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Physician-assisted Suicide (physician-assisted + suicide)
Selected AbstractsPhysician-Assisted Suicide and Criminal Prosecution: Are Physicians at Risk?THE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS, Issue 2 2005Stephen J. Ziegler First page of article [source] Assisted Suicide: Do We Own Our Bodies?DIALOG, Issue 2 2004Jarmo Tarkki Abstract:, The ethics of physician-assisted suicide is explored here in light of classic philosophical discussions of the ownership of one's body plus biblical discussions of the relationship of body and soul. Motives for individual and group suicide are brought to bear on bioethical principles such as that of autonomy. Ethical analysis is here challenged by the case of a 91 year-old woman, Ragnhild, who lived after professional judgments that her life should be ended. [source] Is the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide Compatible with Good End-of-Life Care?JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2009MICHAEL B. GILL abstract Many have held that there is some kind of incompatibility between a commitment to good end-of-life care and the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. This opposition to physician-assisted suicide encompasses a cluster of different claims. In this essay I try to clarify some of the most important of these claims and show that they do not stand up well to conceptual and empirical scrutiny. [source] Equality, Justice, and Paternalism: Recentreing Debate about Physician-Assisted SuicideJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2006ANDREW SNEDDON abstract Debate about physician-assisted suicide has typically focused on the values of autonomy and patient wellbeing. This is understandable, even reasonable, given the import-ance of these values in bioethics. However, these are not the only moral values there are. The purpose of this paper is to examine physician-assisted suicide on the basis of the values of equality and justice. In particular, I will evaluate two arguments that invoke equality, one in favour of physician-assisted suicide, one against it, and I will eventually argue that a convincing equality-based argument in support of physician-assisted suicide is available. I will conclude by showing how an equality-based perspective transforms some secondary features of debate about this issue. [source] End-of-Life Decision Making: Practical and Ethical Issues for Health ProfessionalsAUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL ON AGEING, Issue 2 2000Colleen Cartwright Life-extending changes in medical technology and an ageing population pose practical and ethical problems relating to end-of-life decision making. Health professionals need to understand the fears and concerns of their patients, their preferred place to die, and to respect patient autonomy. Such wishes may be expressed verbally by a competent patient or through an advance directive (living will) or proxy by an incompetent patient. There is an urgent need for increased and improved training of health professionals in pain management and palliative care, and for the development of practical, ethical policies and guidelines with respect to withdrawing/withholding life-sustaining treatment. In addition, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, two of the important moral issues of the 90s, will continue to require open community debate as we move into the new millennium. Australia, in company with most other countries, has many challenges ahead in relation to end-of-life decision making. [source] Co-operation despite disagreement: from politics to healthcareBIOETHICS, Issue 2 2003Noam J. Zohar Political interaction among citizens who hold opposing moral views commonly requires reaching beyond toleration, toward actual co-operation with policies one opposes. On the more personal level, however, regarding (e.g.) interactions between healthcare providers and patients, several authors emphasise the importance of preserving integrity. But those who oppose any ,complicity in evil' often wrongly conflate instances in which the other's position is (and should be) totally rejected with instances of legitimate, although deep, disagreement. Starting with a striking example from the context of a particular tradition, I argue generally that in the latter sort of disagreements, talk of ,complicity' should be largely replaced with a more co-operative moral stance, grounded in a pluralistic framework. Co-operation Despite Disagreement (CDD) should be sought either for institutional reasons , akin to the political , or for relational reasons. CDD involves sharing another's perspective and sometimes calls for adopting another's moral judgements in preference to one's own. I seek to identify some of the conditions and circumstances that would justify such a shift, particularly in scenarios involving assistance, such as physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or the role of an anaesthesiologist in abortion. This discussion is meant to provide examples of the kind of second-order reasons appropriate for determining the terms for CDD , in distinction from first-order considerations (e.g., the much-contested ,active/passive' distinction) which are likely to be the subject of the initial disagreement and hence cannot serve to resolve it. [source] Autonomy, Interdependence, and Assisted Suicide: Respecting Boundaries/Crossing LinesBIOETHICS, Issue 3 2000Anne Donchin Western philosophy has been powerfully influenced by a paradigm of personal agency that is linked to an individualistic conception of autonomy. This essay contrasts this conception with an alternative understanding that recognizes a social component built into the very meaning of autonomy. After reviewing feminist critiques of the dominant conception of autonomy, I develop the broad outlines of a relational view and apply this reconceptualization to a concrete situation in order to show how this altered view reconfigures understanding of the participants' relationships and each of their personal perspectives. The situation chosen, physician-assisted suicide, is intended principally to illustrate one respect in which a relational conception of autonomy reframes a controversial moral issue and reveals perspectives toward it that are likely to be obscured when autonomy is viewed through the lens of the dominant individualistic conception. My principal aim is to show that when autonomy is understood relationally, respecting others' autonomy is likely to be a far more complex issue than is apparent within the standard conception, both for those with professional responsibilities and often for personal intimates as well. [source] | ||||||||||