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Pay Structures (pay + structure)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	80%

Selected Abstracts

National Culture and Industrial Relations and Pay Structures

LABOUR, Issue 2 2001
Boyd Black
The paper develops an explanatory model of comparative industrial relations and labour market structures based on national culture. The four cultural variables derived by Hofstede (Culture's Consequences, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984) are used to investigate the relationship between national culture and various dimensions of industrial relations and pay structures. The paper finds national culture to be associated with the centralization of bargaining, the extent of corporatism, the degree of co-ordination in bargaining, the coverage of collective bargaining, trade union density, the extent of worker participation in decision making, and most dimensions of the pay structure. Hofstede's MAS variable, measuring cultural values representing gender social structuring, is associated with both industrial relations institutions and the pay structure. The results provide support for our cultural model. [source]

Managerial expertise, learning potential and dynamic incentives: get more for less?

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2007
Christian LukasArticle first published online: 16 APR 200
In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that learning-by-doing has in a given task. Absent a managerial labor market, depending on an agent's learning potential, a monotone or non-monotone pay structure may be optimal. The second important result is that using agents' ability distributions as inputs to information systems, higher learning potentials lead to less costly information systems, i.e. actions can be implemented at lower costs. Additionally, it is proven that the criteria cost minimization and value maximization are equivalent in the model's context. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

PAY SATISFACTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES

PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2005
STEVEN C. CURRALL
Using multi level and multi method data, we investigated the relationship between pay satisfaction and outcomes at the organizational level of analysis. Individual-level survey data on pay satisfaction (including satisfaction with pay level, satisfaction with pay structure, satisfaction with pay raises, and benefits) were collected from 6,394 public school teachers. Organizational-level outcome data, both survey and archival, were collected from the 117 public school districts employing these teachers. With respect to its influence on organizational outcomes, pay satisfaction was positively related to school district-level academic performance and negatively related to average teacher intention to quit. We also explored the relationship between district-level union satisfaction and pay satisfaction, which was found to be positive. We discuss implications of our findings for for-profit companies that are knowledge based and human capital intensive (e.g., the service sector) and address possible future directions for research on pay satisfaction. [source]

Pay determination in small firms in the UK: the case of the response to the National Minimum Wage

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 1 2002
Mark Gilman
Pay determination in small firms is widely expected to follow the dictates of the market. Research on 81 firms in three competitive sectors finds, instead, loosely defined and variable pay structures. This variability is explained in terms of the interplay between labour and product markets, firms' own choices, and ,shocks' such as the National Minimum Wage. This analysis thus contributes to developing institutional theories of labour markets and pay systems. [source]

The Financial Crisis: Causes and Lessons,

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2010
Kenneth E. Scott
The author argues that the root cause of the recent crisis was a housing bubble whose origins can be traced to loose monetary policy and a government housing policy that continually pushed for lower lending standards to increase home ownership. The negative consequences of such policies were amplified when transmitted throughout the financial system by financial institutions through the process of securitization. In attempting to assess culpability for the crisis and identify possible reforms, the author focuses on three categories: 1Defects in Financial Products: Without criticizing derivatives and the process of securitization, the author identifies the sheer complexity of the securities as a major source of the problem,for which the solution is a simpler security design combined with greater disclosure about the underlying assets being securitized. 2Defects in Risk Management: Thanks in large part to agency and other incentive problems, there was universal underestimation of risks by mortgage originators and financial institutions throughout the securitization chain. Changing incentive pay structures is part of the solution, and so are better accounting rules for SPEs. But more effective regulatory oversight and ending "too big to fail" may well be the only way to curb excessive private risk-taking. 3Defects in Government Policy and Regulation: While acknowledging the need for more effective oversight, the author argues that there was ample existing authority for U.S. regulators to have addressed these issues. Lack of power and authority to regulate was not at the heart of the problem,the real problem was lack of foresight and judgment about the unexpected. After expressing doubt that regulators can prevent major financial failures, the author recommends greater attention to devising better methods of resolving such failures when they occur. One of the main goals is to ensure that losses are borne not by taxpayers but by private investors in a way that maintains incentives for market discipline while limiting spillover costs to the entire system. [source]

National Culture and Industrial Relations and Pay Structures

Warum haben wir rigide Arbeitsmärkte?

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 4 2001
Rent-seeking versus Soziale Sicherung
This article argues that unions, job protection, and egalitarian pay structures may have as much to do with social insurance of otherwise uninsurable risks as with rent sharing and vested interests. In support of this more benign complementary hypothesis I discuss a range of historical, theoretical, and empirical evidence. The social insurance perspective changes substantially the assessment of often-proposed reforms of European labour market institutions. The benefits from eliminating labour market rigidities have to be set against the costs of reduced cover of human capital related risk. I also argue that it is unclear whether the forces of globalisation, and the new economy, will force countries to deregulate their labour markets. [source]

THE PATTERN AND EVOLUTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN GREAT BRITAIN,

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2007
DAVID BELL
Government policy on the nature of wage bargaining in the public sector can have important implications for the provision of public services. Using the New Earnings Survey, the Labour Force Survey and the British Household Panel Survey, we examine the size and evolution of public,private sector wage differentials across geographical areas within the UK and over time. Public sector bargaining structures have led to historically high wage premia, although these premia are declining over time. In high-cost low-amenity areas, such as the south-east of England, the public sector underpays relative to the private sector, therefore creating problems in recruitment to and provision of public services. Public sector labour markets are around 40 per cent as responsive to area differences in amenities and costs as are private sector labour markets. Differences in the degree of spatial variation between sectors are likely to remain, leading to persistent problems for the delivery of public services in some parts of the UK. Reform of public sector pay structures is likely to be costly, and so other non-pay policies need to be considered to increase the attractiveness of public sector jobs. [source]

Improving the Recruitment and Retention of Organ Procurement Coordinators: A Survey Study

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION, Issue 6 2009
J. Kress
Organ procurement coordinators (coordinators) employed by organ procurement organizations (OPOs) are critical to the success of organ donation. However, their high turnover rates may threaten the success of organ donation. This cross-sectional study examined employment satisfaction and factors contributing to job turnover among 326 coordinators representing 52 of 58 OPOs (90%) who completed an online survey. Most (93%) respondents reported high levels of job satisfaction, although 26% reported considering leaving their OPO, and 61% perceived a high turnover rate at their OPO. Considerations of leaving the OPO were most likely to emerge at 2 years of employment. To secure coordinator job satisfaction, it is essential that prospective coordinators be adequately prepared and informed about negative as well as positive aspects of this line of work. In hiring, OPOs should recruit more proactively, using their staff as contacts, and seek experience in critical care, intensive care, or other on-call work. To retain satisfied employees, OPOs should offer more education and advancement opportunities and focus on such issues as call and hours, rather than salary per se. OPOs should consider a variety of alternative pay structures, particularly separate on-call pay, whether or not coordinators are actually called into service. [source]