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Participation Constraint (participation + constraint)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Voting on Pensions: A Survey

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 2 2005
Grégory De Walque
Abstract., The paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence, size and political sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems. It proposes a simple framework of analysis (a small, open, two overlapping generation economy model), around which some variants are displayed. Dictatorship of the median voter is assumed. The text is organized to answer the following questions: (i) Do political equilibria with PAYG pension schemes exist? (ii) Why do they emerge? (iii) What are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified?, and finally, (iv) What is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous (e.g. demographic) shock? [source]

Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 506 2005
Sandeep Kapur
We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund managers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund's absolute and relative performance. Investors choose whether or not to delegate their investment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose the optimal contract subject to the fund manager's participation constraint. We find that the impact of relative performance evaluation on the equilibrium equity premium and on portfolio herding critically depends on whether the participation constraint is binding. Simple numerical examples suggest that the increased importance of delegation and relative performance evaluation may lower the equity premium. [source]

Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2000
Fernando Alvarez
We introduce a new equilibrium concept and study its efficiency and asset pricing implications for the environment analyzed by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996). Our equilibrium concept has complete markets and endogenous solvency constraints. These solvency constraints prevent default at the cost of reducing risk sharing. We show versions of the welfare theorems. We characterize the preferences and endowments that lead to equilibria with incomplete risk sharing. We compare the resulting pricing kernel with the one for economies without participation constraints: interest rates are lower and risk premia depend on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Additionally, we show that asset prices depend only on the valuation of agents with substantial idiosyncratic risk. [source]