of New Entrants to Higher Education in the UK and Its Implications for Access , a Pilot Study1HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2007Andy Thorpe A central tenet of contemporary education policy relates to the desire to extend higher education (HE) provision to less advantaged groups (,widening participation'). Our paper contends that a key behavioural obstacle to widening participation lies in the erroneous belief that persists among potential entrants from disadvantaged backgrounds as to their capabilities of succeeding within the HE environment , a perception that serves to deflate application/recruitment rates from such groupings. We test this ,false uniqueness' thesis using a sample of 127 new UK undergraduates, finding that students drawn from lower social class backgrounds consistently underestimated their abilities vis-à-vis the overall cohort. [source] Are There Economic Incentives for Non-Traditional Students to Enter HE?HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2007The Labour Market as a Barrier to Widening Participation The expansion of higher education (HE) in the UK has disproportionately benefited young people from relatively rich families: the gap between rich and poor in terms of participation in HE having widened since the 1970s. We explore a neglected possible cause of this class difference: that the labour market fails to provide sufficient incentives for potential entrants from less advantaged backgrounds to enter HE. Most studies of the rewards from participating in HE in the UK suggest that the rates of returns are sufficiently high to provide clear economic incentives to participate. However, until recently, most studies generated estimates of the average rate of return to graduation, which could overestimate returns to marginal entrants, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds. In this review we examine the methodological problems faced by more targeted studies of the rates of return to graduation and review their key findings concerning the economic returns to non-traditional entrants. [source] Choosing the partners in the licensing allianceMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2006Soo Jeoung Sohn I consider a situation in which the incumbent strategically adopts the licensing alliance, facing potential entrants. The queue of entrants consists of two firms, the ,strong' entrant and the ,weak' entrant, who differ in their productivities. The incumbent sets a licensing fee and offers it to the entrants. Each entrant decides whether or not to buy the licensing alliance. After the set of the licensing alliance is determined, they engage in the Cournot competition. I examine the optimal licensing fee, and show that the optimal licensing fee is to charge a discriminatory royalty to each licensee. I also examine the licensing policy on the partner(s): To whom should the licensor license its technology? By comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs for the licensor, I show that licensing to both entrants would be preferred to licensing to a single entrant. But, if the licensor faces the problem on choosing the partner, he prefers the licensing of the weak entrant to the strong entrant. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Vaporware as a Means of Entry DeterrenceTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2003Marco A. Haan Firms in the computer industry are often accused of vaporware, the untruthful pre-announcement of a new version of their product. By claiming they have a new product, critics argue, these firms try to deter potential entrants. The paper analyzes this phenomenon. It shows that vaporware is an equilibrium strategy in a signaling game in which the possibility to market a new product is private information. In this model, the possibility of vaporware can hurt consumers, also in the case the incumbent does have a new version of its product. The welfare effects of vaporware are ambiguous. [source] | ||||||||||