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Philosophical Inquiry (philosophical + inquiry)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Medical Sciences	60%
Humanities and Social Sciences	40%

Selected Abstracts

Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance , Edited by Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz

RELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 4 2009
Severin V. Kitanov
No abstract is available for this article. [source]

The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2003
Linda Zagzebski
Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowingp better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life. [source]

Towards a strong virtue ethics for nursing practice

NURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2006
Alan E. Armstrong rn(g) ba(hons) ma phd
Abstract, Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including anxiety, fear, powerlessness, and vulnerability. There is much debate on the ,therapeutic' or ,helping' nurse,patient relationship. However, despite the current agenda regarding patient-centred care, the literature concerning the development of good interpersonal responses and the view that a satisfactory nursing ethics should focus on persons and character traits rather than actions, nursing ethics is dominated by the traditional obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontology. I critically examine these theories and the role of duty-based notions in both general ethics and nursing practice. Because of well-established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based moral theories are incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. I examine the work of Hursthouse on virtue ethics' action guidance and the v-rules. I argue that the moral virtues and a strong (action-guiding) version of virtue ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-based approach to nursing. The latter is characterized by three features: (1) exercising the moral virtues such as compassion; (2) using judgement; and (3) using moral wisdom, understood to include at least moral perception, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination. Merits and problems of the virtue-based approach are examined. I relate the work of MacIntyre to nursing and I conceive nursing as a practice: nurses who exercise the virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the practice of nursing and thus prevent the marginalization of the virtues. The strong practice-based version of virtue ethics proposed is context-dependent, particularist, and relational. Several areas for future philosophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to develop this account yet further. [source]

Philosophy of technology and nursing

NURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2002
Alan Barnard RN BA MA PhD MRCNA
Abstract This paper outlines the background and significance of philosophy of technology as a focus of inquiry emerging within nursing scholarship and research. The thesis of the paper is that philosophy of technology and nursing is fundamental to discipline development and our role in enhancing health care. It is argued that we must further our responsibility and interest in critiquing current and future health care systems through philosophical inquiry into the experience, meaning and implications of technology. This paper locates nurses as important contributors to the use and integration of health care technology and identifies nursing as a discipline that can provide specific insights into the health experience(s) of individuals, cultures and societies. Nurses are encouraged to undertake further examination of epistemological, ontological and ethical challenges to arise from technology as a focus of philosophical inquiry. The advancement of philosophy of technology and nursing will make a profound contribution to inquiry into the experience of technology, the needs of humanity and the development of appropriate health care. [source]

Navigating ethical discharge planning: A case study in older adult rehabilitation

AUSTRALIAN OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY JOURNAL, Issue 1 2010
Evelyne Durocher
Background:, Ethical issues are becoming more complex as individuals live longer with increased disability and medical needs. This article elucidates common ethical issues encountered in discharge planning with older adults. Methods:, We conducted normative ethical analysis of a clinical case using methods of philosophical inquiry, including thick description, reflexivity, conceptual clarification and examination of competing arguments for internal consistency. Results:, The analysis demonstrates how health-care teams struggle to balance protection from harm while honouring informed choices. We argue that ethical discharge planning requires judicious identification of client values, even if these conflict with team determinations of best interests. Conclusion:, Dialogue is needed to identify risks, help clients determine their personal level of acceptable risk and determine provisions to minimise risks. [source]