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Asymmetric Equilibria (asymmetric + equilibrium)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2007
FRANCESCO DE SINOPOLI
Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria. [source]

Technology Adoption and the Emergence of Regional Asymmetries

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2000
Emanuele Giovannetti
The model explains the emergence of asymmetric productive structures among regions based on adoption of a quality improving technology. Firms' products are differentiated both in location and quality, location is given. We characterize symmetric and asymmetric equilibria of the two stage game in price and adoption. Asymmetric equilibria display partial adoption frequencies and regular geographical patterns of adoptions. The asymmetry of the economy has, often, a reverse U-shaped relation with the innovation size. Market integration is an obstacle for the full adoption of the new technology and favours the emergence of regional asymmetries. [source]

Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2005
Godfrey Keller
We analyze a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield payoffs after exponentially distributed random times. Free-riding causes an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with beliefs as the state variable. We construct the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium of the game, followed by various asymmetric ones. There is no equilibrium where all players use simple cut-off strategies. Equilibria where players switch finitely often between experimenting and free-riding all yield a similar pattern of information acquisition, greater efficiency being achieved when the players share the burden of experimentation more equitably. When players switch roles infinitely often, they can acquire an approximately efficient amount of information, but still at an inefficient rate. In terms of aggregate payoffs, all these asymmetric equilibria dominate the symmetric one wherever the latter prescribes simultaneous use of both arms. [source]

R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2004
Matthias Kräkel
Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]