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Philosophical Problems (philosophical + problem)
Selected AbstractsBelief, Providence and Eschatology: Some Philosophical Problems in Islamic TheismPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 1 2008Imran Aijaz Traditional Islamic theism gives us a certain picture of the world, in which the concepts of belief, providence and eschatology are involved. According to the traditional picture, belief in God is a universal phenomenon. This is because God has providentially arranged the world in such a manner that the signs of God are everywhere and which lead to knowledge of His existence. And, because the world is ,providentially unambiguous', those who do not have faith in God are culpable for their lack of it, and therefore deserve eternal punishment in hell. In this paper, I argue that this traditional picture is simply false, or at the very least seriously contestable. I also explore the implications of my argument for those who might be interested in assessing the viability of some form of (Islamic) ,revisionary theism', in which the concepts of belief, providence and eschatology feature. [source] THE GAP IS SEMANTIC, NOT EPISTEMOLOGICALRATIO, Issue 2 2007Giuseppina D'Oro This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and McGinn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind-body problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances.1 [source] Making History, Talking about HistoryHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2001José Carlos Bermejo Barrera Making history,in the sense of writing it,is often set against talking about it, with most historians considering writing history to be better than talking about it. My aim in this article is to analyze the topic of making history versus talking about history in order to understand most historians' evident decision to ignore talking about history. Ultimately my goal is to determine whether it is possible to talk about history with any sense. To this end, I will establish a typology of the different forms of talking practiced by historians, using a chronological approach, from the Greek andRoman emphasis on the visual witness to present-day narrativism and textual analysis. Having recognized the peculiar textual character of the historiographical work, I will then discuss whether one can speak of a method for analyzing historiographical works. After considering two possible approaches,the philosophy of science and literary criticism,I offer my own proposal. This involves breaking the dichotomy between making and talking about history, adopting a fuzzy method that overcomes the isolation of self-named scientific communities, and that destroys the barriers among disciplines that work with the same texts but often from mutually excluding perspectives. Talking about history is only possible if one knows about history and about its sources and methods, but also about the foundations of the other social sciences and about the continuing importance of traditional philosophical problems of Western thought in the fields of history and the human sciences. [source] Introduction: The Question of Method in Philosophy of EducationJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 3 2009CLAUDIA RUITENBERG It is possible to raise and solve philosophical problems with no very clear idea of what philosophy is, what it is trying to do, and how it can best do it; but no great progress can be made until these questions have been asked and some answer to them given (Collingwood, 2005, p. 1). [source] On the use of non-local prior densities in Bayesian hypothesis testsJOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY: SERIES B (STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY), Issue 2 2010Valen E. Johnson Summary., We examine philosophical problems and sampling deficiencies that are associated with current Bayesian hypothesis testing methodology, paying particular attention to objective Bayes methodology. Because the prior densities that are used to define alternative hypotheses in many Bayesian tests assign non-negligible probability to regions of the parameter space that are consistent with null hypotheses, resulting tests provide exponential accumulation of evidence in favour of true alternative hypotheses, but only sublinear accumulation of evidence in favour of true null hypotheses. Thus, it is often impossible for such tests to provide strong evidence in favour of a true null hypothesis, even when moderately large sample sizes have been obtained. We review asymptotic convergence rates of Bayes factors in testing precise null hypotheses and propose two new classes of prior densities that ameliorate the imbalance in convergence rates that is inherited by most Bayesian tests. Using members of these classes, we obtain analytic expressions for Bayes factors in linear models and derive approximations to Bayes factors in large sample settings. [source] EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN LIGHT OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH RESEARCHBIOETHICS, Issue 2 2009SRIDHAR VENKATAPURAM ABSTRACT The present article identifies how social determinants of health raise two categories of philosophical problems that also fall within the smaller domain of ethics; one set pertains to the philosophy of epidemiology, and the second set pertains to the philosophy of health and social justice. After reviewing these two categories of ethical concerns, the limited conclusion made is that identifying and responding to social determinants of health requires inter-disciplinary reasoning across epidemiology and philosophy. For the reasoning used in epidemiology to be sound, for its scope and (moral) purpose as a science to be clarified as well as for social justice theory to be relevant and coherent, epidemiology and philosophy need to forge a meaningful exchange of ideas that happens in both directions. [source] |