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Pension Reform (pension + reform)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

The Politics of Social Learning: Finance, Institutions, and Pension Reform in the United States and Canada

GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2006
DANIEL BÉLANDArticle first published online: 27 OCT 200
Because the traditional concept of social learning has faced significant criticism in recent years, more analytical work is required to back the claim that the lessons drawn from existing institutional legacies can truly impact policy outcomes. Grounded in the historical institutionalist literature, this article formulates an amended concept of social learning through the analysis of the relationship between finance, social learning, and institutional legacies in the 1990s debate over the reform of earnings-related pension schemes in the United States and Canada. The article shows how social learning related to specific ideological assumptions and policy legacies in the public and the private sectors has affected policymaking processes. At the theoretical level, this contribution stresses the political construction of learning processes, which is distinct from the technocratic model featured in the traditional literature on social learning. This article also distinguishes between high- and low-profile social learning while emphasizing the impact of private policy legacies on learning processes. [source]

The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Eastern Europe

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 2-3 2001
Katharina Müller
The retirement schemes in several East European countries underwent fundamental change in recent years, defying conventional wisdom in welfare state research. This article takes a new look at the determinants of paradigm choice in the area of old-age security, comparing the Polish, Hungarian and Czech experience from an actor-centred institutionalist perspective. The author points out that structural factors , notably the financial situation of retirement schemes and the level of external debt , largely determined the set of main pension reform actors, as well as their relative strength. The resulting actor constellations produced the basic paradigm choice, based on the actors' respective cognitive maps and consequent perception of pension reform alternatives. Tactical moves and the strategic potentialities of the chosen paradigm were also relevant. [source]

Globalization and Pension Reform in Latin America

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2007
Sarah M. Brooks
ABSTRACT While financial globalization has created powerful incentives for Latin American governments to privatize old age pension systems, reliance on short-term capital flows has also constrained the ability of cash-strapped governments to enact that reform. Analysis of the technocratic process of pension reform in Argentina and Brazil provides evidence. Instead of simply generating unidirectional pressures for structural pension reform, financial globalization has created a double bind for Latin America's capital-scarce governments, fostering long-term incentives to privatize pension systems while heightening the risk of punishment in the short term. [source]

The Politics of Pension Reform: Lessons from Public Attitudes in Greece

POLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2003
Owen O'Donnell
While the construction of a rational case for pension reform is often straightforward, the political implementation of such reform can be somewhat more difficult. In large part, this can be attributed to sceptical public opinion. The precise role played by public opinion in constraining the political feasibility of pension reform is, however, unclear. The purpose of this paper is to distil the ways in which public attitudes influence pension reform. This is done through examining survey data from Greece, where progress with the implementation of pension reform has been particularly modest. Political opposition to pension reform appears to be rooted in a general lack of public appreciation of the case for reform combined with the desire to protect interest group privileges. Public ignorance and insecurity breed attitudes not conducive to reform. Public attitudes do not simply act as a given constraint on reform but are a product of the structure of the pension system and the reform process itself. In this path-dependent process, implementation of a reform agenda of rationalisation is more difficult from the starting point of a severely fragmented and distorted system. [source]