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Plausible Account (plausible + account)
Selected AbstractsPotential and Foetal ValueJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2010J. A. BURGESS abstract The argument from potential has been hard to assess because the versions presented by friends and those presented by enemies have born very little resemblance to each other. I here try to improve this situation by attempting to bring both versions into enforced contact. To this end, I sketch a more detailed analysis of the modern concept of potential than any hitherto attempted. As one would expect, arguments from potential couched in terms of that notion are evident non-starters. I then ask how the modern notion of potential needs to be supplemented in order to produce a more convincing argument. I then enquire whether the supplementations utilised in the most distinguished recent presentations of the argument have anything better than an ad hoc role to play in contemporary metaphysics. I conclude that the rehabilitation of the argument is unlikely; in any event, the onus of proof seems to be on the friend of that argument to show that it is uncontrived. Finally, I argue that the (modern) notion of potential has an important role to play in any plausible account of foetal value. [source] FANTASY, FICTION, AND FEELINGSMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 5 2006NORMAN KREITMAN Abstract: The nature of fantasy has been little discussed, despite its importance in the arts. Its significance is brought out here in relation to the long-standing debate on the alleged paradox of fiction,that we respond emotionally to characters and events known to be unreal. Examination of the paradox shows it to be ill founded once the nature of fantasy is appreciated. Moreover, a detailed consideration of fantasy shows that it can itself provide a plausible account of our emotional reactions to creative literature, an account that, after a review of some possible objections, is then contrasted with the leading contemporary theories. [source] Moral Nativism: A Sceptical ResponseMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 3 2010KIM STERELNY In the last few years, nativist, modular views of moral cognition have been influential. This paper shares the view that normative cognition develops robustly, and is probably an adaptation. But it develops an alternative view of the developmental basis of moral cognition, based on the idea that adults scaffold moral development by organising the learning environment of the next generation. In addition, I argue that the modular nativist picture has no plausible account of the role of explicit moral judgement, and that no persuasive version of the ,poverty of the stimulus' applies to moral cognition. [source] Schmitt's Critique of Kelsenian Normativism,RATIO JURIS, Issue 1 2005SYLVIE DELACROIX Schmitt's underlining of the limits which a certain kind of positivism imposes upon itself highlights a contemporary issue about what legal theory should aim at when accounting for the normative dimension of law. Schmitt's ultimate failure to take up the theoretical challenge he himself raised (with its well-known consequences) is deemed to illustrate,negatively,the importance of providing a plausible account of the social practices which bring law into existence. [source] | ||||||||||