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Physical World (physical + world)
Selected AbstractsThe Treasury of Metaphysics and the Physical WorldTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 216 2004Charles Goodman Most modern analytic philosophers have ignored works of Indian philosophy such as Vasubandhu's ,Treasury of Metaphysics'. This neglect is unjustified. The account of the nature of the physical world given in the ,Treasury' is a one-category ontology of dharmas, which are simple, momentary tropes. They include bade physical tropes, the most fundamental level of the physical world, as well as higher-level tropes, including sensible properties such as colours, which are known as derived form. I argue that the relationship between the basic physical tropes and derived form is one of supervenience. Vasubandhu's theory is a powerful and flexible one, which can be adapted so as to be consistent with modern science. [source] Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical WorldCOLOR RESEARCH & APPLICATION, Issue 4 2004Rolf G. Kuehni No abstract is available for this article. [source] Complementary Virtual Architecture and the Design StudioJOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURAL EDUCATION, Issue 2 2002WARREN K. WAKE Complementary virtual architecture combines physical architecture with virtual buildings to address a single program. This bimodal approach serves clients whose activities span both worlds, and it brings conventional architectural concerns of client/corporate identity, artistic expression, and articulation into the virtual domain, and in turn requires coordination with design for the physical world. To prepare students for a future that will likely present many such opportunities, the authors formed and taught for three years a studio centered on projects of this type. [source] Privacy and Commercial Use of Personal Data: Policy Developments in the United StatesJOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2003Priscilla Regan In the online and offline worlds, the value of personal information , especially information about commercial purchases and preferences , has long been recognised. Exchanges and uses of personal information have also long sparked concerns about privacy. Public opinion surveys consistently indicate that overwhelming majorities of the American public are concerned that they have lost all control over information about themselves and do not trust organisations to protect the privacy of their information. Somewhat smaller majorities favour federal legislation to protect privacy. Despite public support for stronger privacy protection, the prevailing policy stance for over thirty years has been one of reluctance to legislate and a preference for self-regulation by business to protect privacy. Although some privacy legislation has been adopted, policy debates about the commercial uses of personal information have been dominated largely by business concerns about intrusive government regulation, free speech and the flow of commercial information, costs, and effectiveness. Public concerns about privacy, reflected in public opinion surveys and voiced by a number of public interest groups, are often discredited because individuals seem to behave as though privacy is not important. Although people express concern about privacy, they routinely disclose personal information because of convenience, discounts and other incentives, or a lack of understanding of the consequences. This disconnect between public opinion and public behaviour has been interpreted to support a self-regulatory approach to privacy protections with emphasis on giving individuals notice and choice about information practices. In theory the self-regulatory approach also entails some enforcement mechanism to ensure that organisations are doing what they claim, and a redress mechanism by which individuals can seek compensation if they are wronged. This article analyses the course of policy formulation over the last twenty years with particular attention on how policymakers and stakeholders have used public opinion about the commercial use of personal information in formulating policy to protect privacy. The article considers policy activities in both Congress and the Federal Trade Commission that have resulted in an emphasis on "notice and consent." The article concludes that both individual behaviour and organisational behaviour are skewed in a privacy invasive direction. People are less likely to make choices to protect their privacy unless these choices are relatively easy, obvious, and low cost. If a privacy protection choice entails additional steps, most rational people will not take those steps. This appears logically to be true and to be supported by behaviour in the physical world. Organisations are unlikely to act unilaterally to make their practices less privacy invasive because such actions will impose costs on them that are not imposed on their competitors. Overall then, the privacy level available is less than what the norms of society and the stated preferences of people require. A consent scheme that is most protective of privacy imposes the largest burden on the individual, as well as costs to the individual, while a consent scheme that is least protective of privacy imposes the least burden on the individual, as well as fewer costs to the individual. Recent experience with privacy notices that resulted from the financial privacy provisions in Gramm-Leach-Bliley supports this conclusion. Finally, the article will consider whether the terrorist attacks of 11 September have changed public opinion about privacy and what the policy implications of any changes in public opinion are likely to be. [source] Recent innovations in marine biologyMARINE ECOLOGY, Issue 2009Ferdinando Boero Abstract Modern ecology arose from natural history when Vito Volterra analysed Umberto D'Ancona's time series of Adriatic fisheries, formulating the famous equations describing the linked fluctuations of a predator,prey system. The shift from simple observation to careful sampling design, and hypothesis building and testing, often with manipulative approaches, is probably the most relevant innovation in ecology, leading from descriptive to experimental studies, with the use of powerful analytical tools to extract data (from satellites to molecular analyses) and to treat them, and modelling efforts leading to predictions. However, the historical component, time, is paramount in environmental systems: short-term experiments must cope with the long term if we want to understand change. Chaos theory showed that complex systems are inherently unpredictable: equational, predictive science is only feasible over the short term and for a small number of variables. Ecology is characterized by a high number of variables (e.g. species) interacting over wide temporal and spatial scales. The greatest recent conceptual innovation, thus, is to have realized that natural history is important, and that the understanding of complexity calls for humility. This is not a return to the past, because now we can give proper value to statistical approaches aimed at formalizing the description and the understanding of the natural world in a rigorous way. Predictions can only be weak, linked to the identification of the attractors of chaotic systems, and are aimed more at depicting scenarios than at forecasting the future with precision. Ecology was originally split into two branches: autecology (ecology of species) and synecology (ecology of species assemblages, communities, ecosystems). The two approaches are almost synonymous with the two fashionable concepts of today: ,biodiversity' and ,ecosystem functioning'. A great challenge is to put the two together and work at multiple temporal and spatial scales. This requires the identification of all variables (i.e. species and their ecology: biodiversity, or autoecology) and of all connections among them and with the physical world (i.e. ecosystem functioning, or synecology). Marine ecosystems are the least impacted by human pressures, compared to terrestrial ones, and are thus the best arena to understand the structure and function of the natural world, allowing for comparison between areas with and areas without human impact. [source] Color Eliminativism and Color ExperiencePACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2002Emmett L. Holman Anyone who is a color eliminativist-i.e., believes that the physical world is colorless-must explain how our sense experience of color can be so systematically illusory. As it turns out, it is difficult to do this without committing oneself to dualism. In this paper I explore the options available to the color eliminativist in this regard, and argue that his/her prospects are more promising, though still far from certain, if s/he adopts the position that sense experience is strictly intentional. [source] II,Control Variables and Mental CausationPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1pt1 2010John Campbell I introduce the notion of a ,control variable' which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world. [source] The Treasury of Metaphysics and the Physical WorldTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 216 2004Charles Goodman Most modern analytic philosophers have ignored works of Indian philosophy such as Vasubandhu's ,Treasury of Metaphysics'. This neglect is unjustified. The account of the nature of the physical world given in the ,Treasury' is a one-category ontology of dharmas, which are simple, momentary tropes. They include bade physical tropes, the most fundamental level of the physical world, as well as higher-level tropes, including sensible properties such as colours, which are known as derived form. I argue that the relationship between the basic physical tropes and derived form is one of supervenience. Vasubandhu's theory is a powerful and flexible one, which can be adapted so as to be consistent with modern science. [source] Emergence and the Forms of MetabolismARCHITECTURAL DESIGN, Issue 2 2010Michael Weinstock Abstract Earlier this year, Michael Weinstock published a seminal book, The Architecture of Emergence: The Evolution of Form in Nature and Civilisation, which challenges established cultural and architectural histories. The conventional worldview is expanded by placing human development alongside ecological development: the history of cultural evolution and the production of cities are set in the context of processes and forms of the natural world. As well as providing a far-reaching thesis, Weinstock's book gives lucid and accessible explanations of the complex systems of the physical world. In this abridged extract from Chapter 5, Weinstock explains the dynamics of individual and collective metabolisms from which intelligence and social and spatial orders emerge. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] A bridge over troubled waters?AREA, Issue 3 2009Systems theory, dialogue in geography In physical geography, systems are seen as a unity of parts and relationships, whereas human geographers using a second-order sociological systems approach define systems in terms of the difference between system and environment. Starting from this, dialogue between physical and human geographers using terms derived from systems theory is mostly in vain. This article explores some of the consequences that follow for dialogue in geography: the differences in defining systems, in the understanding of processes, the problem of system borders, the inconsistent understanding of the ,environment' itself as well as the different epistemology that comes with it (or leads to it). The article tries to bring systems theory back into geography with the decisive aim of enhancing the potentials for interaction between human and physical geographers and, therefore, to explore the possibility of connecting the social with the physical world , deviating from systems theory. [source] Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Relative Ignorance: Handling of Possibilities Under Epistemic and Physical UncertaintyCHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 6 2006Elizabeth J. Robinson Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and "curse of knowledge." [source] The Step to Rationality: The Efficacy of Thought Experiments in Science, Ethics, and Free WillCOGNITIVE SCIENCE - A MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL, Issue 1 2008Roger N. Shepard Abstract Examples from Archimedes, Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and others suggest that fundamental laws of physics were,or, at least, could have been,discovered by experiments performed not in the physical world but only in the mind. Although problematic for a strict empiricist, the evolutionary emergence in humans of deeply internalized implicit knowledge of abstract principles of transformation and symmetry may have been crucial for humankind's step to rationality,including the discovery of universal principles of mathematics, physics, ethics, and an account of free will that is compatible with determinism. [source] Silence as Gesture: Rethinking the Nature of Communicative SilencesCOMMUNICATION THEORY, Issue 4 2008Kris Acheson Silence and speech are often defined in relation to each other. In much scholarship, the two are perceived as polar opposites; speech enjoys primacy in this dichotomy, with silence negatively perceived as a lack of speech. As a consequence of this binary thinking, scholars remain unable to study the full range of the meanings and uses of silence in human interactions or even to fully recognize its communicative power. Merleau-Ponty described language as a gesture, made possible by the fact that we are bodies in a physical world. Language does not envelop or clothe thought; ideas materialize as embodied language, whether spoken or written. If silence is, as I argue here, as like speech as it is different, perhaps silence, too, can be a gesture. Rather than simply a background for expressed thought, if we considered silence to be embodied, to be a mating of the phenomenal and existential bodies, how might that affect current misconceptions of silence and subsequent limitations on the study of communicative silences? Résumé Le silence comme geste : Repenser la nature des silences communicationnels Le silence et la parole sont souvent définis en relation l'un avec l'autre. Dans une grande partie de la recherche, les deux phénomènes sont perçus comme étant des pôles opposés. La parole jouit de la primauté dans cette dichotomie, le silence étant perçu négativement comme une absence de parole. Conséquence de cette pensée binaire, les chercheurs demeurent incapables d'étudier toute la complexité des significations et des usages du silence dans les interactions humaines, ni même d'en reconnaître complètement le pouvoir communicationnel. Merleau-Ponty décrivait le langage comme un geste, rendu possible par le fait que nous sommes des corps dans un monde physique. Le langage n'enveloppe ni ne vêt la pensée; les idées se matérialisent comme un langage incarné, qu'il soit parlé ou écrit. Si, tel que je le soumets ici, le silence est aussi semblable à la parole qu'il n'en est différent, peut-être alors le silence peut-il être, lui aussi, un geste. Plutôt qu'un simple arrière-plan pour l'expression de la pensée, si nous considérions le silence comme étant incarné, comme étant un accouplement des corps phénoménaux et existentiels, quelles conséquences cela pourrait-il avoir sur les idées fausses que l'on se fait actuellement du silence et sur les limites subséquentes à l'étude des silences communicationnels? Abstract Stille als Geste. Neue Überlegungen zum Wesen kommunikativer Stille Stille und Rede werden oft in Abhängigkeit voneinander definiert und häufig als Gegensätze wahrgenommen, wobei Rede in dieser Dichotomie Vorrang genießt, während Stille eher negativ als das Fehlen von Rede wahrgenommen wird. Als eine Konsequenz dieses binären Denkens, bleibt es Wissenschaftlern unmöglich, das volle Ausmaß von Bedeutungen und Verwendungen von Stille in menschlicher Interaktion zu untersuchen und deren kommunikative Macht zu verstehen. Merleau-Ponty beschrieb Sprache als eine Geste möglich gemacht durch die Tatsache, dass wir Körper in einer physischen Welt sind. Sprache verhüllt oder bekleidet Gedanken nicht, Ideen materialisieren sich als Sprache, gesprochen oder geschrieben. Wenn Stille, und so argumentiere ich hier, vergleichbar aber auch verschieden von Sprache ist, kann man Stille möglicherweise auch als Geste verstehen. Verständen wir Stille als verkörpert, anstatt einfach nur als einen Hintergrund für ausgedrückte Gedanken, als eine Verbindung zwischen phänomenalen und existentiellen Körpern, wie kann dies dann die aktuelle Misskonzeptualisierungen von Stille beeinflussen und daraus folgend Einschränkungen bei der Untersuchung von kommunikativer Stille aufzeigen? Resumen El Silencio como un Gesto: Repensando la Naturaleza de los Silencios Comunicativos El silencio y el habla son a menudo definidos en relación de uno con otro. En muchos estudios, los 2 son percibidos como polarmente opuestos; el habla disfruta de la primacía en esta dicotomía, mientras que el silencio es percibido negativamente como la falta del habla. Como una consecuencia de este pensamiento binario, los estudiosos permanecen inhabilitados para estudiar el rango completo de los significados y usos del silencio en las interacciones humanas, y para reconocer su poder comunicativo. Merleau-Ponty describió el lenguaje como un gesto, hecho posible por el hecho de que somos cuerpos en un mundo físico. El lenguaje no desarrolla ó viste ese pensamiento; las ideas se materializan como personificados en el lenguaje ya sea hablado ó escrito. Si el silencio es, como yo expongo aquí, como el habla así como es diferente del habla, tal vez el silencio pueda ser un gesto también. En vez de ser simplemente un antecedente del pensamiento expresado, si consideramos al silencio como un ser personificado, como una pareja de los cuerpos fenomenales y existentes, cómo podría eso afectar las concepciones corrientes equivocadas sobre el silencio y sus limitaciones subsecuentes para el estudio de los silencios comunicativos? ZhaiYao Yo yak [source] | ||||||||||||||||