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Perceptual Experience (perceptual + experience)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	73%
Psychology	10%
Life Sciences	10%

Selected Abstracts

Perceptual Experience , Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 234 2009
Paul Coates
First page of article [source]

I,Andy Clark COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY AND THE SENSORIMOTOR FRONTIER

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2006
Andy Clark
ABSTRACT What is the relation between perceptual experience and the suite of sensorimotor skills that enable us to act in the very world we perceive? The relation, according to ,sensorimotor models' (O'Regan and Noë 2001, Noë 2004) is tight indeed. Perceptual experience, on these accounts, is enacted via skilled sensorimotor activity, and gains its content and character courtesy of our knowledge of the relations between (typically) movement and sensory stimulation. I shall argue that this formulation is too extreme, and that it fails to accommodate the substantial firewalls, dis-integrations, and special-purpose streamings that form the massed strata of human cognition. In particular, such strong sensorimotor models threaten to obscure the computationally potent insensitivity of key information-processing events to the full subtleties of embodied cycles of sensing and moving. [source]

A Neglected Account of Perception

DIALECTICA, Issue 3 2008
Tom Stoneham
I aim to draw the reader's attention to an easily overlooked account of perception, namely that there are no perceptual experiences, that to perceive something is to stand in an external, purely non-Leibnizian relation to it. I introduce the Purely Relational account of perception by discussing a case of it being overlooked in the writings of G.E. Moore, though we also find the same move in J. Cook Wilson, so it has nothing to do with an affection for sense-data. I then discuss the relation between the PR account and recent disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, and note that the PR account has some claim to be the only one that truly respects the directness of perception. The paper does not aspire to persuade the reader of the correctness of the neglected PR account, merely that it should be treated as a serious candidate in philosophical debates about perception. [source]

Independent mechanisms for ventriloquism and multisensory integration as revealed by theta-burst stimulation

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE, Issue 10 2010
Caterina Bertini
Abstract The visual and auditory systems often concur to create a unified perceptual experience and to determine the localization of objects in the external world. Co-occurring auditory and visual stimuli in spatial coincidence are known to enhance performance of auditory localization due to the integration of stimuli from different sensory channels (i.e. multisensory integration). However, auditory localization of audiovisual stimuli presented at spatial disparity might also induce a mislocalization of the sound towards the visual stimulus (i.e. ventriloquism effect). Using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation we tested the role of right temporoparietal (rTPC), right occipital (rOC) and right posterior parietal (rPPC) cortex in an auditory localization task in which indices of ventriloquism and multisensory integration were computed. We found that suppression of rTPC excitability by means of continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) reduced multisensory integration. No similar effect was found for cTBS over rOC. Moreover, inhibition of rOC, but not of rTPC, suppressed the visual bias in the contralateral hemifield. In contrast, cTBS over rPPC did not produce any modulation of ventriloquism or integrative effects. The double dissociation found in the present study suggests that ventriloquism and audiovisual multisensory integration are functionally independent phenomena and may be underpinned by partially different neural circuits. [source]

That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2007
Benj Hellie
A gift of a dollar for each article in the philosophy of perception and consciousness published since 1990 making reference, explicitly or implicitly, to Moore's discussion in the second half of Moore 19031 of an alleged ,transparency' and ,diaphanousness' pertaining to some aspect of perceptual experience would very likely cover the tab of a mid-priced dinner for two.2 Moore's poetically expressed observations have captured the imagination of contemporary philosophers of perception and consciousness, and have served as the basis of much fruitful discussion in those areas. Still, despite all the attention these observations have received, the contemporary literature lacks a close reading of the second half of Moore's paper, without which it is impossible to understand Moore's observations in the context in which they were originally expressed. It is understandable that such a close reading is lacking: the second half of Moore's paper has been rightly described by one of his most sympathetic and dedicated interpreters as ,extremely dense and opaque' (Klemke 2000: 55).3 But despite the evident difficulties of the task, I aim here, with some trepidation, to provide the missing close reading. The main points of my interpretation will be these. The centerpiece of the anti-idealist manoeuvrings of the second half of the paper is a phenomenological argument for what I will call a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, ,that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric.4 The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be. My discussion will proceed as follows. In section 1, I will discuss some theses and elucidate some notions from the philosophy of perception and consciousness which will be central to my interpretation; having done so, I will be in a position to explain how an accurate understanding of Moore may contribute to theoretical advances in the philosophy of perception and consciousness. The next two sections contain the exegetical heart of the paper: section 2 provides an analysis of Moore's case for the relational view; section 3 attempts to explain the place of the relational view in the overall refutation of idealism. Section 4 critically discusses a pair of competing interpretations. Section 5 wraps things up, drawing concluding morals as to the campaigns on behalf of which Moore should and should not be enlisted. [source]

Functional brain mapping during free viewing of natural scenes

HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING, Issue 2 2004
Andreas Bartels
Abstract Previous imaging studies have used mostly perceptually abstracted, idealized, or static stimuli to show segregation of function in the cerebral cortex. We wanted to learn whether functional segregation is maintained during more natural, complex, and dynamic conditions when many features have to be processed simultaneously, and identify regions whose activity correlates with the perception of specific features. To achieve this, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity when human observers viewed freely dynamic natural scenes (a James Bond movie). The intensity with which they perceived different features (color, faces, language, and human bodies) was assessed psychometrically in separate sessions. In all subjects different features were perceived with a high degree of independence over time. We found that the perception of each feature correlated with activity in separate, specialized areas whose activity also varied independently. We conclude that even in natural conditions, when many features have to be processed simultaneously, functional specialization is preserved. Our method thus opens a new way of brain mapping, which allows the localization of a multitude of brain areas based on a single experiment using uncontrolled, natural stimuli. Furthermore, our results show that the intensity of activity in a specialized area is linearly correlated with the intensity of its perceptual experience. This leads us to suggest that each specialized area is directly responsible for the creation of a feature-specific conscious percept (a microconsciousness). Hum. Brain Mapp. 21:75,83, 2004. © 2003 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source]

Perspectives on the Past: A Study of the Spatial Perspectival Characteristics of Recollective Memories

MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 2 2007
DOROTHEA DEBUS
I begin by considering the ,Past-Dependency-Claim', which states that every recollective memory (or ,R-memory') has its spatial perspectival characteristics in virtue of the subject's present awareness of the spatial perspectival characteristics of a relevant past perceptual experience. Although the Past-Dependency-Claim might for various reasons seem particularly attractive, I show that it is false. I then proceed to develop and defend the ,Present-Dependency-Claim', namely the claim that the spatial perspectival characteristics of an R-memory depend on the spatial perspectival characteristics of perceptual experiences that the subject has at the time at which the R-memory occurs. Lastly, I discuss the phenomenon of so-called ,observer-memories', which presents a special challenge for any attempt to account for the spatial perspectival characteristics of R-memories. I argue that we have no good reason to deny that the relevant experiences should count as memories, and I show that we can account for the spatial perspectival characteristics of observer-memories with the help of the ,Present-Dependency-Claim'. More generally, the paper shows that certain events that occur in a subject's mental life (namely, a subject's R-memories) are necessarily dependent on other events that occur in the relevant subject's mental life (namely, on certain perceptual experiences). This more general conclusion in turn should be relevant for any attempt to develop an appropriate account of a subject's mental life as a whole. [source]

Augmenting the Cartesian medical discourse with an understanding of the person's lifeworld, lived body, life story and social identity

NURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2009
Helena Sunvisson RN PhD
Abstract Using three paradigm cases of persons living with Parkinson's Disease (PD) the authors make a case for augmenting and enriching a Cartesian medical account of the pathophysiology of PD with an enriched understanding of the lived body experience of PD, the lived implications of PD for a particular person's concerns and coping with the illness. Linking and adding a thick description of the lived experience of PD can enrich caregiving imagination and attunement to the patient's possibilities, concerns and constraints. The work of Merleau-Ponty is used to articulate the middle terms of the lived experience of dwelling in a lifeworld. Examining lived experience of embodied intentionality, skilled bodily capacities as highlighted in Merleau-Ponty's non-mechanistic physiology opens new therapeutic, coping and caregiving possibilities. Matching temporal rhythms can decrease the stress of being assisted with activities of daily living. For example, caregivers and patients alike can be taught strategies for extending their lived bodily capacities by altering rhythms, by shifting hyperactivity to different parts of the body and other strategies that change the perceptual experience associated with walking in different environment. A medical account of the pathophysiology of PD is nessessary and useful, but not sufficient for designing caregiving in ways that enrich and extend the existential skills of dwelling of persons with PD. The dominance of mechanistic physiology makes caregivers assume that it is the ,real discourse' about the disease, causing researchers and caregivers alike to overlook the equally real lived experience of the patient which requires different descriptive discourses and different sources of understanding. Lack of dialogue between the two discourses is tragic for patients because caregivers need both in order to provide attuned, effective caregiving. [source]

PERCEPTION AND THE REACH OF PHENOMENAL CONTENT

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 236 2009
Tim Bayne
The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ,No', whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ,Yes'. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception. [source]

I,Andy Clark COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY AND THE SENSORIMOTOR FRONTIER

PHENOMENOLOGY AND INTERPRETATION BEYOND THE FLESH

ART HISTORY, Issue 4 2009
AMANDA BOETZKES
This article explores the ethical questions surrounding the phenomenological approach to interpretation in art history. It addresses contemporary art, from postminimalist sculpture to installation. Although the risk of phenomenology is that it merely confirms and reproduces the viewer's perceptual expectations, in fact, on a deeper level, the notion of the ontological intertwining of the viewer and the artwork demands a receptive stance in the face of art. Through an investigation of the notions of embodiment, intentionality, and mode of confrontation, I suggest that phenomenology not only mediates a trenchant understanding of the perceptual experience of the artwork, it is predicated on an acknowledgement of the artwork's alterity from interpretation. In this way, it invites a consideration of the linguistic malleability implicit in the fleshly chiasm that binds the viewer to the artwork. [source]

Perception With Compensatory Devices: From Sensory Substitution to Sensorimotor Extension

COGNITIVE SCIENCE - A MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL, Issue 6 2009
Malika Auvray
Abstract Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience (Grice, 1962), to which we have added the criteria of behavioral equivalence (Morgan, 1977), dedication (Keeley, 2002), and sensorimotor equivalence (O'Regan & Noë, 2001). We discuss which of them are fulfilled by perception through sensory substitution devices and whether this favors the view that perception belongs to the substituting or to the substituted modality. Though the application of a number of criteria might be taken to point to the conclusion that perception with a sensory substitution device belongs to the substituted modality, we argue that the evidence leads to an alternative view on sensory substitution. According to this view, the experience after sensory substitution is a transformation, extension, or augmentation of our perceptual capacities, rather than being something equivalent or reducible to an already existing sensory modality. We develop this view by comparing sensory substitution devices to other "mind-enhancing tools" such as pen and paper, sketchpads, or calculators. An analysis of sensory substitution in terms of mind-enhancing tools unveils it as a thoroughly transforming perceptual experience and as giving rise to a novel form of perceptual interaction with the environment. [source]

A Neglected Account of Perception

A Certain Je Ne Sais Quoi

HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH, Issue 2 2005
Verbalization Bias in Evaluation
People's evaluations of stimuli may change when they verbally attempt to communicate the reasons underlying their judgments. The reported experiments demonstrate the interactive influence of expertise, verbalizability (i.e., the ease with which stimulus features can be linguistically encoded), and appraisal mode in the verbalization bias phenomenon. In Experiment 1, art novices and experts rated their liking of artworks with compositional features that were easy (e.g., figurative,naturalistic) or difficult (e.g., abstract) to verbalize. When asked to verbalize the reasons underlying their judgments, novices assigned lower ratings to abstract but not figurative works. Experts, in contrast, were not influenced by the verbalization manipulation. Experiment 2 explored the possibility that verbalization bias is attributable to a componential appraisal mode that verbalization induces, rather than the specific reasons that people articulate. We found that verbalizing reasons for liking or disliking one abstract work influenced art novices' judgments of a second work for which they did not attempt to verbalize reasons. Moreover, those who merely attempted to verbalize their perceptual experiences also exhibited this contamination effect. The results of both studies suggest that verbalizing the attributes of complex stimuli can significantly alter the way we evaluate these stimuli. [source]

In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience

MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 3 2009
KATHRIN GLÜER
Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ,phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience. [source]

Perspectives on the Past: A Study of the Spatial Perspectival Characteristics of Recollective Memories

Novel Colours and the Content of Experience

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2003
Fiona Macpherson
The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation. [source]

Psychological processes and paranoia: implications for forensic behavioural science

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 3 2006
Richard P. Bentall Ph.D.
Paranoid delusions have recently become the focus of empirical research. In this article, we review studies of the psychological mechanisms that might be involved in paranoid thinking and discuss their implications for forensic behaviour science. Paranoia has not been consistently associated with any specific neuropsychological abnormality. However, evidence supports three broad types of mechanism that might be involved in delusional thinking in general and paranoia in particular: anomalous perceptual experiences, abnormal reasoning, and motivational factors. There is some evidence that paranoia may be associated with hearing loss, and good evidence that paranoid patients attend excessively to threatening information. Although general reasoning ability seems to be unaffected, there is strong evidence that a jumping- to-conclusions style of reasoning about data is implicated in delusions in general, but less consistent evidence specifically linking paranoia to impaired theory of mind. Finally, there appears to be a strong association between paranoia and negative self-esteem, and some evidence that attempts to protect self-esteem by attributing negative events to external causes are implicated. Some of these processes have recently been implicated in violent behaviour, and they therefore have the potential to explain the apparent association between paranoid delusions and offending. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]