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Pension Policies (pension + policy)
Selected AbstractsDistributional Impacts of Pension Policy in Argentina: Winners and Losers within and Across GenerationsINTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 3 2006Camila Arza The paper deals with the life-cycle intra- and intergenerational income transfers operated by the pension system in Argentina by estimating the internal rates of return obtained by different generations and types of workers from their participation in the system. The empirical analysis confirms that earlier generations of workers benefited from higher social security returns than later generations, which retired under a matured system with large deficits. The worst-affected cohorts were those born after 1920, particularly suffering from a social security crisis and falling real wages. For future generations retiring fully under the new mixed pension system, returns will more closely depend on financial market performance and the evolution of administration costs. Intragenerational transfers were also observed for all cohorts under study, as a result of the original system design as well as adjustments adopted during the implementation process. The real distributional impact of progressive benefit formulas could, however, be offset by state transfers to cover pension deficits and forward tax shifting in a context of unequal pension coverage. [source] The Tax Consequences of Long-Run Pension Policy,JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2006Fischer Black A firm's pension fund is legally separate from the firm. But because pension benefits are normally independent of fund performance, pension assets impact the firm very much as if they were firm assets. Because they are worth more when times are good and less when times are bad, common stocks in the pension fund add to the sponsoring firm's leverage. They cause contributions to a pension fund to be high just when the firm can least afford to pay them. Conversely, bonds in the pension fund will make it easier for the firm to avoid default on its own bonds when times are bad all over: The more bonds a pension fund buys, the more the firm can borrow. The tax treatment accorded the pension fund differs notably from that accorded the firm. Some have argued that a firm can capitalize on the difference by accelerating the funding of its pension plan. The benefits of full funding are wasted, however, unless the added contributions to the fund are invested in bonds; higher pension contributions now mean lower contributions later, hence higher taxes later. The benefits come from earning, after taxes, the pretax interest rate on the bonds in the pension fund. If the firm wants to take advantage of the differing tax treatment of bonds without altering the level of its current pension contributions, it can (1) sell stocks in the pension fund and then buy bonds with the proceeds while (2) issuing debt in the firm and buying back its own shares with the proceeds. An investment in the firm's own stock creates no more tax liability than an investment in stocks through the pension fund. [source] Ageing and the tax implied in public pension schemes: simulations for selected OECD countriesFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2004Robert Fenge Abstract A key figure suited to measuring intergenerational imbalances in unfunded public pension schemes is given by the ,implicit tax rate' imposed on each generation's lifetime income. The implicit tax arises from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits fall short of actuarial returns to contributions paid to these systems while actively working. Under current pension policies, implicit tax rates will increase sharply for younger generations in most industrialised countries. In this paper, this is illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Nevertheless, there are remarkable differences across countries regarding both the level of implicit taxes and their development over successive age cohorts, which can be attributed to differences in ageing processes and in the institutional features of national pension systems. In addition, we can demonstrate how effective different approaches to pension reform are in smoothing the intergenerational profile of implicit tax rates. [source] The Political Power of the Retirees in a Two-Dimensional Voting ModelJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2003Georges Casamatta We show that the retirees are able to obtain favorable pension policies whereas they belong to a minority in the population. The argument relies on the multidimensional nature of the political process. We consider a two-dimensional collective choice problem. The first of these choices is the level of the contribution rate to the Pay-As-You-Go pension system. The second is a noneconomic decision, unrelated to the pension system. Using a political agency model, we show that, as soon as the retirees are sufficiently numerous, the equilibrium tax rate may be higher than the tax rate preferred by the young, who yet constitute a majority over the pension issue. [source] Perspektiven der Alterssicherungspolitik in Deutschland ,Über Konzeptionen, Vorschläge und einen angestrebten ParadigmenwechselPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 4 2000Winfried Schmähl The paper outlines different concepts for designing pension policies linked to current reform proposals in Germany. The role of the state, mandatory or voluntary savings for old age and the primary objectives and types of income redistribution aimed at by the design of pension schemes are central. In contrast to the economic debate which is dominated by the topic pay-as-you-go (PAYG) versus funding, the author argues that it is especially important to deal with changes within the major German PAYG-financed scheme in order to realize positive economic and social effects, especially by a close contribution??benefit link as part of a broader reform concept. There are, however, limits to an overall reduction of the pension level in such a pension scheme, if a close contribution??benefit link is to remain politically acceptable. Here this is demonstrated by current reform proposals for substituting a major part of PAYG pensions by funded pensions in Germany. The paper also points out some hidden, implicit and long-term effects of such a strategy. Finally, the author refers to some often neglected effects in mainstream proposals for a major shift towards funding. [source] Welfare Regimes for Aging Populations: No Single Path for ReformPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 4 2009Mehmet F. Aysan We consider recent trends in pension policies in OECD countries in light of demographic aging associated with welfare regime type (Liberal, Social Democratic, Continental, and Southern European). These regime types represent different responsibilities assumed for social security on the part of the market, the state, and the family. While there are significant differences in labor market characteristics, the demographic similarities in aging bring similar pressures for pension reforms across OECD countries. These reforms address fiscal issues in state pensions, typically by increasing the length of the working life, placing more of the pension responsibility on individuals, or converting to defined-contribution approaches. Our study shows that there is no single path for pension reform. While there are some variations, welfare states tend to follow their traditional paths, which differ across welfare regime types. [source] The World Bank Approach to Pension ReformINTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 1 2000Robert Holzmann This paper highlights the World Bank's thinking and worldwide involvement in pension reform. Both are driven by the Bank's mandate to help countries develop economically and to reduce poverty. The Bank has four key concerns in working with clients on pension policy: (1) short-term financing and long-term financial viability; (2) effects on economic growth; (3) adequacy and other distributive issues; and (4) political risk and sustainability. In response to these concerns and after review of the three main reform options for unfunded systems - mere PAYG reform, a rapid and complete shift to a mandatory funded system, and a gradual shift to a multipillar scheme - the Bank clearly favours the multipillar approach but in a pragmatic and country-specific manner. When helping to implement a pension reform the Bank fully takes account of country preferences and circumstances, bases its support on sound reform criteria, links the client assistance with knowledge management, provides training and other measures to enhance the reform capacity of a country, and seeks cooperation with other international institutions. In addition, the Bank has a comprehensive research agenda to improve the working of multipillar schemes, and the investigations include issues of coverage, administrative costs and annuities. [source] Ideas, Economic Pressures, and Pension PrivatizationLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2005Raúl L. Madrid ABSTRACT This article maintains that the recent wave of pension privatization has been spurred largely by rising pension expenditures and chronic capital shortages. Many policymakers in Latin America and around the world believed that privatizing their public pension systems would boost their domestic savings rate and resolve the systems' financial problems, thereby reducing their dependence on unstable foreign capital and freeing resources for other, more productive uses. There is no clear evidence that pension privatization will bring these economic benefits, however. To understand why policymakers held these beliefs, we must examine how ideas about pension privatization have formed. Two particularly important factors are the Chilean model and the World Bank's growing influence on pension policy. A probit analysis of the determinants of pension privatization provides support for these arguments. [source] |