Pessimistic View (pessimistic + view)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Art Museums, Old Paintings, and Our Knowledge of the Past

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2001
David Carrier
Art museums frequently remove old paintings from their original settings. In the process, the context of these works of art changes dramatically. Do museums then preserve works of art? To answer this question, I consider an imaginary painting, The Travels and Tribulations of Piero's Baptism of Christ, depicting the history of display of Piero della Francesca's Baptism of Christ. This example suggests that how Piero's painting is seen does depend upon its setting. According to the Intentionalist, such changes in context have no real influence upon the meaning of Piero's painting, and consequently museums can be said to preserve works of art. According to the Skeptic, if such changes are drastic enough, we can no longer identify the picture's original meaning, and museums thus fail to preserve works of art. Skepticism deserves attention, for such varied influential commentators as Theodore Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Maurice Blanchot, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, Hans Sedlmayr, and Paul Valéry hold this pessimistic view of museums. I develop the debate between the Intentionalist and the Skeptic. Ultimately skepticism is indefensible, I argue, because it fails to take account of the continuities in the history of art's display. But Intentionalism is also deficient because it is ahistorical. In presenting the history of Piero's painting, The Travels and Tribulations of Piero's Baptism of Christ shows that we can re-identify the original significance of Piero's work and the recognizable continuities that obtain through its changes. It thus makes sense to claim that at least in certain circumstances art museums can preserve works of art. [source]


Maternal expectations about infant development of pre-term and full-term infants: a cross-national comparison

INFANT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 1 2006
Y. van Beek
Abstract In three European regions (The Netherlands, Northern Italy and Southern Italy) we investigated whether mothers of healthy pre-term infants (n=92) adjust their expectations for the timing of developmental milestones in the first years of life as compared to mothers of full-term infants (n=140). We examined whether these adjustments could be seen as reflecting a pessimistic view, as would be predicted from the ,prematurity stereotype' perspective. Partial corrections for prematurity were regularly made, but no indications were found for an overly pessimistic view. Moreover, the differences between the regions in the anticipated timing of mastery of milestones were larger than the effects of prematurity. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


A Notional Worlds Approach to Confusion

MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 2 2007
KRISTA LAWLOR
How should we assign semantic values to confused statements? Recently, philosophers have taken a pessimistic view of confusion, arguing that understanding confused belief demands significant departure from our normal interpretive practice. I argue for optimism. Our semantic treatment of confusion can be a lot like our semantic treatment of empty names. Surprisingly, perhaps, the resulting semantics lets us keep in place more of our everyday interpretive practices in the face of confused belief. [source]


Book Review Feature: Two Reviews of The Challenge of Affulence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and Britain Since 1950,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 521 2007
Andrew J. Oswald
Is affluence a good thing? The book The Challenge of Affluence by Avner Offer (2006) argues that economic prosperity weakens self-control and undermines human well-being. Consistent with a pessimistic view, we show that psychological distress has been rising through time in modern Great Britain. Taking over-eating as an example, our data reveal that half the British population view themselves as overweight, and that happiness and mental health are worse among fatter people in Britain and Germany. Comparisons also matter. We discuss problems of inference and argue that longitudinal data are needed. We suggest a theory of obesity imitation where utility depends on relative weight. [source]